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ABSTRACT 
 In a profession where people are the greatest assets, the Marine Corps has an 
institutional imperative to understand its manpower processes and continuously seek out 
ways to improve them. This includes understanding how and why we select our 
lieutenant colonel commanders. The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most 
influential billets in the Marine Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only 
have a profound impact on the current and future readiness of the Marine Corps, they also 
influence every military manpower system from recruiting to retention. As such, it 
matters how the Marine Corps selects these commanders. In this thesis, I conduct a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the United States Marine Corps Command 
Screening Program (CSP). Using data from Fiscal Years 2015–2019 Lieutenant Colonel 
Command Selection Boards, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the factors influencing 
selection outcomes, and whether or not the selection outcomes are affected by any 
relationships between the composition of the board and those officers being screened for 
command. I find that the CSP can be improved to meet its desired intent, and factors 
influencing selection outcomes vary between Primaries and Alternates, command types, 
and across years. 
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The Marine Corps has a problem. According to the Marine Corps Operating 
Concept, “The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, and equipped to meet the 
demands of [the] future operating environment” (Neller, 2016, p. 8). Ultimately, this is a 
manpower problem that demands a manpower solution. This solution starts with 
understanding how and why we select our lieutenant colonel commanders. This thesis 
intends to contribute to that understanding. 
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPORTANCE 
The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most influential billets in the 
Marine Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only have a profound impact on 
the current readiness of the Marine Corps, but also have the ability to influence every 
military manpower system, from recruiting and retention to incentives and promotions. 
Commanders at this level have a direct and immediate impact on the operational, 
maintenance, and administrative readiness of the institution writ large. As such, it matters 
how the Marine Corps select these commanders.  
BACKGROUND 
In 1992, the Marine Corps implemented the Command Screening Process (CSP) to 
ensure Marines receive the “best and most fully qualified” leadership. The CSP is intended 
to “provide all eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command” to 
“maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting force” (United States Marine Corps 
[USMC], 2017, p. 1). As part of the CSP, the command selection board is one of the most 
important boards in the Marine Corps because it is the first level of command at which the 
Marine Corps deliberately selects its leaders and decides the future direction of the 
organization. However, the Marine Corps defines CSP success as putting the best and most 
qualified lieutenant colonel in a command billet. The reality is that we, as an institution, do 
not really know if the CSP is meeting its intent. The process may be working and 
comparatively better than other processes, but we have an institutional imperative to 
understand the process and continuously seek out ways to improve it. 
xviii 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
My thesis focuses on how the CSP selects Marine Corps lieutenant colonel 
commanders. Using data from FY2015–FY2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection 
Boards, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the factors influencing selection outcomes, 
and whether or not the selection outcomes are affected by any relationships between the 
composition of the board and those officers being screened for command. To answer my 
research questions, I organize my analysis along four lines of effort: quantitative data, 
survey results, board room observations, and comparisons with civilian organizations. 
My datasets are comprised of 98 board member observations and 2838 eligible 
officer observations and are compiled from three separate sources: personnel data from 
Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW); Fitness Reports from Manpower Management 
Records and Performance Branch (MMRP)–30; and board records and results from 
Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA)–3. My survey includes responses 
from active duty Marine officers who have been board members on the Lieutenant Colonel 
Command Selection Board. Out of the 114 surveyed, there are 29 survey respondents 
spanning boards ranging from FY2006 to FY2019. Additionally, I use information 
obtained through observations during the FY2019 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection 
Board, as well as discussions and observations with employees of both Amazon and the 
Seattle Seahawks organization to compare their hiring and selection processes with those 
of the Marine Corps.  
I use two multivariate regression models in my analysis: Logistic Regression Odds 
Ratios and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I use these models to determine the relationships 
between 1) personnel data and officers that are selected for command, 2) board 
composition and those selected for command, and 3) board voting iterations and an 
officer’s performance while in command. These models indicate how certain variables 
influence the outcome of those lieutenant colonels selected for command. These variables 
include data on both the board members and the eligible officers screened for command, 




ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
I find that I cannot currently conclude whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent 
and selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for command. I do find that 
board members generally agree on how to define “best and most fully qualified” and what 
characterizes a successful command tour. Furthermore, I find that the board is much more 
conclusive when selecting Primaries than Alternates, and what matters for selection varies 
by Command Type and even across time in some cases. The findings also show that on 
average commanders perform well in their billet regardless of when they were selected by 
the board. I also find that similarities between the board and the eligible officer sometimes 
do matter; further supporting the board members’ beliefs that board composition has the 
ability to impact the selection outcomes. 
I further find that the CSP is analogous to the resume portion of most civilian firms’ 
initial hiring processes. Whereas civilian organizations place significant emphasis on being 
able to assess a person’s qualitative attributes through interviews and other means, board 
members are required to make command selection decisions directly from a resume. Lastly, 
I find that the Marine Corps should implement ways to measure the effectiveness of the 
CSP to better understand the process and continually discover ways to improve it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on my findings, I recommend the Marine Corps improve the Command 
Screening Program in four specific areas. First, the CSP needs to make changes to the 
information available to the board by providing an analytical summary to board members 
and leveraging HQMC elements. Second, the CSP should randomize the briefing order of 
sub-boards and packages within those sub-boards to better meet its intent of a fair and 
equitable opportunity for all eligible officers to command. Third, the Marine Corps should 
require all eligible officers who desire to be screened for lieutenant colonel command to 
submit an application. Through this change, board members would receive a more holistic 
picture of each eligible officer and be able to spend more effort screening those officers 
who actually want command. Lastly, the Marine Corps should include Cornerstone as the 
final step in the CSP. This is a logical transition for two reasons: the mission of Cornerstone 
xx 
is inherent to the CSP mission; and Cornerstone can be a means to provide a qualitative 
assessment of each board-selected commander 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research should focus on expanding the scope to compare board results 
during times of varying national security threats and economic stability. Additionally, I 
recommend comparing command climate results to command selection board voting 
results to assess the congruency of board and subordinates’ perspectives of those selected 
for command. Lastly, I recommend an analysis of RBRs to assess the relationships between 
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Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; 
the resources they will expend in war are human lives. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
Complacency kills. In the military profession, this phrase carries both a literal and 
figurative meaning. In the context of this thesis, this phrase is equally as consequential. 
History has shown the impact of military commanders on the battlefield and on their troops 
(Hart & Tzu, 1971; Moyar, Kagan, & Kagan, 2009; Ricks, 2013; Schell, 1987). 
Complacency—with respect to command selection—has the potential to critically affect 
the Marine Corps, whether in the form of human lives or institutional existence through 
retention and talent management. The Marine Corps holds Marines at every rank 
accountable for knowing themselves and seeking self-improvement. This naturally invokes 
the question: Does the Marine Corps hold itself accountable for doing the same as an 
institution? The answer is “yes” in many respects, and we can do better in at least one: 
command selection. The reality is that we, as an institution, do not really understand how 
or why we select our commanders or if our screening program is actually meeting its intent. 
In this thesis, I provide a systemic analysis of the Command Screening Program (CSP) and 
the factors influencing selection outcomes.  
A. MANAGING EXPECTATIONS 
I focus solely on the lieutenant colonel command selection processes within the 
CSP. My primary and secondary research questions investigate whether or not the CSP is 
meeting its intent of selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for 
lieutenant colonel command, the factors influencing those selection outcomes, and how the 
Marine Corps should measure the effectiveness of the CSP.  
From my research, I find that I cannot determine whether or not the CSP is meeting 
its intent. Whereas I do find that board members generally agree on how to define “best 
and most fully qualified” and what characterizes a successful command tour, I also find 
that the board is much more decisive when selecting Primaries than Alternates. 
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Furthermore, I find that what matters for selection varies by Command Type and in some 
cases, even across time. The findings also indicate that while board composition can have 
an effect on selection outcomes, those selected perform well in their command billet 
regardless of when they were selected by the board.  
To answer these research questions, I examine the mechanics of the CSP, the board 
composition, and voting results from the last five boards. Using survey results, I provide 
perspective into the CSP from past board members, to include how they define the phrases 
“best and most-fully qualified” and “successful command tour.” Additionally, I discuss the 
hiring methods of two well-established organizations, Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks, 
to explore best practices that could be implemented into the CSP.  
While acknowledging the vast improvement opportunities in manpower processes 
and systems (e.g., Performance Evaluation System and incentive structures), I use this 
thesis to think on the margins about practical actions that the Marine Corps can take within 
its current structures. With that stated, this thesis is not a discussion on officer promotion 
or officer quality, nor am I am going to spend chapters arguing the importance of leadership 
or what makes a good leader. Marines understand the importance of leadership, and the 
CSP intends to provide Marines with the best leaders. This thesis is an analysis of the 
process and the factors influencing that process.  
B. PROBLEM FRAMING 
Marine Corps leadership is neither flippant nor careless with command selection. 
The Generals and Colonels responsible for selecting commanders have a grave 
understanding of the institutional impacts of their selections.1 In fact, my underlying 
assumption of this thesis is that every board member intends and desires to select the best 
and most fully qualified officer for command. The board members do this with the 
information provided by the established process. My thesis is not a challenge to the 
integrity and/or wisdom of the board members; however, it absolutely challenges the 
                                                 
1 The Marine Corps Manual clearly outlines the responsibilities and authorities of commanders 
(USMC, 1980). Furthermore, board members are sagaciously chosen because they have profound 
experience and institutional perspective that support their command selection decisions. 
3 
process used to inform their decision-making. This thesis is all about understanding the 
process. So here is my disruptive thought: if we are to analyze and critique the individual 
Marine—at any rank and in any billet—we had better first understand and be relentlessly 
improving the institutional processes that put them there. 
The Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC) acknowledges and identifies the 
holistic service problem clearly: “The Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained, 
and equipped to meet the demands of [the] future operating environment” (Neller, 2016, p. 
8). Whereas the MOC’s five critical tasks are necessary for institutional improvements and 
solutions to this problem, they are not sufficient. Critical Task 6.5 identifies the need to 
“exploit the competence of the individual Marine” (Neller, 2016, p. 24). This need is real, 
but it is not the whole truth. This task should be less about exploiting individual 
competence than it is about ensuring the structural processes and people are aligned with 
the outcomes we say we want.2 To accomplish this critical task, we must first examine the 
organizational systems responsible for empowering the people charged with that 
exploitation. Ultimately, this is a manpower problem that demands a manpower solution.  
Marines want and need commanders who know how to exploit their individual 
competence and who fervently approach uncertainty with unbridled imagination and will. 
We already have competent, creative, and motivated Marines, but individual attributes are 
worthless if the command climate limits them or fails to realize their value altogether. As 
New England Patriots Head Coach Bill Belichick states it, “Good players cannot overcome 
bad coaching, it’s impossible” (CNBC, 2017). If commanders do not know how to 
effectively create an environment that maximizes the talent and creativity of our Marines, 
it does not matter how many competent Marines we have or how many incentives we use 
to attract and retain them. From recruitment to retirement, the Marine Corps’ greatest core 
competency is its human element, and its competitive advantage is its reputation and 
warfighting ethos. The Marine Corps does not “promise us a rose garden,” nor does it 
promote service career opportunities as an incentive for wearing our hallowed eagle, globe, 
                                                 
2 Steven Kerr describes this organizational dynamic in his article “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While 
Hoping for B” (Kerr, 1975). 
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and anchor. What the Marine Corps does promise is the honor and privilege of being a 
Marine, of being one of the few and the proud. Commanders must exploit that. That is why 
we choose to be Marines. Using this framework, the Marine Corps must reexamine its 
leadership paradigm and command selection processes if it hopes to solve its holistic 
service problem. 
Some might argue that the Command Screening Program (CSP) is working and 
should be left alone. Others might contend that only minor changes are necessary.3 If we 
define working as slating high-performing officers to commands then, yes, by that 
definition the process is working. However, the reality is that we, as an institution, do not 
really have a consistent definition of CSP success. Common CSP defenses center on three 
themes that favor the process as-is: the first is that those selected for command are highly 
qualified, more so than those commanders selected before the formalized process was 
established; the second is that the Marine Corps’ command selection process is better than 
any other service’s; and the third being that on average, less than two percent of Marine 
Corps commanders are fired.4 I believe these statements are true and significant, but can 
we really claiming these comparative-type answers as evidential proof the process is 
working? Working is not analogous to excellent. As a reader, would it warrant any pause if 
I told you that of the eleven lieutenant colonel commanders that were selected on the last 
five selection boards and then subsequently fired, all of them were considered the “best of 
the best” by the board? Although commander relief rates do not entirely represent the 
health of the process, we should be asking why and how this happened. 
Using the comparative rationale to define process effectiveness, these officers were 
probably more qualified to command than their pre-process predecessors, were selected by 
the relatively best process, and represent only a small percentage of those high-quality 
officers selected by the process. Furthermore, these officers were highly competent and 
                                                 
3 Based off the survey results. Additionally, the CSP does incorporate feedback from annual After 
Action Reports and board debriefs to constantly improve its processes. Past feedback includes 
standardizing briefing templates and discrepancy notices; however, most feedback highlights poor Fitness 
Report writing and inaccurate or outdated OMPFs. 
4 These comments are summarized from the survey I conducted in support of this thesis. These survey 
responses are discussed more fully in subsequent chapters. 
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exhibited qualities valued and rewarded by the institution throughout their careers. It is 
also reasonable that under this rationale, the individual commander is solely to blame for 
the paradoxical outcome while the institutional processes that placed them there remain 
unscathed and unchallenged. By these standards, the process is working.  
For whatever reasons—warranted or not—the Marine Corps is complacent with its 
command screening program. We choose to accept working as the permanent stand-in for 
greatness. And we do so at the expense of our greatest resource, our Marines at every rank. 
Our institutional complacency with the CSP may have unintended effects, whether in the 
form of retention and talent management or in the most literal and consequential form of 
human lives. From the recruit to the Commandant and the board member to the 
commander, the Marine Corps owes every Marine its institutional best. Yes, the process 
might be working and comparatively better than other processes, but we have an 
institutional imperative to understand the process, determine if it is optimally working, and 
continuously seek out ways to improve it. Our institutional survival depends on it. 
C. WHY THE MARINE CORPS SHOULD CARE 
The lieutenant colonel command billet is one of the most influential in the Marine 
Corps. Officers selected for these commands not only have a profound impact on the 
current readiness of the Marine Corps, but they also influence future readiness with respect 
to retention rates and leadership quality throughout its ranks. Commanders at this level 
have a direct and immediate impact on the operational, maintenance, and administrative 
readiness of the institution writ large. As such, the Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection 
Board is one of the most important boards in the Marine Corps. It is the first level of 
command at which the Marine Corps deliberately selects its leaders and decides the future 
direction of the organization.  
In 1992, the Marine Corps implemented the Command Screening Program (CSP) 
to ensure Marines receive the “best and most fully qualified” leadership. The CSP is 
intended to “provide all eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command” 
to “maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting force” (United States Marine Corps 
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[USMC], 2017, p. 1). However, there is currently no comprehensive evaluation metric in 
place to determine the success rate of the CSP.  
When it comes to command selection and slating, the Marine Corps defines success 
as putting the best and most qualified lieutenant colonel in a command billet. However, the 
Marine Corps has no definitive means for accurately determining the “success rates” of its 
commanders. We assume the board members who select these commanders choose the best 
and most fully qualified commanders, and as such, the process is successful.  
Very little research evaluates the CSP’s effectiveness in selecting and slating 
commanders. Currently, studies only compare the CSP to previous command selection 
methods (Marr, 1997), or more specifically, examine how the Marine Corps chooses 
commanders for Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons and Recruiting Stations (Gonzalez, 
2011; Munoz, 2005). In contrast, much research has been done on Marine Corps promotion 
processes and how the Marine Corps determines officer quality (DeBardeleben, 2013; 
Hoffman, 2008; Long, 1992; Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017). Though many 
characteristics may overlap, there is a significant difference between promotion and 
command. It is time the Marine Corps better understood its command screening processes 
and the dynamics affecting the outcomes. 
D. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
The command selection boards are nonstatutory, meaning they are not governed by 
law. This signifies that the Marine Corps has the flexibility to adjust both the inputs to the 
process and the process itself to achieve the desired outcomes. The CSP currently mirrors 
the statutory promotion boards. As previously stated, there are numerous qualification 
overlaps between promotion and command, but they are not the same. As detailed in the 
MOC, we are all charged to think differently and more creatively about complex problems 
(Neller, 2016). The Marine Corps has the opportunity and authority to be more creative in 
its command selection processes; this thesis contributes to the institutional endeavors of 
putting our words into action. 
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E. THE THESIS CHAPTERS 
I organize this thesis into seven chapters. Chapter I is an introduction to the thesis 
and its relevance to the Marine Corps. Chapter II provides the background and detailed 
description of the CSP. Chapter III is a literature review of past research. Chapter IV 
describes the data sources, models, and variables used in the analysis. Chapter V is the 
analysis and findings. Chapter VI offers recommendations to the CSP. Chapter VII 
concludes the thesis with a discussion of thesis limitations and recommendations for 
further study. 
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Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
A. WHAT AND WHY IS THE CSP? 
In 1992, the Marine Corps established the Command Screening Program (CSP) to 
select the best and most fully qualified lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders (USMC, 
2017). Prior to the CSP, Commanding Generals at the division, group, and wing levels 
were given the authority to select the commanders in their respective major subordinate 
commands (Marr, 1997). This system—colloquially referred to as the “ol’ boy network”—
often conveyed a perceived bias and left little opportunity for smaller MOSs to have 
command (National Naval Officers’ Association [NNOA], 2008). To address these 
perceptions and concerns, the Marine Corps implemented the CSP to achieve four tenets. 
NNOA states these four tenets as follows, 
• Ensure Marines are being led by the “best and most fully qualified” 
• Ensure officers are afforded an equal opportunity to compete for command 
• Formalize command assignments 
• Eliminate sponsorship/cronyism. (NNOA, 2008) 
Except for a few distinct Commandant-selected commands, all lieutenant colonel 
and colonel commanders that have held command since the CSP’s inception have been 
selected by the CSP. The program has undergone many informal changes over the years, 
in addition to a couple of formal revisions to the Marine Corps Order (MCO). The most 
recent formal revision was with the publication of MCO 1300.64B in 2017. 
Though the CSP covers both lieutenant colonel and colonel command selections, I 
focus solely on the Lieutenant Colonel Command Screening Board (CSB) in my thesis. 
Henceforth, whenever I use the term “CSP,” “CSB,” or “the board” in this thesis, I refer to 
lieutenant colonel command selection only, as the primary purpose of this analysis is to 
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determine whether or not the CSP selects the best and most fully qualified eligible officers 
for lieutenant colonel command. 
B. CSP OVERVIEW 
The CSP comprises every CSB preparation, CSB execution, and post-CSB action. 
Whereas these actions range from command validation and board member solicitation to 
release of the board results and managing any commander replacement requirements, the 
command board (CSB) is the fundamental function of the CSP.  
There are two types of boards in the Marine Corps, statutory (e.g., officer promotion 
boards) and non-statutory (e.g., command selection boards). The CSB is non-statutory, 
meaning it is conducted in accordance with Marine Corps policy not law. However, the 
CSB is structured to mirror statutory boards (USMC, 2016, 2017). This fact is crucial to 
the heart of this thesis and will be discussed throughout because the Marine Corps has the 
authority and flexibility to revise the CSB to meet its institutional needs and objectives.  
The CSP is the Commandant’s program. The program is assigned to the Deputy 
Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) and delegated to the Director of 
Manpower Management (MM) for execution. Marine Manpower Officer Assignments 
(MMOA), MM, M&RA administers the CSP and any changes to the CSP must be approved 
by the Deputy Commandant, M&RA. 
The CSP mission is to provide “Marines with the best and most fully qualified 
commanders in order to maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting force” (USMC, 
2017, p. 1). The Marine Corps defines “best” as those officers that possess particular skills 
that meet the needs of the Marine Corps; furthermore, it defines “fully qualified” as officers 
that have demonstrated the requisite qualifications and performance of duties to capably 
perform the duties associated with the slated command (USMC, 2017).  
The board selects from a list of “eligible lieutenant colonels and lieutenant colonels 
(select) who are best and most fully qualified for command” (USMC, 2017, p. 1). 
Furthermore, “the board selects as primaries—those slated for command—the number of 
officers equal to the number of command billets available. Additionally, the board selects 
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a sufficient number of alternates to meet command requirements when the primaries 
decline or cannot otherwise take command” (USMC, 2017, p. 1). 
C. CSP TIMELINE 
The CSB convenes every July to select the officers who will assume command of 
the vacated billets in the following fiscal year. As stated previously, the CSP encompasses 
a wide variety of actions that are accomplished throughout each fiscal year. The general 
CSP timeline is below and is followed by brief description of each major milestone (the 
FY2019 CSP timeline is depicted for clarity): 
1. March 2018. MMOA solicits CSP billet information to identify command 
billets to be slated for vacancies from 1 June 2019 to 31 May 2020 
2. April 2018. MMOA receives command billet validation from the 
commands 
3. May 2018. MMOA releases the CSB announcement MARADMIN 
4. July 2018. MMOA conducts the CSB 
5. August 2018. MMOA releases the CSB results MARADMIN 
6. October 2018. MMOA reviews and confirms any declinations and 
subsequent Fleet-ups 
1. Command Billet Validation (March–April) 
The CSP billet solicitation and validation process ensures that commanders are 
selected for the appropriate command billet during the fiscal year command screening 
boards. This annual process is vital for preparing the CSB and command slating. The intent 
of the process is to gain accurate and command input to identify required billet information, 
validate actual command billets, and identify command billets that require screening on the 
board. Of note, command billet lengths range between 18 and 24 months and depend on 
the unit; as such, the same commands are rarely screened each year. Furthermore, this 
process includes validation and/or removal of existing commands and the addition of new 
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commands to the CSP. This validation process is critical for achieving optimal results for 
both the commands and officers slated for command (MMOA-3, personal communication, 
March 2018).  
Every March, MMOA sends out a message to Major Subordinate Commands 
requesting their validation of commands both to be screened during the board in July and 
those that will not be screened. Between March and April, each command updates its 
respective available command billets in a spreadsheet provided by MMOA, and MMOA 
updates the Command Database. MMOA then publishes the list of all commands to be 
screened during the board on its webpage. MCO 1300.64B outlines the guidance for 
inclusion and/or removal of commands into the CSP. Any request to add or remove 
commands from the CSP must be approved by DC, M&RA and takes effect during the next 
board. These requests are also validated during this process.  
The number of commands being screened varies annually. On average, there are 
approximately 148 command billets screened per year. Figure 1 shows the variation of 
validated commands over the last five boards (see Chapter IV for a description of my thesis 
data sources). An example of the validation document is provided in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 1. Number of Validated Commands (FY15–FY19) 
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2. CSB Announcement (May)
The purpose of this announcement MARADMIN is to provide information 
regarding board composition, outline eligibility criteria for consideration, provide 
instructions for those who decline command, and provide guidance for communication 
with the board. Because eligibility criteria can change (e.g., lieutenant colonels (select) 
were not eligible in some years), the current criteria is published in the annual CSB 
announcement in accordance with MCO 1300.64B. On average, 882 officers have been 
eligible to be screened for command each year over the last five boards. 
Eligible officers are not required to opt-in to be screened for command, only to opt-
out. Some officers do not desire to be considered for command due to various personal and 
professional reasons even though they are eligible to be screened. These officers submit a 
written request—known as remove by request or “RBR”—to their monitors (if submitted 
prior to the board convening) or to the board president (if submitted while the board is 
convened) and are removed from command consideration without prejudice or negative 
repercussions on their careers. On average, 568 officers have been screened for command 
per year (out of the 882 eligible officers) over the last five boards due to RBRs. Figure 2 
shows the summary of those eligible to be screened for command over the last five boards. 
Figure 2. Summary of Eligible Officers (FY15–FY19) 
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3. Conduct of the CSB (July)
The CSB is convened every July at Marine Corps Base Quantico and lasts for 
approximately three to four weeks. Figure 3 depicts the standard flow of the board process. 
Figure 3. Standard Command Selection Board Process. Source: 
MMOA-3 internal documents (2018). 
The specifics of the board process are described in detail in this section. I first 
discuss the board composition, governing documents, and general setup, and then transition 
to the actual selection process.  
Board Composition. The members of the CSB consist of General Officers and 
Colonels that have executed successful command tours at both the colonel and lieutenant 
colonel levels (by exception upon approval from the Director of MM). Though varied from 
year to year, on average there are 19 board members on each board comprised of 2 General 
Officers and 17 Colonels. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) annually solicits each 
Major Subordinate Command (MSCs) to nominate board members in accordance with the 
requirements as prescribed in MCBUL 5420. To ensure a diversity of demographics and 
experience, the board is comprised of General Officers and Colonels assigned to all 
elements of the MAGTF and supporting establishments, and those who have executed 
alternative career paths (USMC, 2016). HQMC thoroughly screens the records of each 
nominated board member prior to confirming their participation to reinforce board 
integrity. The Director of MM has the authority to add or remove board members to achieve 
the desired representative mix. To further protect the integrity of the board process, board 
membership is kept confidential until the board convenes, and HQMC keeps the identity 
of the board members from the public until the results of the board are released in August. 
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Precepts. As stated previously, the CSB is non-statutory though it is executed under 
the general construct of statutory boards. As such, the board is guided by a precept signed 
by the Commandant. The precept includes a list of the board members and support 
personnel, oaths to be taken by the aforementioned, eligibility criteria for officers to be 
screened, any specific requirements and necessary information used for selection criteria, 
and a statement regarding equal opportunity (USMC, 2017). The FY2019 LtCol CSB 
precept is provided in Appendix B for reference. 
Board Communication. The primary form of communication is the electronic 
command screening questionnaire provided by MMOA (see Appendix C for template), 
accessible to each eligible officer approximately six weeks prior to the board convening. 
Each eligible officer is afforded the opportunity to list his or her command preferences, 
unique qualifications, and any other information he or she would want the board to 
consider. Additional forms of communication are encouraged, to include updates to the 
officer’s official military record and/or remove by request (RBR). Of note—and a 
significant deviation from statutory boards—the board president, at his or her discretion, 
may allow the board room to consider any and all record updates even after the board has 
convened. Any submissions and updates made by an eligible officer for the purposes of the 
board are destroyed after the board. Communication with the board is mandatory, though 
those officers who do not communicate with the board are still screened. 
Board Room Setup. Board members are assigned seats in the board room according 
to rank seniority, regardless of experience as board members. For example, the Board 
President is both the senior ranking Marine and Board Member #1 whereas the junior 
colonel is Board Member #19. Though this configuration is not explicitly stated in the 
board room, many board members are aware of the seating arrangements. Board Member 
#1 sits at an elevated desk at the front of the room facing the board members; all other 
board members face in the direction of the board president. Board Member #2 is positioned 
at the front row desk to the far right of Board Member #1; all subsequent board members 
are arranged in ascending numerical order after Board Member #2, ultimately resulting in 
Board Member #19 being seated in the back row. These assigned seats remain throughout 
the duration of the board and are equipped with a desk, computer, and storage space. There 
16 
are multiple television screens mounted throughout the board room which display 
everything from the briefing order and voting results to the daily schedule and additional 
coordinating instructions. Figure 4 provides an example of the board room setup.  
 
Figure 4. Board Room of Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board 
(Boardroom “E”). Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018). 
Board members use the digital board room application (DBR) system to prepare, 
brief, and vote the eligible officer packages. The DBR is software that allows the board 
members to conveniently access the MBS and OMPF of each officer being screened by the 
board. While the board is convened, board members spend nearly all of their time using 
DBR to prepare their assigned packages, take notes during board member briefs, and vote 
on each officer being considered. An example of a DBR screenshot is shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Example of DBR Application. Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018).  
Selected versus Slated. An officer must first be selected for command to be slated 
for command. Selection refers to those officers chosen by the board members to be either 
primaries or alternates for command. Slated refers to the specific unit for which the selected 
officer is assigned to command. For example, an officer who is selected as a primary is 
then slated to a specific command; an officer selected as an alternate is on standby to be 
slated for a command if a primary is either unable or unwilling to accept command or is 
relieved of command. 
Command Types. There are two types of commands for which an officer can be 
selected and slated: MOS-specific commands (e.g., Engineer Battalions or F/A-18 
Squadrons) and commands open to any MOS, also known as “strung” commands (e.g., 
Combat Logistics Battalions or Recruit Depot Battalions). MOS-specific commands and 
strung commands are found in both the operating forces and the supporting establishment. 
MOS-specific commands, or Primary MOS commands, are those commands available only 
to officers with that MOS. Strung commands are available to any MOS or a certain group 
of MOSs. “Stringing” is the process by which the board screens officers of a certain MOS 
or group of MOSs for a command (USMC, 2017). Stringing is done to provide an equitable 
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opportunity for all officers of all MOSs to command, as some MOSs have a lower 
opportunity to command than others. The board president has the flexibility to deviate from 
the stringing plan to ensure the best and most fully qualified officers are selected and slated 
to each command. To reiterate, the board screens only for commands that have been 
validated for that respective board. 
Board Execution. The board process starts with swearing in of board members, 
board recorders, and support personnel on Day 1, in addition to the review of board 
precepts, board president guidance, and additional in-briefs from MMOA support 
personnel (e.g., using the digital board room application, reading a Master Brief Sheet, 
routine administrative and logistic information, etc.). Board support personnel are an 
integral part of ensuring efficient board execution, as they provide continuous assistance 
and updates to the board members as required. Once the Day 1 introductory actions are 
complete, the board begins case preparation.  
Every board is executed in accordance with the precepts and board president’s 
guidance. Because the CSB is non-statutory, the board president has flexibility to 
determine how operations will be conducted within the board room. For example, some 
board presidents allow additional material to be introduced to the board room (e.g., updated 
photos, fitness reports, certificates) even though the board is already convened; other board 
presidents do not allow such material. Additionally, board presidents establish actions such 
as voting “cut lines” (will be discussed in further detail later), selection of alternates, board 
room dialogue expectations during briefings, and the MOS briefing order. 
MMOA provides a recommended MOS briefing order to the board president, 
though the actual order is determined by the board president. For example, the board 
president may choose to have the larger MOS “pools” briefed first or brief all aviation 
MOSs last.5 The MOS “pools” are briefed and voted on in what are technically referred to 
as sub-boards. Sub-boards are also established for Strung commands and at times, 
Alternate selections. The board systematically selects officers for command within each 
                                                 
5 Over the last five boards, the board selected commanders for all ground MOSs first and then selected 
commanders for all aviation MOSs. 
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MOSs before moving onto the next MOS sub-board. However, depending on the size of 
the MOS sub-board (e.g., screening 150 infantry officer packages versus 40 supply officer 
packages), the board president may decide to combine smaller MOS pools into a single 
sub-board (e.g., legal officers and public affairs officers) during package preparation to 
maintain board room efficiency and adhere to established timelines. Prior to starting the 
process for each MOS sub-board, the board members receive a MOS advocacy brief from 
either a HQMC representative or board member with that respective MOS background. 
The purpose of this advocacy brief is to convey relevant experiences, billets, and skillsets 
important to each MOS, in addition to the qualities of a good commander in that MOS. 
This process contributes to the board members’ understanding of each MOS and provides 
an opportunity for board members to engage in beneficial dialogue with the advocates.  
Each board member is randomly assigned officer packages (commonly referred to 
as “cases”) to review and subsequently brief to the board room for sub-board voting. Case 
preparation is the process by which board members review each assigned package, all 
supporting documentation in the officer’s official military personnel file, and prepare 
respective briefing notes. On average, every board member is afforded approximately two 
hours to prepare each case. The optimal case distribution is to have an equitable number of 
cases randomly assigned to each board member, though at times, some board members are 
randomly assigned more cases in a sub-board than other board members. In the event that 
a board member finishes preparing all of his or her assigned cases with ample time 
remaining, that board member may be assigned a few of another board member’s cases to 
adhere to the board’s established schedule. Additionally, board members may request to 
have a case reassigned if they have previous experience with that officer and/or have 
previously written Fitness Reports on that officer. (Of note, the board president has the 
authority to mandate case reassignment in such occurrences; some choose to do so where 
as others do not.) Once all cases have been prepared, the board then transitions to the 
briefing portion of the sub-board. 
Cases are briefed in any order as designated by the board president. Often, the board 
president chooses to have the cases briefed in ascending alphabetical order of the cases’ 
last names (e.g., LtCol Alpha to Major Zulu). Additionally, the board president designates 
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which information gets briefed first (e.g., most recent experience and performance 
evaluations to time as a second lieutenant, or vice versa). Each briefer is allotted six 
minutes to brief each case and provided the briefing template as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Board Member Briefing Template.  
Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018). 
For each case, the briefing board member provides a numerical ranking 
recommendation (or “recommended value”) to the board. During the brief, other board 
members take notes on that officer and assign that officer an initial ranking; these board 
member rankings may differ from the briefing board member’s recommendation. The 
ranking scale and description is as follows: 








Some board presidents allow briefers to include additional descriptors with the 
rankings—such as “6++” or “Soft 5”—to mitigate the limitations of a constrained 
numerical scale. Though these descriptors may assist board members in distinguishing 
cases during the voting process, the only rankings that are entered in DBR during the voting 
process are the numerical rankings.  
The voting process is relatively simple and quick, but it might be the most 
significant action in the CSP. The voting process determines which officers are selected as 
Primaries and Alternates and those who are not. Voting is anonymous and done in iterations 
(iterations are analogous to rounds). The board president determines the structure of the 
iterations for each sub-board and as such, this process can vary each year. For example, the 
board president may choose to have separate voting iterations for Primaries and Alternates, 
or the board president may use the same sub-board voting iterations to select both. 
Regardless of construct, board members vote on all Primaries first; once the Primaries are 
selected, the board members then select the Alternates from the remaining officers in the 
respective sub-board. The number of voting iterations varies and is situationally dependent 
upon the “cut line” established by the board president. The “cut line” distinguishes those 
who receive a final selection determination (e.g., select or non-select) in a particular 
iteration from those who are voted on again in a subsequent iteration. Moreover, the 
number of voting iterations could depend on the board members’ ability to reach a decisive 
number of “Yes” votes for the authorized number of selections. 
The first voting iteration begins after all briefs in a particular sub-board are 
completed and ends after every board member has entered a respective rank (6-1) in DBR 
for each case in the sub-board. Board members may use their initial rankings assigned 
during the briefing process, or they may update their rankings upon hearing all of the briefs. 
Board member rankings and votes interact in the following manner: only rankings of “6” 
receive “Yes” votes whereas rankings of “5-1” equate to a “No” vote. This respective 
equivalence is necessary due to the limited number of cases that board members are 
authorized to select for the validated commands. Figure 7 is an example of the DBR voting. 
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Figure 7. DBR Voting Example. Source: MMOA-3 internal documents (2018). 
There is no time limit placed on the voting process. This ensures board members 
are able to make the best voting decision without unnecessary added pressure. When all 
board members have voted—usually after a few minutes—the board recorder provides a 
print out of the iteration voting results to the board president and displays the results on the 
board room television screens for the board members to view. In general, two criteria must 
be met before the voting process is complete for each sub-board: 1) the voting iteration 
results clearly indicate a strong selection recommendation, and 2) the board has selected 
the authorized number of cases for that sub-board. If neither criteria have been met, the 
board president then determines the “cut line” for the subsequent voting iteration. Though 
situationally dependent on the size of the sub-board and number of cases authorized to 
select, common “cut lines” are made immediately below cases receiving all—or all but 
one—”Yes” votes, and immediately above cases receiving all—or all but one—”No” votes. 
Figure 8 is an example of an iteration results printout with “cut lines.”  
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Note: Case distribution is random and seeks to assign to board members equally. However, 
depending on the size of the MOS sub-board, some board members brief more than once while 
other bord members may not brief at all. All data in Figure 8 is fictional. 
Figure 8. Example Results for Voting Iteration #1.  
Adapted from actual board voting results. 
Cases receiving the most “Yes” votes are listed first, and the remaining cases are 
listed in descending order of “Yes” votes. As stated previously, the board president 
determines whether or not the sub-board is complete or if another voting iteration is 
required to select the authorized total number of cases. If another voting iteration is 
required, the board president determines the “cut line(s)” and identifies which cases will 
be voted on again in the next iteration. The board members then re-vote on the identified 
cases only. As the number of iterations per sub-board increases, board members often rank 
the same case differently per iteration to reach the authorized total number of cases. As 
such, case order may vary with each successive iteration. Figure 9 is an example of Iteration 
#2 voting results.  
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Note: Ranking order may vary in each iteration (e.g., officer who received 16 “Yes” votes in 
Iteration #1 now ranked lower in Iteration #2 than two officers who received only 15 and 13 
“Yes” votes in Iteration #1. All data in Figure 9 is fictional. 
Figure 9. Example Results for Voting Iteration #2.  
Adapted from actual board voting results. 
This iterative process continues until the board members select the authorized total 
number of cases for each sub-board. Some sub-boards have been completed in one 
iteration, whereas others have gone as many as nine iterations. If the board president 
chooses to have separate sub-boards for Alternates, the iterative selection process is 
similar. However, the board president has the flexibility to select Alternates in any manner, 
so this description might not accurately represent every selection method. 
Strung command sub-boards use the iterative voting process as well. As previously 
stated, stringing is the process by which the board screens officers of a certain MOS or 
group of MOSs for a command open to any MOS (USMC, 2017). As such, strung 
commands are typically briefed after MOS-specific commands (see Appendix D for a 
comprehensive list of strung commands from FY2015–FY2019 boards). The exception is 
those MOSs that do not have MOS-specific commands. 
Slating. The slating process matches the selected officers with their respective 
command preferences. MOS-specific commands are slated with officers who currently 
hold the primary MOS required by the command; strung commands are slated with officers 
of any eligible MOS required by the command. This process also varies year to year. 
Regardless of the slating variations, the board takes into account officer command 
preferences (from the command questionnaire), past unit history, and any special 
circumstances. However, not all officers slated for command in a particular board are 
selected for command by that same board.  
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In the board precept, the Commandant provides a by-name list of those officers 
selected for command on a previous selection board but were unable to assume command 
due to uncontrollable circumstances (known as “deferrals”). The convening board is 
directed to make every effort to slate those officers for a command requisite to their 
previous slating. Additionally, the board considers any and all commands identified for 
early slating during the slating process.  
Board Report. At the conclusion of the board, the board provides a report to the 
Commandant for final approval. This report contains the recommended command slate, a 
prioritized list of those selected as alternates, statistics of those selected and those not 
selected, and a signed document acknowledging the board’s compliance with all precept 
guidance. As it is the Commandant’s program, the Commandant has the authority to change 
the board results. Once the Commandant has approved the final command slate, MMOA 
releases the CSB results. 
4. CSB Results (August) 
MMOA publishes the CSB results in a MARADMIN. The MARADMIN lists 
details about the number of officers screened by the board and a by-name list of the 
command slate approved by the Commandant. The alternate list is published via the 
MMOA website and lists only the names of those selected as alternates, not the order of 
precedence by which they were selected.  
Those officers slated for command are required to accept command within two 
weeks of the MARADMIN’s release. Officers that have been slated for command and 
subsequently decline command are “not considered for any other command and are 
ineligible for command screening on future boards” (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4). Only DC, 
M&RA can approve any exceptions to this policy. Furthermore, “officers that accept 
command and refuse to execute orders” are administratively separated from the Marine 
Corps (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4). Of note, eligible officers are required to route declinations to 
MMOA by October of their respective FY board, and the declination “must be endorsed 
through the first general officer in the chain of command” (USMC, 2017, p. 1-4). 
26 
As previously discussed, slated officers also have the opportunity to defer 
command. Deferrals are those officers who were slated for command but were unable to 
assume command due to uncontrollable circumstances. Those approved for deferral “will 
be non-competitively selected for command on a later board and then compete for slating” 
(USMC, 2017, p. 1-4).  
5. Confirm Fleet-ups (October) 
When command vacancies result from slated officer declinations and deferrals, 
MMOA fills those vacancies from the prioritized list of Alternates. This process is known 
as “fleet-ups.” Fleet-up packages are based on Alternate rankings, command requirements, 
Alternate command preferences, and timing. In special cases, officers selected as Primaries 
for a supporting establishment command may be fleeted-up to a vacant operational 
command; an alternate would then fleet-up to the vacated supporting establishment 
command. The Director, MM is the approving authority for all fleet-up packages.  
Those Alternates fleeted-up for command are required to accept or decline 
command within five working days of notification. If a slated Alternate declines command, 
that officer is subject to the same processes as previously listed for slated Primaries. Initial 
fleet-ups are completed by October and continue throughout the year, as required. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the purpose of the Command Screening Program (CSP) and 
provides a detailed description of the actions and information included therein. This chapter 
is essential for understanding the significant amount of planning and preparation that the 
Marine Corps requires to ensure the CSP is fair, equitable, and unbiased to the fullest 
extent. Furthermore, I reference many of these actions throughout the remaining chapters, 
so it is important to have an understanding of each. In the next chapter, I present the gaps 
and overlaps in existing military and civilian literature that influence my thesis analytical 
framework. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will 
be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
There is no shortage of literature on the topic of leadership. And there is no 
knowledge gap when it comes to the importance of leadership and command in the Marine 
Corps. A search through Marine Corps Gazette archives, review of organizational 
leadership principles and traits, or scan of the Commandant’s Reading List quickly 
demonstrates this truth. However, the Marine Corps espouses that all Marines are leaders 
regardless of rank and billet. As such, research in leadership is necessary but not sufficient 
for understanding how and why the Marine Corps selects its commanders.  
Leadership in the officer ranks has typically been studied through the lens of 
promotion processes. In fact, many studies look at factors influencing officer promotions 
in the Marine Corps, and how the Marine Corps defines “quality officer” using promotion 
and education board outcomes as proxies (Gonzalez, 2011; Hoffman, 2008; Long, 1992; 
Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017). In contrast, very little has been written about how the 
Marine Corps selects its commanders. Whereas there are similarities and overlapping 
criteria for both command and promotion, a sound argument can be made that the two are 
not synonymous. However, because the Marine Corps uses the “best and fully qualified” 
criteria in nearly every selection board—both statutory and nonstatutory—the existing 
research done in these areas is still relevant to my thesis.  
It is important to acknowledge that these studies focus on the record of the 
individual officer being screened, and their outcomes are based on the underlying 
assumption that the current processes used to inform the board accurately and holistically 
capture an officer’s quality and value to the organization. Very few of these studies 
examine the processes and systems in place that influence how and why boards have certain 
outcomes. To supplement the significant gap in military literature, I use the profusion of 
academic literature to examine how civilian hiring processes and committees influence 
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hiring decisions, as well as the relationship between those who select organizational 
leaders, those who are selected, and organizational performance. My research blends 
existing military and academic research to provide insights into the processes by which the 
Marine Corps selects is lieutenant colonel commanders and the factors that might influence 
those selection outcomes. 
A. MILITARY RESEARCH 
There is an overwhelming presumption that the CSP is successful. Success in this 
context is defined as selecting the “best and most fully qualified” officers for command. 
Although there have been a few disapproving remarks made since the program’s inception 
in 1992, Marine Corps leaders have continued to praise the fairness and effectiveness of 
the CSP, especially when compared to its “good ol’ boy” predecessor (Dobson, 2008; 
Fetzer, 1999; Keenan, 2013; Krulak, 1996; Mundy Jr, 1992; Wilkins & Anderson, 1995). 
Whereas I fully support and embrace the CSP’s intent and inherent virtue, I am, however, 
compelled to seek out the evidence supporting such enthusiastic claims. 
1. Military Research Organizations  
I am not able to find any relating studies by RAND Corporation or Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA), which is unusual considering they are two organizations widely-used to 
conduct military-related research. However, the Military Leadership Diversity 
Commission (MLDC) released an Issue Paper in 2010 describing the dynamics inherent to 
both command and promotion selection processes within the military services (MLDC, 
2010). Using a qualitative examination of the processes, they conclude that these processes 
attempt to maximize fairness while mitigating board member biases through guidance to 
the board, and through racial/ethnic and gender diversity of the board.  
2. Command-Selection Studies 
Marr is the first—and only—person to conduct a statistical analysis of the CSP 
(1997). Completed five years after the program was established, Marr’s thesis examines 
whether or not the CSP is a better system of selecting lieutenant colonel commanders than 
previous methods used. He establishes and subsequently compares four separate groups 
29 
based on a specific characterization of pre- and post-board selections and develops seven 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to assess the comparisons using statistical tests. From 
his analysis, Marr ultimately finds that the CSP is achieving its purpose and should remain 
in place. He further concludes that the CSP is a “better” system according to two of his 
MOEs, “worse” according to two of his MOEs, and the other three MOEs show there is no 
statistically significant difference between the CSP and previous methods. Furthermore, 
due to the relative newness of the CSP, Marr acknowledges the need for further study when 
more data becomes available. However, I am unable to find similar quantitative studies to 
assess against Marr’s findings. Though his study is dated, Marr provides analytical insight 
into the CSP’s effectiveness as compared to previous command selection methods.  
There is only one other study I find that directly assesses the effectiveness of the 
Marine Corps’ CSP (Rideout, 2005). In his thesis, Rideout conducts a qualitative 
examination whether or not the CSP is the most effective process for screening and 
selecting lieutenant colonels and colonels for command. He uses summary promotion 
statistics from MMOA and qualitative results from surveys sent to general officers and past 
board members in his examination. Rideout subsequently concludes that the Marine Corps 
should continue using the CSP to select its commanders, as it is the most effective process 
and its program objectives remain valid. This study is qualitative in nature and provides no 
statistical analysis to support the author’s claims. Although his omits any quantitative 
analysis, I include Rideout’s study for two reasons: first, it is one of only two available 
studies pertaining directly to the CSP; and second, it reinforces my previous statements 
about the significant gap in this specific research area. 
A few others have studied the processes by which their respective military services 
select commanders (Norris, 2013; Taylor, 2017; White, 2015). Norris’ examination of the 
United States Army’s command selection processes is the most analogous to my own 
research (Norris, 2013). In it, he suggests that “the Army does not select the best qualified 
officers to command … because it does not provide those who select commanders with all 
of the information necessary to make well-informed decisions” (Norris, 2013, p. 1). He 
further posits that the Army does not properly manage these officers selected for command. 
He provides a qualitative analysis of the Army’s Centralized Selection List (CSL)—the 
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program that selects the Army’s battalion and brigade commanders—by identifying three 
factors that contribute to the Army selecting subpar commanders: 1) poor personnel 
management resulting from DOPMA requirements; 2) shortfalls and limitations of the 
Officer Evaluation Report (similar in concept to USMC Fitness Reports); and 3) the 
selection board process and composition of the board members (p. 5–13). To remedy these 
deficiencies, Norris suggests: 1) the removal of command tour length requirements to 
decrease the need to select unqualified officers to fill command vacancies; 2) including 
interviews and 360-degree assessments to provide a more comprehensive picture of an 
officer; and 3) more effectively identifying relevant information during the board, and 
selecting board members that have either served in the units being slated for command or 
are familiar with the operations and culture of each. All three deficiencies and solutions are 
applicable to the Marine Corps’ CSP. Though there are cultural, structural, and size 
differences between the Army and Marine Corps that affect our respective processes, 
Norris’s work demonstrates the fundamental need to improve how the services select 
commanders.  
3. Command-Related Studies 
Though not exactly related to lieutenant colonel command selection, there have 
been a few studies relating to the topic of command selection in the Marine Corps 
(Gonzalez, 2011; Munoz, 2005). Munoz analyzes the formal selection process for RS 
Commanders that was implemented in 1996, and evaluates the effectiveness of the process 
against previous selection methods. He concludes that recruiting success is attributed to the 
formalized process, finding there is a decrease in the number of RS Commanders fired and 
an increase in selection of females and minorities. Furthermore, he finds there is a decrease 
in MOS diversity selection, and that graduate education is not a decisive factor in the 
selection process. Qualitatively, Munoz identifies three important skills of successful RS 
Commanders, they: 1) mentor and serve; 2) effectively communicate the correct message; 
and 3) trust the capabilities of their people. It is unclear from the analysis whether or not 
any of these results are statistically significant. This study is relevant to my thesis because 
officers selected as RS Commanders are also board-selected and have a higher probability 
of being selected for lieutenant colonel command. In fact, every year in the CSP precepts, 
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the Commandant specifically states that a successful tour with Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command (MCRC) should be viewed as a significant accomplishment because it 
demonstrates an ability to function in a highly competitive and highly pressured 
environment. Essentially, this assumes that if an officer qualifies for RS Command, they 
are inherently qualified for lieutenant colonel command as well.  
Gonzalez examines the variables influencing promotion to lieutenant colonel and 
command selection rates for Aviation Maintenance Officers and Aviation Supply Officers 
in the Marine Corps. He finds that serving as a MALS XO, having a Meritorious Service 
Medal, and having above-average RO markings are positive indicators for selection to 
lieutenant colonel. He further finds that serving in combat is not statistically significant for 
promotion to lieutenant colonel, and not being PME complete and scoring below a first 
class PFT reduces the probability of promotion to lieutenant colonel. Additionally, 
Gonzalez finds that those typically selected to command have served as Operations 
Officers or Executive Officers, have above-average RO markings, and have at least one 
combat Fitness Report. 
4. Promotion-Related Studies 
As previously stated, the Marine Corps uses the “best and fully qualified” criteria 
in nearly every selection board, to include promotion and education boards. There is a vast 
body of research on factors influencing officer promotions and how the Marine Corps 
defines “quality officer.” Though most of the studies find statistically significant positive 
correlation between promotion and variables depicting experience and performance (e.g., 
Fitness Report markings, physical fitness, and combat experience), the significance varies 
greatly by rank and military occupational specialty (Hoffman, 2008; Long, 1992; Rateike, 
2017; Stolzenberg, 2017). This means that what a board deems important for one rank 
and/or specialty is not necessarily as important for another. It also indicates that subcultures 
in the Marine Corps have different values and perspective when it comes to officer quality. 
Furthermore, “quality officer” is primarily determined through performance measures such 
as higher education (PME), job experience, and awards; and officers who attain the rank 
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of lieutenant colonel have had a successful career and are therefore inherently quality 
officers (Rateike, 2017; Stolzenberg, 2017).  
The outcomes of these studies as expected. The selection processes used to 
determine the “best and most fully qualified” officers are similarly structured, based on the 
same aggregate information (e.g., Fitness Reports and OMPF), and the phrase “best and 
most fully qualified” is itself ambiguous and subjective in nature. To date, these studies 
have placed the selection probabilities entirely on the officer being screened, providing 
little understanding of how and why the processes yield these outcomes. In this next 
portion, I explore academic research explaining the systematic dynamics of civilian hiring 
processes and those groups that charged with making those hiring decisions. 
B. ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
1. Impact of Hiring Committees 
Those who make hiring decisions have a direct influence on selection outcomes 
(Morgan & Carley, 2014). Similar to the Marine Corps, many hiring and promotion 
decisions in the civilian sector are made by groups of decision makers, whether by a 
company’s Board of Directors or hiring committee (Levy, 2007). The value and impact of 
group decision-making on hiring processes is well studied. Research shows that groups and 
committees make better hiring decisions because these groups provide greater experience, 
broader perspectives, and more diverse thought during the selection process (Alpern & Gal, 
2009; Levy, 2007; Li, Rosen, & Suen, 2001; Marlowe, Schneider, & Nelson, 1996; Morgan 
& Carley, 2014; Stumpf & London, 1981). Groups are able to aggregate information that 
is not otherwise available to one person (Li et al., 2001). Additionally, groups can tend to 
be more fair and equitable toward those being screened than individuals (Stumpf & 
London, 1981). However, there are downsides to having these same groups.  
Hiring committees have a propensity to use personal bias and experience as metrics 
for determining quality candidates (known as homophily and the “similar-to-me” effect) in 
their decision making processes (Dalessio & Imada, 1984; Frank & Hackman, 1975; Janis, 
1982; Morgan & Carley, 2014; Rand & Wexley, 1975; B. Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 
1995). This “similar-to-me” effect will be explained more thoroughly in the next section. 
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Depending on the motivations, some group members may manipulate their information to 
support their preferred selection outcomes (Levy, 2007; Li et al., 2001), and groups can 
also encourage uniformity and group think, especially when individuals within the group 
are similar and inclusion into the group is privileged (Janis, 1982; Morgan & Carley, 2014). 
2. “Similar-To-Me” Effect 
To paraphrase Warfighting, any principle or system that neglects the impact of the 
human dimension is inherently flawed (HQMC, 1997). This human dimension is 
inextricably linked to selection processes both in the Marine Corps and in the civilian sector 
and manifests itself through personal bias, imperfect information, and errors related to 
assessing that information. Throughout these processes, boards and committees continually 
assess a candidate’s job fit (measured by past performance) and their fit within the 
organization (Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, 2000; Rivera, 2012). Kristof asserts that while 
those involved in the hiring process often think they are assessing a candidate’s fit within 
the organization, they are actually basing their assessments off of the candidate’s similarity 
to themselves. Furthermore, selecting candidates similar to themselves is acceptable 
because those making the hiring decisions view themselves as successful and their values 
as being highly compatible with the organization’s values (Kristof, 1996). This concept is 
further supported by Schneider’s attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) model, Byrne’s 
attraction paradigm model, and Frank and Hackman’s 1975 seminal study, suggesting that 
interpersonal attraction influences hiring decisions because hiring decisions are 
interpersonal events (Frank & Hackman, 1975; Goldberg, 2005; B. Schneider et al., 1995). 
This attraction is commonly known as the “similar-to-me” effect. 
Rand’s study in 1975 examines the effects of biographical similarities, race of 
applicant, and the effect of an interviewer’s attraction to the job applicant and the 
subsequent evaluation. He finds that “biographical similarity of interviewer and applicant 
led to higher ratings of the candidate’s job suitability” and was perceived to be more 
intelligent, more knowledgeable, better adjusted, and better liked than biographically 
dissimilar job applicants (Rand & Wexley, 1975, p. 535). He also finds that a job 
applicant’s race does not have a statistically significant effect, though highly prejudiced 
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interviewers rated all applicants as having lower job suitability regardless of race (Rand & 
Wexley, 1975). Another study finds that hiring decisions are affected more by the “degree 
of similarity between the interviewers’ self-perception” of an ideal employee and the 
applicant than similarities between the applicant and the interviewer (Dalessio & Imada, 
1984, p. 67). However, this study did not discuss how the interviewers arrived at the ideal 
employee; it is possible the ideal employee resembled the interviewers’ perceived sense of 
self. There is also research showing the strong relationship between recruiter-applicant race 
similarities and weak relationship between age similarities on interview assessments and 
subsequent hiring decisions (Goldberg, 2005; Lin, Dobbins, & Farh, 1992), while recruiter-
applicant gender dissimilarities have a significant effect (Goldberg, 2005). Lastly, although 
bias will always exist, studies show that the experience level of a hiring committee can 
mitigate the effect of those biases (Frank & Hackman, 1975; Marlowe et al., 1996). 
Another means to mitigate these biases would be to remove photos and personally 
identifiable information from applications; however, these actions have also shown to have 
unintended consequences and committees actually end up hiring less-diverse candidates 
(Behaghel, Crepon, & Le Barbanchon, 2015; Williams, Brooks, & Shmargad, 2018). 
3. Impact of Board Composition  
Diversity within a hiring committee or group influences how these groups select 
diverse candidates (Smith, Turner, Osei-Kofi, & Richards, 2004). This diversity can be 
race, gender, experience, and the like; but what about diversity of thought? The longer an 
employee is with an organization, the more they take on the characteristics and values of 
the organization as their own (Kristof, 1996). In the case of the senior officer selection 
boards, board members have been with the organization for at least two decades and may 
have subsumed organizational norms; as such, there might be less thought diversity than 
consciously realized. Moreover, groups are more prone to initially support a dissenting 
view as long as there is hope the dissenter will change his or her mind; however, if the 
dissenter remains steadfast, the group tends to exclude that individual to restore unity in 
the group (Janis, 1982). As such, groupthink has the potential to minimize the effects of 
more surface-level diversity such as gender, race, and experience. Many studies have 
shown that experience and backgrounds are still preferred with respect to board 
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membership, but organizations are now wanting members that bring new perspectives to 
the board (Siciliano, 1996). 
Diverse groups also tend to value diverse candidates, whereas groups with similar 
attitudes and beliefs have difficulty accepting those candidates whose values differ from 
their own (Morgan & Carley, 2014). Morgan and Carley find that diverse groups feel less 
pressure to select those who look like them while committees that are similar have a 
difficult time selecting candidates from a diverse pool (Morgan & Carley, 2014). These 
results suggest that board composition, combined with an organization’s focus on 
socialization, strongly impacts the number of candidates reviewed before being deciding 
on an acceptable candidate (Morgan & Carley, 2014). 
Though not directly related to hiring committees, there is a vast amount of research 
examining the relationship between board composition—and human resource management 
practices writ large—and organizational performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Morgan & Carley, 2014; Siciliano, 1996). Boards of 
Directors are analogous to selection boards in the sense that board members on the former 
choose senior leadership within organizations and also have a direct and holistic impact on 
the organization. Siciliano finds that board diversity enhances only certain types of 
organizational performance, whereas other studies find that overall board composition has 
no significant impact on organizational performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Klein, 
1998), though Klein does find that board structure significantly impacts performance (e.g., 
insider directors on board finance and investment committees). The results of these 
findings seem to intuitively contradict the impacts of diversity within decision-making 
groups; however, board composition is typically defined and studied under the context of 
internal and external directors, not diversity. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a discussion of existing military and academic literature to 
provide insights into the processes by which the Marine Corps selects is lieutenant colonel 
commanders and factors that might influence those selection outcomes. In the next chapter, 
I discuss the data and methodology used in my analysis. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Decision-making requires both the situational awareness to recognize the 
essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical 
solution. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
My thesis focuses on how the Command Screening Program (CSP) selects 
lieutenant colonel commanders in the Marine Corps. I examine the mechanics of the CSP, 
the factors influencing selection outcomes, and the effects of board composition on those 
officers being screened for command. To answer my research questions, I organize my 
analysis along four lines of effort: quantitative data, survey results, board room 
observations, and comparisons with civilian organizations. Table 1 outlines the lines of 
effort (LOE) used to answer the respective research questions. This chapter provides a 
description of each line of effort, data sources, and the methodologies used in my analysis. 
Table 1. Methodology Used for Analysis 
 
A. LINE OF EFFORT #1: FY15–FY19 LTCOL CSB DATA 
1. Data Description 
My quantitative data focuses on Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Command Selection 
Boards (CSB) between FY2015 and FY2019. To conduct my analysis, I use pooled cross-
sectional data for both the board members and eligible officers who were screened on these 
LOE 1 LOE 2 LOE 3 LOE 4
Primary Question
Does the USMC CSP select the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for LtCol command?
Secondary Question 1
Does board composition influence selection outcomes? X X X
Secondary Question 2
Is there a correlation between voting iterations and performance in command? X
Secondary Question 3
How should the Marine Corps measure the effectiveness of the CSP? X X X
Lines of Effort and Thesis Research Questions
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FY boards only (it does not include those from the eligible population who RBRd). The 
number of board member observations is 98, and there are 2838 eligible officer 
observations. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of these observations. 
Table 2. Observation Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Variable Mean
Rank Rank
O4 0.403 O6 (Colonel) 0.888
O5 0.597 O7-O9 (Any General Officer) 0.112
PMOS Category AMOS Category*
Ground Combat Arm 0.256 Ground Combat Arm 0.327
Combat Service Support 0.423 Combat Service Support 0.296
Aviation 0.321 Aviation 0.265
General Officer 0.112
Time In Service (Yrs) 20.1 Time In Service (Yrs) 27.9
Gender Gender
Male 0.952 Male 0.939
Female 0.048 Female 0.061
Race Race
White 0.822 White 0.847
Non-White 0.178 Non-White 0.153
Assigned Unit Assigned Unit
Operating Forces 0.394 Operating Forces 0.459
Supporting Establishment 0.606 Supporting Establishment 0.541
STEM Degrees 0.175 STEM Degrees 0.143
Number of Deployments 4.3 Number of Deployments 5.1
Fitness Fitness
PFT 1st Class 0.895 PFT 1st Class 0.898
PFT Other 0.105 PFT Other 0.102
High PFT ( >=285 ) 0.185 High PFT ( >=285 ) 0.163
CFT 1st Class 0.894 CFT 1st Class 0.908
CFT Other 0.106 CFT Other 0.092
High CFT ( >=285 ) 0.758 High CFT ( >=285 ) 0.735
Marksmanship Marksmanship
Rifle Expert 0.769 Rifle Expert 0.765
Rifle Other 0.231 Rifle Other 0.194
Pistol Expert 0.649 Pistol Expert 0.796
Pistol Other 0.351 Pistol Other 0.204
Awards Awards
Meritorious Service Medal 0.755 Meritorious Service Medal 0.990
Bronze Star 0.210 Bronze Star 0.622
Recruiting Service Ribbon 0.076 Recruiting Service Ribbon 0.112
Eligible Officers (n = 2838)
Demographics Summary  (FY15-FY19)
Board Members (n = 98)
* Use the AMOS for board members because more similar to the eligible officer PMOS categories.
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The quantitative datasets used in my analysis are compiled from three separate 
sources: personnel demographic data from Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW); Fitness 
Reports from Manpower Management Records and Performance Branch (MMRP)–30; and 
board records and voting results from Manpower Management Officer Assignments 
(MMOA)–3.  
TFDW. TFDW is the Marine Corps’ integrated data repository containing more 
than 30 years of historical manpower data (HQMC, 2019). Many of the independent 
variables I use in my thesis come from TFDW, including all demographic data for both the 
board members and those officers screened on the boards. For the purposes of my analysis, 
all TFDW data represents what existed on the date each respective board convened. The 
intent is to reconstruct what the board members see during the board.  
MMRP-30. MMRP-30 processes and stores all Fitness Report data (HQMC, 2019). 
In the same manner used with TFDW, MMRP-30 provided me with de-identified Fitness 
Reports statistics of all board members and officers screened for command during the 
FY2015 and FY2019 LtCol CSBs. Using this data, I reconstruct the average cumulative 
Reporting Senior (RS) and Reviewing Officer (RO) values of each eligible officer at every 
rank. Additionally, I create the average cumulative RS and RO values for each eligible 
officer during their respective lieutenant colonel command tours. I use this data to compare 
board voting results and performance during command. 
MMOA-3. MMOA-3 is responsible for administering the Command Screening 
Program and nearly all other Marine Officer boards (HQMC, 2019). MMOA-3 provided 
an extensive number of board documents and records. These documents contain the board 
planning documents, voting iterations, and selection outcomes of each board. 
2. Methodology 
I choose these datasets for multiple reasons. First, I use this data to examine the 
variables that influence selection outcomes. Second, much of the literature describes the 
impact of board composition on hiring selection outcomes. I use this data to examine the 
selection outcomes of the CSP by analyzing similarities between the selection committees 
and applicants, and the composition of the board itself. Third, the voting iterations provide 
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a rare insight into board room dynamics by illuminating how the board defines “best and 
most fully qualified” by means of their voting processes. Lastly, I use the Fitness Report 
data to not only examine the impact of performance on selection outcomes, but also as a 
retrospective comparison between the voting results (e.g., how the board viewed an officer) 
and how that officer performed while in command. 
B. LINE OF EFFORT #2: SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Data Description 
My primary source of qualitative data includes online survey responses from active 
duty Marine officers who have been board members on the LtCol CSB. Those surveyed 
span boards ranging from FY2006 to FY2019. The purpose of the survey is to collect 
feedback on the LtCol CSB by focusing on the experience and perspective of the board 
members, the board processes, and existing measures of effectiveness. I categorize the 
survey into six sections: board member demographics, board member experience, board 
member perspective, board composition, CSP measures of effectiveness, and board 
member final thoughts. The number of questions range from 26 to 44 depending on the 
number of boards on which the officer has been a board member. I identify key themes 
throughout the responses, use those themes to answer my research questions, and provide 
insight on board member perspectives and board room dynamics.  
Out of the total survey population of 114, there are a total of 29 survey respondents. 
The survey results show that 39 respondents took the survey. It records this number using 
the number of participants who opened the link. However, because only 29 respondents 
provided actual responses to the questions, I drop 10 of the respondents from the survey 
analysis. Table 3 provides the survey respondent summary statistics. Furthermore, I do not 
provide a statistical analysis of the results due to the small sample size. I only provide 
summary statistics of the responses, and discuss any trends in the comments.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Survey Respondents 
 
2. Methodology 
I use the survey to explore how board members view the Command Screening 
Program. The board members provide a unique and invaluable perspective on the CSP, as 
they are the rare few Marines who have not only directly participated in the CSP but are 
also outcomes of it. As academic literature suggests, the experiences and biases of board 
members impact the hiring selection outcomes. In this survey, past board members share 
their perspectives on how they define “best and most fully qualified” for command, what 








% of Total 
Respondents
Number of Times a LtCol CSB Board Member
Male 28 96.55% 1 21 72.41%




Brigadier General 8 27.59% Number of Times Any USMC Board Board Member
Major General 1 3.45% 1 6 20.69%
Lieutenant General 3 10.34% 2 7 24.14%
3 6 20.69%
4 2 6.90%
0180 1 3.45% 5 4 13.79%
0202 1 3.45% 7 2 6.90%
0302 7 24.14% 15 1 3.45%
0370 1 3.45% 40 1 3.45%
0402 3 10.34%
0802 2 6.90% Was LtCol CSB Your First Board Member Experience?
1302 2 6.90% Yes 10 34.48%
4402 2 6.90% No 19 65.52%
7532 2 6.90%
7557 1 3.45% Level of O6 Command Experience on First LtCol CSB
7562 2 6.90% O6 Cmd Not Slated 1 3.45%
7565 1 3.45% O6 Cmd In Progress 17 58.62%







Survey Respondent Demographics Survey Respondent Board Experience
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C. LINE OF EFFORT #3: FY19 CSB OBSERVATIONS 
1. Data Description 
I was afforded the opportunity to observe the first week of the FY2019 Lieutenant 
Colonel Command Selection Board. The board was comprised of 19 Board Members, 2 
General Officers and 17 Colonels. During this time, I observed board room dynamics and 
discussions between board members, in addition to information used in case preparation, 
voting iterations, and selection outcomes for multiple MOS sub-boards. I observed ground 
MOS sub-boards only, to include both combat arms and combat service support MOSs. 
Because I was only present for the first week of the board, I cannot speak to the subsequent 
weeks. I use my board room observations to develop my perspectives and 
recommendations presented in this thesis.  
2. Methodology 
The command selection board is highly secretive due to the sensitivity and 
significance of the board outcomes. Other than what is briefed during the MMOA 
Roadshow and/or discussions with previous board members, not much is known about the 
board process and board room dynamics. I use my board observations to gain a firsthand 
understanding of the board process and interactions between board members. To maintain 
integrity of the board, I only provide general observations about what I saw and heard. I 
use my observations of the process and board room dynamics to develop my perspectives 
and recommendations presented in this thesis.  
D. LINE OF EFFORT #4: CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Data Description 
Amazon. As part of the September 2018 NPS Internship Program, I spent one week 
with Amazon Human Resource personnel to learn how Amazon hires its people; 
specifically, to learn how Amazon hires its mid-level managers with military experience. 
Furthermore, I spent a preponderance of my time in discussion with senior- and mid-level 
military recruiting teams to gain an understanding of their hiring processes, and what they 
look for during their screening processes.  
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Seattle Seahawks. In November 2018, I had the opportunity to speak with Seattle 
Seahawks General Manager (GM) John Schneider regarding their processes for hiring their 
coaches, athletes, and support personnel. The conversation was approximately 30 minutes 
in duration and was conducted via telephone. Additionally, I supplement the conversation 
with the book written by Seattle Seahawks Head Coach Pete Carroll titled “Win Forever.” 
2. Methodology 
Amazon. The Marine Corps Operating Concept describes the need for Marines who 
can think creatively and provide adaptive solutions in a complex environment (Neller, 
2016). Amazon wants and needs the same kinds of people (Amazon, 2019). More 
importantly, Amazon attracts these kinds of people. I use my Amazon internship 
experience to compare Amazon’s hiring processes and organizational values with those of 
the CSP. 
Seahawks. The Commandant’s guidance to the FY2019 LtCol CSB Board 
President was to “choose the best athlete” for command (heard during FY2019 LtCol CSB 
observations). The purpose behind this conversation was to gain insight into how a 
professional athletic organization—well-known for turning low-level and/or undrafted 
players into dominant athletes in their respective positions—selects its players and coaches 
to enable consistent dominant team performances from year to year. As with Amazon, I 
use this discussion with GM Schneider and Coach Carroll’s book to compare the hiring 
processes and organizational values with those of the Marine Corps and how these 
influence their hiring decisions. 
E. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
I use two multivariate regression models in my analysis as part of LOE #1: Logistic 
Regression and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I use these models to determine the 
relationships between 1) personnel data and officers that are selected for command, 2) 
board composition and those selected for command, and 3) board voting iterations and an 
officer’s performance while in command. These models demonstrate how certain variables 
influence the outcome of those selected for lieutenant colonel command. These variables 
include data on both the board members and the eligible officers screened for command, 
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and range from demographic data and experience to Fitness Reports and unit history. I 
discuss these models below. 





Logistic regression models are appropriate when the outcome is binary 
(Wooldridge, 2016). As such, I use logistic regression models for most of my analysis 
because the desired outcome is whether or not an officer is selected or selected to a certain 
command type. However, because only the direction of the coefficients can be interpreted 
in logistic regression models, I use odds ratios to discuss the magnitude of the effect that 
the independent variables have on the dependent variables.  
Odds ratios are always interpreted in relation to 1. If the odds ratio is greater than 
1, an event is more likely to occur. If the odds ratio is less than 1, an event is less likely to 
occur. If the odds ratio equals 1, the event is equally as likely to occur. The following is an 
example of a Logistic Regression model used in my analysis (I only include one example 
for brevity): 
P(Primary Selection) = G ( 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� +
𝛽𝛽3(𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5(𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) +
𝛽𝛽6(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) ) 
By controlling for these specific factors—performance, demographics, etc.—I am 
able to examine the how these factors influence an eligible officer’s odds of being selected 
to a specific outcome.  
2. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥3 + ⋯+  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 +  𝜀𝜀 
OLS models are appropriate when looking at the linear relationship between 
variables. I use the OLS model when estimating the relationship between voting iterations 
and an officer’s performance in command. The estimates (𝛽𝛽) are interpreted as the effect 
on Y from a one unit change of x. The following is an example of my OLS model: 
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LtCol Performance = 𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1�𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� +
𝛽𝛽2(𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) 
In this particular model, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽1, which depicts the 
relationship between the number of board voting iterations used to select an officer as a 
Primary and how that officer performs while in lieutenant colonel command. If there is a 
relationship, I expect a negative value on this coefficient because the highest-performing 
officers are typically selected in earliest voting iterations. 
F. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
1. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables change in the models depending on the specific research 
questions I am answering in my analysis. The selection outcomes and command type 
outcomes are binary variables, and the performance outcomes are continuous. Table 4 is 
list of the dependent variables used in all of the models in my analysis, followed by a brief 
description of each.  
Table 4. List of Dependent Variables Used in Analysis 
 
Selection Outcomes
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_TotalSel = 1 if ElgOff Selected as Primary or Alternate, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SelPri = 1 if ElgOff Selected for Command as Primary, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SelAlt = 1 if ElgOff Selected for Command as Alternate, = 0 Otherwise
Command Type Outcomes
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_SltCmd_PRIMARYTOTAL = 1 if ElgOff Command Slated to a Primary MOS Command, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SltCmd_STRUNGTOTAL = 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Strung Command, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SltCmd_OPFOR = 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Operational Forces Command, = 0 Otherwise
EO_SltCmd_SPTEST = 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Supporting Establishment Command, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_PMOS_OPFOR = 1 if ElgOff Command Slated to a Primary MOS Command in the OpFor, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_PMOS_SPTEST = 1 if ElgOff Command Slated to a Primary MOS Command in the SptEst, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_Strung_OPFOR = 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Strung Command in the OpFor, = 0 Otherwise
CmdType_Strung_SPTEST = 1 if ElgOff Slated to any Strung Command in the SptEst, = 0 Otherwise
LtCol Command Performance
Variable Name Variable Value
pctLtCol_RS_RV_Cum ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value while in LtCol Command
pctLtCol_RO_CV_Cum ElgOff Average FitRep RO Cumulative Value while in LtCol Command
Dependent Variables In Analysis
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Selection Outcomes. All three of these variables indicate whether or not an officer 
is selected for command by the board. MMOA-3 provided the data for the Primary and 
Alternate selection outcomes as part of the board results for the sample. I create the Total 
Select variable to represent if an officer is selected as either a Primary or an Alternate. 
Command Type Outcomes. These indicator variables are created from the 
command slating data provided by MMOA-3 as part of the board results. To create these 
variables, I first categorize each board-slated command into four distinct indicator 
variables: Primary MOS (PMOS), Strung, Operational Forces (OPFOR), and Supporting 
Establishment (SPTEST). I then interact those four distinct indicator variables to create 
four interacted command-type indicator variables as shown in Table 4. The results of the 
analysis using the four interacted command types are listed in the main body of this thesis. 
The results using the four distinct indicator variables are in Appendix E. 
LtCol Command Performance Outcomes. These two variables are continuous and 
represent the average Reporting Senior (RS) and Reviewing Officer (RO) cumulative 
values of each officer’s Fitness Reports (FitRep) while in lieutenant colonel command. 
MMRP-30 sent me every FitRep of all officers included in this sample. I delete all FitReps 
that are not identified as being in a slated lieutenant colonel command billet using the billet 
description and unit description of each FitRep. I then calculate both the RS and RO mean 
cumulative values for each officer during his or her command billet and use each of those 
mean values in my analysis. 
2. Independent Variables 
Table 5 is a list of the independent variables used in all of my models. Table 6 is 
the list of all of the additional variables added to my models when assessing whether or not 
the board members select eligible officers that are similar to them. Table 7 is a list of the 
independent variables added to my models when looking at the relationship between voting 
iterations and performance in command. A description of the variables follows each table. 
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Table 5. Independent Variables Used in All Models 
 
Fiscal Year Board
Variable Name Variable Value
fy_board_Num Depicts the Fiscal Year during which the Selection Board Convened
Demographics
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_Female = 1 if ElgOff is a Female, = 0 if Male
EO_Maj = 1 if ElgOff is Major, = 0 if LtCol
EO_RaceNotWhite = 1 if ElgOff Race is Not White, = 0 if Race is White
Career
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_TIS_Num ElgOff Time In Service
EO_dep ElgOff Number of Deployments
EO_SptEstUnit = 1 if ElgOff Assigned to a SptEst Unit, = 0 if OpFor Unit
PMOS Categories
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_AviationPMOS = 1 if ElgOff has Aviation PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
EO_GndCmbtPMOS = 1 if ElgOff has Ground Combat Arm PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
EO_CSSPMOS = 1 if ElgOff has Combat Service Support PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
Training & Education
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_STEMDeg = 1 if ElgOff has STEM Degree, = 0 Otherwise
EO_PFTOther = 1 if ElgOff does not have a 1stClass PFT, = 0 if has a 1stClass PFT
EO_HighPFT = 1 if ElgOff PFT Score >= 285, = 0 Otherwise
EO_CFTOther = 1 if ElgOff does not have a 1stClass CFT, = 0 Otherwise
EO_HighCFT = 1 if ElgOff CFT Score >= 285, = 0 Otherwise
EO_rifle_Other = 1 if ElgOff does not have a Expert Rifle, = 0 if is an Expert Rifle
EO_pistol_Other = 1 if ElgOff does not have a Expert Pistol, = 0 if is an Expert Pistol
Awards
Variable Name Variable Value
EO_awards_MSM = 1 if ElgOff received MSM, = 0 Otherwise
EO_awards_BZSTR = 1 if ElgOff received Bronze Star, = 0 Otherwise
EO_awards_MCRC = 1 if ElgOff received Recruiting Ribbon, = 0 Otherwise
Performance
Variable Name Variable Value
pctCapt_RS_RV_Cum ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Captain
pctMajor_RS_RV_Cum ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Major
Independent Variables Used In Analysis
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Fiscal Year Board. This categorical variable is provided by MMOA-3 and depicts 
the fiscal year for which each eligible officer was screened by respective board members. 
Demographics. These variables are from the data provided by TFDW. I create the 
indictor variables Female, Major, and Race to represent the gender of the eligible officers 
in the sample, their rank at the time of the board, and whether or not they are white. 
Career. Time in Service and Number of Deployments are both continuous variables 
provided by TFDW. I create the Supporting Establishment indicator variable to depict 
whether or not the eligible officer is assigned to a supporting establishment unit at the time 
of the board. To create this variable, I categorize all supporting establishment units using 
the unit description as provided by TFDW.  
PMOS Categories. I create these indicator variables using the Primary Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) of each eligible officer. For simplicity, I separate all 
MOSs into three categories: Ground Combat Arms (03XX, 08XX, 18XX), Combat Service 
Support (01XX, 02XX, 04XX, 06XX, 13XX, 30XX, 34XX, 43XX, 44XX, 45XX, 58XX), 
and Aviation (60XX, 66XX, 72XX, 73XX, 75XX).  
Training and Education. These variables are created using the data provided by 
TFDW. STEM Degree is an indicator variables that includes any degree description that 
contains words such as “engineering,” “mathematics,” or one of the sciences. Additionally, 
this variable includes any officer that graduated from one of the military academies. (Of 
note, I cannot use PME because many observations are missing this data.) The PFT and 
CFT variables are indicator variables, as are the Rifle and Pistol variables. Both PFT Other 
and CFT Other include 2nd Class, 3rd Class, Fails, and any waivers such as medical or 
deployment. Rifle Other and Pistol Other include Sharpshooter and Marksman classes.  
Awards. The three indicator variables for awards are created using the TFDW data. 
These variables indicate whether or not an officer has these awards, not the number of each 
award an officer may have. 
Performance. These two continuous variables are created using the FitRep data 
provided by MMRP-30. To create these variables, I calculate the mean RS cumulative 
values for every FitRep each eligible officer has at both the ranks of captain and major.  
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Table 6.  Additional Independent Variables Used to Analyze 




Variable Name Variable Value
BM_Female = 1 if Board Member/Briefer is a Female, = 0 if Male
pctBM_Female Percent of the Board that is Female
EOBM_Female_FF Interaction between Female ElgOff and Female Briefer
EOBM_Female_FpctF Interaction between Female ElgOff and Percent of the Board that is Female
Race
Variable Name Variable Value
Coll_BM_OtherRace = 1 if Board Member/Briefer is Not White, = 0 if White
pctColl_BM_OtherRace Percent of the Board that is Not White
EOBM_Race_nWnW Interaction between Non-White ElgOff and Non-White Briefer
EOBM_Race_nWpctNW Interaction between Non-White ElgOff and Percent of Board that is Not White
MOS Categories
Variable Name Variable Value
BM_Col_GndCmbtAMOS1 = 1 if Board Member/Briefer has Ground Combat Arm AMOS1, = 0 Otherwise
BM_Col_CSSAMOS1 = 1 if Board Member/Briefer has Combat Service Support AMOS1, = 0 Otherwise
BM_Col_AvtnAMOS1 = 1 if Board Member/Briefer has Aviation AMOS1, = 0 Otherwise
BM_GenOffPMOS = 1 if Board Member/Briefer has General Officer PMOS, = 0 Otherwise
pctBM_Col_GndCmbtAMOS1 Percent of the Board that is Ground Combat Arm AMOS1
pctBM_Col_CSSAMOS1 Percent of the Board that is Combat Service Support AMOS1
pctBM_Col_AvtnAMOS1 Percent of the Board that is Aviation AMOS1
pctColl_BM_GO Percent of the Board that is General Officer PMOS
EOBM_MOS_GndCS Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and CSS AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_GndA Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Aviation AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_GndGO Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and GenOff PMOS Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSGnd Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Ground Combat AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSCS Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and CSS AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSA Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Aviation AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_CSGO Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and GenOff PMOS Briefer
EOBM_MOS_AGnd Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Ground Combat AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_ACS Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and CSS AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_AA Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Aviation AMOS1 Briefer
EOBM_MOS_AGO Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and GenOff PMOS Briefer
EOBM_MOS_GndpctCS Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board that CSS AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_GndpctA Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board that Aviation AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_GndpctGO Interaction between Ground Combat PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board that General Officer PMOS
EOBM_MOS_CSpctGnd Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Ground Combat AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_CSpctCS Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board CSS AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_CSpctA Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Aviation AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_CSpctGO Interaction between CSS PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board GenOff PMOS
EOBM_MOS_ApctGnd Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Ground Combat AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_ApctCS Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board CSS AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_ApctA Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board Aviation AMOS1
EOBM_MOS_ApctGO Interaction between Aviation PMOS ElgOff and Percent of Board GenOff PMOS
Physical Fitness
Variable Name Variable Value
BM_HighPFT = 1 if Board Member/Briefer PFT Score >= 285, = 0 Otherwise
pctBM_HighPFT Percent of the Board that has a High PFT
EOBM_PFT_HH Interaction betweeen High PFT ElgOff and High PFT Briefer
EOBM_PFT_HpctH Interaction between High PFT ElgOff and Percent of Board that is High PFT
Coll_BM_PFTOther = 1 if Board Member/Briefer does not have a 1stClass PFT, = 0 if has a 1stClass PFT
pctColl_BM_PFTOther Percent of the Board that does not have a 1stClass PFT
EOBM_PFT_OO Interaction betweeen PFT Other ElgOff and PFT Other Briefer
EOBM_PFT_OpctO Interaction between PFT Other ElgOff and Percent of Board that is PFT Other
Deployments
Variable Name Variable Value
BM_dep Board Member/Briefer Number of Deployments
pctBM_dep Percent of the Board Number of Deployments
EOBM_Dep Interaction betweeen ElgOff Deployments and Briefer Deployments
EOBM_pctDep Interaction between ElgOff Deployments and Percent of Board Deployments
STEM Degrees
Variable Name Variable Value
BM_STEMDeg = 1 if Board Member/Briefer has STEM Degree, = 0 Otherwise
pctBM_STEMDeg Percent of the Board with STEM Degrees
EOBM_STEMDeg Interaction betweeen ElgOff STEM Degree and Briefer STEM Degree
EOBM_pctSTEMDeg Interaction between ElgOff STEM Degree and Percent of Board STEM Degree
Independent Variables In Analysis
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Table 7. Additional Independent Variables Used to Analyze 
Relationship between Voting Iterations and Command Performance 
 
 
Board Member Number. I create this categorical variable using the board results 
and board documentation provided by MMOA-3. As described in Chapter II, board 
members are assigned their board numbers in accordance with rank superiority. The board 
precepts list the board member names but not the assigned numbers. Therefore, I assign 
the board member numbers to each board member using the FY2019 board precepts and 
my board observations regarding how the board members were seated within the board 
room as a guideline. 
Voting Iterations. Both of these independent variables are created using the board 
result data provided by MMOA-3. Count is a continuous variable that represents the 
number of times the board voted on an eligible officer to select him or her as a Primary. 
This number aggregates the sub-boards in which each eligible officer appeared, as 
applicable. I do not analyze by specific sub-boards because the sub-boards and voting 
structures vary each year as the Board President directs. As such, this variable counts only 
the number of voting iterations in a which an eligible officer appeared, not the number of 
votes in each voting iteration and is not specific to any sub-board. The second variable 
represents whether or not an eligible officer was selected as a Primary in the first voting 
iteration vice any other voting iteration. 
Board Member Number
Variable Name Variable Value
bm_number_Num Number assigned to each board member
Voting Iterations
Variable Name Variable Value
countPri Total number of voting iterations to result in selection as Primary
VI1_Primary = 1 if ElgOff selected as a Primary in the first voting iteration, = 0 Otherwise
Performance
Variable Name Variable Value
pctCapt_RS_RV_Cum ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Captain
pctMajor_RS_RV_Cum ElgOff Average FitRep RS Cumulative Value as a Major
Independent Variables In Analysis
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Performance. These continuous variables are created using the FitRep data 
provided by MMRP-30. To create these variables, I calculate the mean RS cumulative 
values for every FitRep an eligible officer has at both the ranks of captain and major.  
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a discussion of the four lines of effort used to answer my 
primary and secondary research questions. Additionally, I provide a description of my data 
sources, the two models used in my analysis, and a detailed description of the variables 
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V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, 
and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war 
and is inherently flawed. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
The Marine Corps champions the idiom “situationally dependent.” Whether in 
combat or in academic analysis, an outcome always depends on the specific variables 
included in the situation or model. When presenting my analysis and findings, my intent is 
not to convince the reader that my methods and outcomes are absolute. Rather, my intent 
is to cause the reader to think about and better understand the situational dynamics 
influencing CSP outcomes and determine if the Marine Corps can—or should—improve 
its processes. 
As stated in the previous chapter, I use four lines of effort to answer my research 
questions. This chapter is organized to provide a sequential analysis of each research 
question using the applicable lines of effort. I find that I cannot currently conclude whether 
or not the CSP is meeting its intent and selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible 
officers for command. Instead, I do find that board members generally agree on what 
defines the phrase “best and most fully qualified,” and what constitutes a successful 
command tour. Furthermore, I find that the board is much more conclusive when selecting 
Primaries than Alternates, and what matters for selection varies by Command Type and 
even across time in some cases. The findings also show that on average commanders 
perform well in their billet regardless of when they were selected by the board. Lastly, I 
find that the briefer experience and board composition in many cases do not statistically 
matter; however, board members believe that certain variables with respect to board 
composition have the ability to impact the selection outcomes.  
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does the USMC Command Screening Program select the best and most fully 
qualified eligible officers for LtCol Command? I cannot answer this question. But before 
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discarding this thesis, first consider that the Marine Corps cannot answer this question 
either. There is simply no data available or evaluation metric in place to definitively answer 
this question. This fact is a definitive statement in itself. 
To reiterate, the board members understand the importance of their position and 
have selected a number of phenomenal lieutenant colonel commanders using the current 
process. I would prefer to emphatically state that the Marine Corps does, in fact, select the 
best and most fully qualified eligible officer for command. Moreover, I would like to prove 
the CSP merits of selecting outstanding lieutenant colonel commanders time and again. I 
just cannot back up any statement with data. As such, I use my additional lines of effort to 
examine what board members think about the CSP while also comparing the hiring 
practices of civilian organizations against the Marine Corps’ command screening process. 
(1) Observations from Past Board Members 
Best and Most Fully Qualified. This phrase—“best and most fully qualified”—is 
not only ambiguous, but it is also used as selection criteria for almost every Marine Corps 
board. As such, I ask the survey respondents to define what this phrase means to them in 
the context of the CSP. 
Many respondents explicitly state that measures of past performance are used for 
predicting future success in command. “Best” is most commonly defined by two elements 
found in Fitness Reports: 1) some sustained level of performance, and 2) demonstrated 
leadership. Of significance though, “best” is comparatively defined and is relative to an 
officer’s peer group being considered. “Most fully” is often referred to as having the 
necessary experience and key billets held throughout an officer’s career.  
Whereas most board members agree on the need for experience, there are minor—
yet significant—differences in what constitutes necessary experience. Some board 
members believe an officer should have well-rounded experiences across the MAGTF, 
HQMC, and Supporting Establishments; others state it is more important that an officer 
displays strong performance in “key billets within their primary MOS.” Of note, these 
differences of opinion exist within MOSs and across MAGTF elements. In addition to 
performance and leadership, a few board members speak to an officer’s intangible qualities 
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such as having “institutional vision” and “character,” and being “morally and ethically 
sound” as necessary attributes of being best qualified for command. 
One survey respondent provides a particularly thorough response that captures the 
sentiments of many of the other respondents: 
By a careful and deliberate screening of the member’s OMPF and any 
additional information submitted, that the record clearly and consistently 
demonstrated, consistently throughout his/her career that they have 
demonstrated through observed leadership and billets held that they have 
the necessary experience, performance and demonstrated proclivity to 
command marines and sailors at the O5 level. The essence of best and most 
fully qualified is measured as a comparison to officers of similar grade and 
experience. 
Top Three Criteria for Command Selection. Next, I ask the survey respondents to 
provide their top three criteria for selecting an officer for command. Though many of the 
answers are similar to the previous question (e.g., “experience” and “performance”), there 
is substantial variation in how these terms are described and valued. The variation in these 
responses provides insights into the differences between what board members value and 
how they determine what defines “best and most fully qualified” for command. 
Some board members use specific definitions of performance to describe their 
criteria. For example, one board member lists the top three criteria as such: “1) overall 
performance; 2) performance in previous command billets; and 3) performance in key 
billets that highlights leadership potential (OPFOR, HQMC, Special Duty, Supporting 
Establishment).” Another board member lists: “1) performance in other command 
(Company Command, Det OIC, RS CO, etc.) or command-like positions (SPC at TBS, 
OCS, etc.); 2) performance in combat and deployed assignments; and 3) performance in 
MOS assignments.” 
Additionally, there are themes throughout these responses, including: an officer’s 
leadership, RS/RO command recommendations, strength of billet assignments, and MOS 
credibility. A few board members also provide a couple of unique responses that include 
an officer’s “appearance,” “exceptional performance in basics (PFT, CFT, PME, MCMAP, 
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etc.),” and “Time in grade.” However, there are responses from two separate board 
members that stand out amongst the others. They are as follows: 
“1. High scores on profiles based on those who rated them I know.” 
“3. Recommendations from previous commanders and the credibility of 
those commanders in the board room. Most Colonels know most Colonels 
and their reputation. If they are known and have a good reputation, their 
recommendation goes a long way.” 
These two responses might give merit to the idea that those sitting on the board, in 
addition to the strength of an eligible officer’s record, influence board selection outcomes. 
A Successful Command Tour. A successful command tour can be characterized by 
a myriad of factors depending on the type of command. As such, I ask the survey 
participants to define what it means for an officer to have a successful lieutenant colonel 
command tour.  
On average, many respondents define success as a commander’s ability to 
consistently accomplish the unit’s mission, improve readiness, establish a healthy 
command climate, and take care of the Marines and gear under his or her charge. 
Additionally, some respondents define success as comparatively better than something 
else. For example, a few respondents state success is “leaving a unit in a better place” or 
“both the organization and CO emerge from the experience better than when the command 
tour began.” Moreover, some respondents add that “a change of command ceremony (not 
a relief)” is a sign of a successful command tour. Furthermore, a few respondents add that 
servant leadership, good retention, solid morale, and notable safety and force preservation 
results are also good indicators of a successful command tour. 
Promotion versus Command. Warfighting states that the Marine Corps should 
recognize “those officers who are best suited to command assignments and those who are 
best suited to staff assignments—without penalizing one or the other by so recognizing” 
(HQMC, 1997, p. 64). The command screening board is structured to mirror the promotion 
boards. Though many qualities of command and promotion overlap, I am interested in 
knowing how the board perceives the two. As such, I ask the survey respondents to provide 
their thoughts regarding the similarities and differences between promotion and command 
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criterion and the institutional emphasis placed on both. Table 8 provides the response rates 
to those survey questions. 
Table 8. Survey Responses 
 
 
A majority of the board members believe that the criteria used for promotion is 
necessary for command selection but only a third of the respondents agree that the same 
criteria is sufficient for command selection. Moreover, the respondents do not agree on 
whether or not those officers selected for promotion are best and fully qualified for 
command. Of further interest, the variations in responses regarding staff and command 
billets indicate that while board members understand the value of each billet, there is 
disagreement about how each qualifies an officer for command. 
One respondent summarizes promotion and command criteria as such: 
Competition for promotion is across all eligible officers in grade, regardless 
of MOS. The aggregate is what is under consideration. Competition for 
command is largely within your respective MOS population. This places a 
premium on documented performance within their primary MOS key 
billets. Break out performance is critical. The level of depth of talent drives 
us this direction. For example, an officer who does well in HQMC staff jobs 
but did not break out in their MOS key billets tends to not compete as 
favorably as someone who does extremely well within their MOS billets. 
The responses to these questions provide insight to not only how some board 
members view officer quality and career paths, but also how the Marine Corps might view 
them as well. Whereas the responses to the questions are interesting, more research is 
required before providing any valid conclusions on the differences and similarities between 
Survey Questions: Perspective Agree (%) Disagree (%)
The criteria used to promote an officer to LtCol is necessary for selecting an officer for LtCol Command 27 93.10% 2 6.90%
The criteria used to promote an officer to LtCol is sufficent for selecting an officer for LtCol Command 10 34.48% 19 65.52%
Officers selected for promotion are best qualified for selection to command 15 51.72% 14 48.28%
Officers selected for promotion are fully qualified for selection to command 12 41.38% 17 58.62%
Officers that have held prior command billets are more qualified for LtCol command than those that have not 18 62.07% 11 37.93%
Officers that have only held staff billets are successful LtCol commanders 12 41.38% 16 55.17%
Officers that have held command positions are better officers than those that have not 2 6.90% 27 93.10%
The Marine Corps appropriately values command billets 28 96.55% 1 3.45%
The Marine Corps appropriately values staff billets 22 75.86% 7 24.14%
Survey Responses Regarding Promotion and Command
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the command and promotion processes and the variables impacting the selection outcomes 
of each. 
Because I cannot answer my primary research question with data, this section is 
designed to provide insight into what past board members think about the CSP and the 
factors that influence selection outcomes. In the next section, I discuss the CSP in terms of 
hiring processes and how it compares and contrasts with methods civilian organizations 
employ when selecting their people. 
(2) Civilian Comparison 
The CSP is analogous to the resume portion of most civilian firms’ initial hiring 
processes. The significant difference is the CSP already has the eligible officer resumes by 
default, whereas with civilian firms, applicants are required to submit them for screening. 
Civilian firm recruiters then screen the applications and select which applicants should be 
considered for further review and interviews (Bock, 2015). Most firms then personally 
interview the selected applicants to assess whether or not they are a good fit with the firm 
(Arvey & Campion, 1982). In contrast, the Marine Corps “hires” commanders directly 
from the resume. 
Personnel economics describes applications in terms of signaling and self-selection. 
The inherent challenges with applications is that both the right and the wrong type of 
applicants apply, and the hiring committee is at a disadvantage to distinguish between the 
two types due to asymmetric information (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). Hiring committees can 
overcome this challenge through signaling, meaning that high-quality individuals can 
separate themselves from the low quality by incurring some costs that the low-quality 
individuals are unwilling to incur (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). Furthermore, those who are 
willing to incur those costs self-select into the application process, while those who are 
either unqualified or unwilling to incur the costs self-select out. Signaling and screening 
are most likely to be beneficial in jobs where “small differences between candidates, 
including intangibles such as drive, confidence, or interpersonal skills, may lead to large 
differences in effectiveness on the job.” (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014, p. 32). In the same way, 
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the CSP would benefit from signaling and screening because the board members would 
only be preparing and briefing competitive eligible officer packages. 
Most civilian hiring processes start with an application (Bock, 2015; Lazear & 
Gibbs, 2014). In fact, most Marine Corps selection processes start with an application as 
well. Consider the following examples. The Marine Corps requires prospective officers to 
apply to Officer Candidate School. Lance Corporals and Sergeants are required to submit 
application packages for Marine of the Quarter and Noncommissioned Officer of the 
Quarter, respectively. Marines who desire to be schoolhouse instructors must submit an 
application package for consideration. The list could easily go on.6 Additionally, Marine 
Corps applications often require more than resumes, they can also include personal essays 
and chain of command recommendations. The Marine Corps—like most civilian firms—
requires applications not because resumes are unnecessary, but because they are 
insufficient for assessing a Marine’s preparation, commitment, and desire. In short, the 
Marine Corps incorporates applications when it wants see how badly a Marine wants 
something. Except when it comes to command. 
As discussed in Chapter II, board members currently use three official inputs during 
the board screening process: Official Military Personnel Files, Fitness Reports, and 
command screening questionnaires. Of the three, eligible officers are only required to 
submit the questionnaire prior to the board convening; the other two inputs are provided 
by default in the DBR. More importantly, of these three, the board members spend most of 
their time reviewing and assessing the officers’ Fitness Reports and Master Brief Sheets. 
These inputs are “statistics-“ and “resume-driven” and though necessary, they are limited 
in their ability to provide board members with a holistic picture of an officer’s fit for 
command. Furthermore, all three inputs fail to capture the subordinate perspectives 
(ironically, the same perspectives of those the CSP was intended to benefit). The Marine 
Corps needs to include inputs that not only require an officer to compete for screening 
opportunities, but also better capture an officer’s qualitative attributes from an all-inclusive 
perspective. Civilian hiring processes already incorporate these methods. As such, I use 
                                                 
6 I even had to apply for my one-week Naval Postgraduate School Internship with Amazon. 
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this next section to discuss the hiring processes of two civilian organizations—Amazon 
and the Seattle Seahawks—and how they compare with the CSP. 
Amazon. Amazon has a very strong organizational culture. From building names 
and office decor to employee identities as “Amazonians” and codes named after failed 
inventions, Amazon’s history and culture pervades every aspect of the globally dominant 
organization. To maintain this organizational emphasis, Amazon hires people that fit their 
culture and will raise the level of performance within the organization. To do so, Amazon 
implements an intricate hiring process that ensures each potential manager is scrutinized 
and assessed in full. The process I am about to describe comes from my observations with 
the military recruiters as it pertains to screening for operations and area managers (the 
warehouses and fulfillment centers throughout the country). As such, some of procedures 
I describe may not pertain to other businesses and sections within Amazon, though the 
reasons behind the procedures resonate throughout the entire organization. 
The Amazon hiring process for managers is multifaceted and deliberate. As part of 
the application package, an applicant submits a resume and completes an online screening 
assessment. A recruiter screens the application and recommends a phone interview or 
rejects the application. The applicant then conducts a phone interview with an operations 
or area manager. If recommended by the phone interviewer, the applicant next conducts an 
in-person interview with multiple managers who are also trained interviewers (to include 
what is known as a “Bar Raiser”). The interviewers then deliberate over the applicant, and 
if the interviewers recommend the applicant, the recruiter then offers the applicant the 
position. The remaining of this discussion focuses on the interviews.  
The purpose of the interviews is to determine whether or not an applicant has what 
it takes to lead and manage people. Interviews are less about the question and all about 
answer. As the former head of Google’s People Operations eloquently states it, “[The] 
questions are bland; it’s the answers that are compelling... You’ll see a clear line between 
the great and the average” (Bock, 2015). The Amazon interviewer panel includes four area 
and operations managers that are “higher ranking” than the respective manager position for 
which the applicant is competing. Each interviewer is provided a pool of interview 
questions based on specific leadership principles they were assigned to assess, and each 
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interviewer spends about 45-60 minutes with the applicant. Once the interviews are 
complete, the interviewers submit their assessments electronically and then discuss the 
hiring decision amongst themselves. During the discussion, interviewers are empowered 
and encouraged to openly challenge each other’s assessments and seek clarification 
regarding an interviewer’s comments. Furthermore, there is one interviewer assigned to 
assess both the applicant and the interviewers; this interviewer is known as a “Bar Raiser.” 
Bar Raisers are highly trained interviewers who provide an unbiased, objective 
viewpoint that is in the best interest of the organization. Their sole purpose is to ensure 
interviewers are asking the right questions (e.g., those that focus on the 14 leadership 
principles only) and hiring people who are the right fit for Amazon, who will “raise the 
performance bar” of the organization, not simply the position for which they are applying. 
Potential Bar Raisers must be nominated by a high-level manager to begin the program. 
Once accepted into the program, they participate in a 16–22 week course that trains them 
how to interview. During this time, they must conduct approximately 25–40 interviews and 
receive feedback on each of them. Once their training is complete, they must appear before 
a Bar Raiser Committee from which they may or may not receive the official title of Bar 
Raiser. (Of note, Bar Raisers are also expected to fulfill the responsibilities of their primary 
job positions.) Bar Raisers ensure the process is meeting the intent of hiring leaders aligned 
with the organizational vision. 
Amazon makes a significant investment in how it hires its leaders. Amazon 
recognizes the importance of hiring people who not only can effectively lead others, but 
who also align with their organizational culture and will raise the level of performance of 
the organization. Amazon further recognizes the importance of interviews in assessing that 
fit. From these interviews, these interviewers assess if an applicant can lead others, will 
continue to take risks and fail fast, can communicate clearly, knows how to properly 
prepare, understands and values the organizational culture, and has growth potential. From 
the application to the interview, Amazon understands the importance of being able to 
qualitatively assess whether or not someone is the right fit for a position and the 
organization. Amazon understands a resume is not sufficient. 
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Seattle Seahawks. The Seahawks are led by a head coach and general manager who 
are committed to making every aspect of the organization the best it can be. Head Coach 
Pete Carroll and General Manager (GM) John Schneider both joined the Seahawks in 2010. 
Since that time, the team has appeared in two Super Bowls (winning one), won multiple 
conference and division titles, produced nearly 20 pro bowl selections, and been 
consistently among the NFL leaders in multiple offensive and defensive categories (Seattle 
Seahawks, 2018). Moreover, they have done so by conducting over 1800 player 
transactions via draft picks, trades, and free agency acquisitions (Seattle Seahawks, 2018). 
In short, Coach Carroll and GM Schneider excel at selecting the right people who align 
with their organizational vision. And according to GM Schneider, what “experts” might 
consider the best athletes are not always the right athletes for the Seahawks (J. Schneider, 
personal communication, November 27, 2018). 
The Seahawks’ player selection process, while elaborate and methodical, is 
designed solely for the purpose of “picking guys that fit what we’re looking for” 
(J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). Players must not only 
possess the requisite skill required to play professionally, the players must also be 
coachable, confident and humble, and possess a level of grit that drives them to constantly 
improve themselves and those around them (J. Schneider, personal communication, 
November 27, 2018). In fact, according to Coach Carroll, the player’s ability to make 
others around them better is just as important to evaluate as height, weight, and speed 
(Seattle Seahawks, 2019).  
Using a combination of formal and informal processes, the Seahawks assess a 
player’s tangible and intangible qualities through a series of observations and scouting 
methods, physical and psychological tests, and personal interactions such as interviews, 
phone calls, and site visits. For a player to be selected, the coaches must first collectively 
buy-in on that player’s abilities and potential and whether or not they can be developed. 
They also decide if the player is an organizational fit (J. Schneider, personal 
communication, November 27, 2018). For the Seahawks, the right athletes are defined by 
more than just a statistics sheet; the right athletes have the necessary skill set, but also 
continuously strive to make themselves and those around them better. Moreover, the 
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approach and passion motivating this selection process also apply when the Seahawks hire 
coaches. 
Great coaches have a vision for their team, understand and live their personal 
philosophy, understand and know their people (players and other coaches alike), and 
recognize how to maximize the strengths and complement the weaknesses of their people 
(Carroll, Roth, & Garin, 2011). GM Schneider refers to this as self-efficacy (J. Schneider, 
personal communication, November 27, 2018). He states that coaches must have a strong 
vision of who they are and want to be, understand people and their environment, and exude 
empathy, confidence, and humility. And he uses a variety of methods to examine and 
observe these qualities. 
NFL head coaches are always in the spotlight, win or lose. According to GM 
Schneider, he can tell a lot about a coach’s character by how he handles adversity, 
especially after a loss (J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). A 
coach’s stats matter, but they are not the entire story. He watches how coaches speak and 
respond to questions during press conferences and interviews; he listens to what they say 
about the players and the organization, in addition to the level of responsibility they take 
for their team’s standing. He also speaks to other coaches who have worked with that 
coach. These coaches provide additional context and insight about the prospective coach 
that cannot otherwise be captured on a resume. 
The Seahawks always compete. Whether on the playing field or in developing their 
draft strategy, the Seahawks are always looking to improve themselves and their processes 
(J. Schneider, personal communication, November 27, 2018). GM Schneider states that as 
an organization, the Seahawks pride themselves in not having all of the answers so they do 
everything they can to outwork the competition (J. Schneider, personal communication, 
November 27, 2018). As Coach Carroll puts it, they are always evaluating their programs 
and processes, making adjustments in order to maximize the capabilities of players, and 
find every way to become the most competitive organization that they can be (Seattle 
Seahawks, 2019). 
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In this section, I describe elements of two prominent and highly successful 
organizations’ hiring processes. Both organizations emphasize that success comes from 
hiring the right people; people who not only possess the requisite skillset, but are also 
aligned with the organizational vision and fit within the organizational culture. Moreover, 
when making these selection decisions, both Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks place 
significant value on a person’s qualitative attributes not found in resumes or player 
statistics. In contrast, the CSP gives board members statistics and resumes and expects 
them to be able to pick the best and most fully qualified officer for command. The Marine 
Corps could learn from these organizations, if it is willing to acknowledge the deficiencies 
in its processes and seek self-improvement. Instead of the best and most fully qualified 
officer, maybe the Marine Corps should be selecting the right officer for command. And 
to do this, the CSP must incorporate better methods of capturing an officer’s qualitative 
attributes. 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #1  
Does board composition influence selection? I approach this question from four 
perspectives. First, I look at what variables influence selection outcomes. Second, I 
examine if the board is consistent over time the variables influencing selection outcomes. 
Third, I examine whether or not the board members select officers who are similar to them. 
Lastly, I discuss what the survey respondents think about the impact of board composition 
on selection outcomes. 
1. Deriving the Models 
In my analysis, I attempt to replicate the information used by the board at the time 
the board convened. As such, I include Fitness Report data, training data, and awards. With 
respect to Fitness Reports, there is debate over which markings are more representative of 
a Marine’s true performance, Reporting Senior (RS) markings or Reviewing Officer (RO) 
markings.7 Furthermore, board members have access to the both the “at processing” values 
                                                 
7 The Reporting Senior is typically the first officer in a Marine’s chain of command and is responsible 
for evaluating a Marine’s performance. The Reviewing Officer is responsible for supervising and reporting 
on the Reporting Senior. 
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and the “cumulative” values of each Fitness Report. To narrow down the performance 
variables in my analysis, I use the statistical software package Stata to analyze the selection 
outcomes using the following four Fitness Report categories: Reporting Senior at 
Processing, Reporting Senior Cumulative, Reviewing Officer at Processing, and 
Reviewing Officer Cumulative. From this analysis, there is no distinct difference in any of 
the selection outcomes. As such, I then look at the Fitness Report profile shapes to 
determine which of the four categories to use in my analysis. 
At the beginning of each board, board members are encouraged to brief Fitness 
Report profile shapes as displayed on each Marine’s Master Brief Sheet. These shapes are 
derived from the “upper,” “middle,” and “lower” Fitness Reports at each rank of a Marine’s 
career. Board members brief these shapes using both the RS and RO markings (e.g., 
“Hourglass,” “Diamond,” “Home Plate over Inverted Triangle,” etc.).8 To replicate the 
“upper,” “middle,” “lower” categories on the Master Brief Sheets, I combine the RS and 
RO values in each category for each rank and analyze how they impact selection outcomes. 
I find that because most of the screened officers are in the “upper” category, these profile 
shape categories do not provide much insight into the relationship between Fitness Report 
performance and command selection outcomes.  
I then create models to examine the effect of a point increase in the average RS and 
RO cumulative values at the ranks of captain and major, and find that there is still little 
difference in selection outcomes. This finding is confirmed when I cross-validate the 
models using the statistical software package JMP. As such, my analysis includes the RS 
Cumulative values at both captain and major.  
To further validate my model, I perform cross-validation by building models and 
training sets using FY2015–FY2018 data to classify the FY2019 data. The high 
miscalculation rates are the same for both the RS and RO models. Additionally, I use all 
second order interactions in my models, and the models still do not perform much better. 
                                                 
8 RS markings create the top half of these shapes; RO markings form the bottom half. For example, a 
high-performing officer would have an hourglass shape: an inverted triangle shape on top (most reports are 
above average) and triangle on the bottom (most officers ranked below this high-performer). In contrast, a 
less-competitive officer would have a diamond-shaped profile. 
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This suggests that my models are sufficient for analysis using the data provided by HQMC. 
From these initial analyses there is no difference in the outcomes in using RS cumulative 
or RO cumulative values. As such, I continue my analysis using the point increases in the 
RS cumulative values at the ranks of captain and major because. 
2. The Quantitative Analysis 
(1) What Variables Influence Selection Outcomes? 
Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics of the total eligible officer sample, those 
who were selected for command, and those eligible officers who were not selected by the 
board. This table shows that variables matter differently with respect command selection, 
but not whether or not these differences are statistically significant.  
The differences makes sense in variables such as performance, fitness, and awards. 
With that stated, there are some other results worth mentioning. For example, lieutenant 
colonels have lower selection rates even though there are more lieutenant colonels in the 
total sample. Non-white eligible officers are more underrepresented in those selected for 
command and more overrepresented in those not selected as compared to the number of 
non-white eligible officers in the total sample. Additionally, marksmanship appears not to 
matter much between those selected and not selected, nor do selection rates between those 
eligible officers with High CFTs and those without. 
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Table 9. Selection Descriptive Statistics (FY15–FY19) 
 
 
Next, I examine at the relationship between the rank seniority of each board 
member and selection outcomes. As described in Chapter II, Board Member #1 is the Board 
President and the senior Marine on the board, whereas the lowest ranking board member 
has the highest board member number. Figure 10 shows the means of all selection 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance
Captain RS Cumulative Values 91.437 2.659 83.883 100 92.506 2.529 84.565 100 90.755 2.513 83.883 100
Major RS Cumulative Values 92.476 2.751 83.672 100 93.773 2.502 84.440 100 91.649 2.579 83.672 99.450
Rank
O4 0.403 0.491 0 1 0.560 0.497 0 1 0.304 0.460 0 1
O5 0.597 0.491 0 1 0.440 0.497 0 1 0.696 0.460 0 1
PMOS Category
Ground Combat Arm 0.256 0.437 0 1 0.268 0.443 0 1 0.249 0.432 0 1
Combat Service Support 0.423 0.494 0 1 0.348 0.476 0 1 0.471 0.499 0 1
Aviation 0.321 0.467 0 1 0.385 0.487 0 1 0.280 0.449 0 1
Time In Service (Yrs) 20.1 3.5 13 34 19.6 3.4 13 32 20.5 3.5 13 34
Gender
Male 0.952 0.214 0 1 0.965 0.185 0 1 0.944 0.230 0 1
Female 0.048 0.214 0 1 0.035 0.185 0 1 0.056 0.230 0 1
Race
White 0.822 0.382 0 1 0.862 0.346 0 1 0.797 0.402 0 1
Non-White 0.178 0.382 0 1 0.138 0.346 0 1 0.203 0.402 0 1
Assigned Unit
Operating Forces 0.394 0.489 0 1 0.450 0.498 0 1 0.358 0.479 0 1
Supporting Establishment 0.606 0.489 0 1 0.550 0.498 0 1 0.642 0.479 0 1
STEM Degrees 0.175 0.380 0 1 0.161 0.368 0 1 0.184 0.388 0 1
Number of Deployments 4.3 2.4 0 27 4.5 2.5 0 27 4.2 2.4 0 25
Fitness
PFT 1st Class 0.895 0.307 0 1 0.933 0.250 0 1 0.870 0.336 0 1
PFT Other 0.105 0.307 0 1 0.067 0.250 0 1 0.130 0.336 0 1
High PFT ( >=285 ) 0.185 0.389 0 1 0.241 0.428 0 1 0.150 0.357 0 1
CFT 1st Class 0.894 0.308 0 1 0.929 0.258 0 1 0.871 0.335 0 1
CFT Other 0.106 0.308 0 1 0.071 0.258 0 1 0.129 0.335 0 1
High CFT ( >=285 ) 0.758 0.428 0 1 0.813 0.390 0 1 0.723 0.448 0 1
Marksmanship
Rifle Expert 0.769 0.422 0 1 0.772 0.420 0 1 0.767 0.423 0 1
Rifle Other 0.231 0.422 0 1 0.228 0.420 0 1 0.233 0.423 0 1
Pistol Expert 0.649 0.477 0 1 0.679 0.467 0 1 0.630 0.483 0 1
Pistol Other 0.351 0.477 0 1 0.321 0.467 0 1 0.370 0.483 0 1
Awards
Meritorious Service Medal 0.755 0.430 0 1 0.757 0.429 0 1 0.754 0.431 0 1
Bronze Star 0.210 0.407 0 1 0.240 0.427 0 1 0.190 0.393 0 1
Recruiting Service Ribbon 0.076 0.265 0 1 0.093 0.291 0 1 0.065 0.246 0 1
Selection Descriptive Statistics  (FY15-FY19)
Total Eligible Officers 
(n = 2838)
Eligible Officers Selected 
(n = 1105)
Eligible Officers Not Selected 
(n = 1733)
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outcomes based on the rank seniority of the board member as compared to the means of 
the selection outcomes of the entire sample.  
 
Figure 10. Board Member Selection Outcomes (FY15–FY19) 
As shown in Figure 10, both the Board President and Board Member #19 average 
the mean number of selections of the entire board. However, it is important to mention that 
the Board President only briefs about half of the number of cases as the other board 
members. Due to the observable variation in Figure 1, I analyze whether or not an eligible 
officer’s odds of being selected are affected as a result of being briefed by a particular 
board member. These results are shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Odds of Being Selected Based on Briefer 
Table 10 shows that on average and holding all else constant, selection outcomes 
are not influenced by any particular briefer as compared to the Board President. 
Furthermore, Table 10 indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between selection outcomes and the rank seniority of the board. I also analyze this impact 














Board Member #2 1.032 0.839 1.014 0.792 1.048 1.022
[0.290] [0.279] [0.311] [0.292] [0.451] [0.444]
Board Member #3 1.087 0.865 1.178 0.934 0.864 0.846
[0.305] [0.288] [0.357] [0.343] [0.381] [0.377]
Board Member #4 1.010 0.732 1.124 0.833 0.789 0.747
[0.287] [0.246] [0.345] [0.307] [0.356] [0.340]
Board Member #5 1.043 0.716 0.819 0.483* 1.507 1.437
[0.295] [0.240] [0.257] [0.182] [0.627] [0.604]
Board Member #6 0.894 0.688 0.917 0.722 0.908 0.852
[0.255] [0.231] [0.285] [0.270] [0.401] [0.380]
Board Member #7 1.082 0.932 0.938 0.778 1.325 1.341
[0.305] [0.306] [0.290] [0.286] [0.556] [0.568]
Board Member #8 0.830 0.636 0.795 0.615 1.002 0.951
[0.239] [0.213] [0.252] [0.231] [0.439] [0.420]
Board Member #9 1.206 1.215 0.826 0.816 1.897 1.814
[0.340] [0.399] [0.260] [0.303] [0.775] [0.748]
Board Member #10 0.936 0.756 0.944 0.776 0.957 0.940
[0.268] [0.254] [0.296] [0.290] [0.423] [0.419]
Board Member #11 1.062 1.032 0.923 0.839 1.309 1.355
[0.315] [0.362] [0.302] [0.330] [0.577] [0.602]
Board Member #12 1.032 0.772 1.128 0.853 0.833 0.819
[0.292] [0.256] [0.345] [0.311] [0.372] [0.369]
Board Member #13 0.774 0.749 0.598 0.561 1.328 1.358
[0.225] [0.254] [0.197] [0.217] [0.565] [0.584]
Board Member #14 0.985 0.730 0.962 0.711 1.041 0.992
[0.283] [0.245] [0.302] [0.265] [0.456] [0.439]
Board Member #15 1.026 0.853 0.904 0.759 1.265 1.192
[0.294] [0.287] [0.285] [0.284] [0.542] [0.515]
Board Member #16 0.919 0.762 0.953 0.827 0.897 0.860
[0.264] [0.258] [0.299] [0.311] [0.401] [0.388]
Board Member #17 1.152 1.087 0.818 0.697 1.785 1.765
[0.327] [0.361] [0.258] [0.262] [0.735] [0.733]
Board Member #18 0.848 0.698 0.936 0.801 0.755 0.730
[0.244] [0.236] [0.293] [0.300] [0.346] [0.337]
Board Member #19 0.997 0.738 0.938 0.672 1.120 1.059
[0.286] [0.249] [0.295] [0.254] [0.487] [0.465]
Board Member #20 0.879 0.897 0.606 0.636 1.620 1.604
[0.314] [0.369] [0.254] [0.305] [0.804] [0.805]
Board Member #21 0.774 0.913 0.589 0.683 1.353 1.369
[0.363] [0.504] [0.327] [0.456] [0.875] [0.900]
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y
Constant 0.646* 0*** 0.386*** 0*** 0.129*** 2.24e-05***
[0.149] [0.000] [0.097] [0.000] [0.046] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on Briefer Rank Seniority
Board Member #1 is the base category, who is also the Board President and the senior ranking board member.
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by each fiscal year, and the results indicate that for four out of the five years, selection 
outcomes are not influenced by particular briefers. It is difficult to make many conclusions 
from this table because board members are rarely the same from year to year, and the 
probability is even lower that repeat board members have the same board member number. 
The only constant each year is that board member number is based off of rank superiority, 
and as Table 10 indicates, rank superiority does not affect the selection outcomes. 
Next, I examine any differences in variables that influence selection as a Primary 
versus selection as an Alternate. MMOA-3 publishes the board results with respect to 
overall selection rates. However, selection refers to both Primary and Alternate selections 
by the board (as a reminder, “Primaries” are selected and slated to a command, and 
“Alternates” are selected but not slated). Because MMOA-3 uses this terminology, I 
analyze the outcomes of those selected, but also distinguish between those selected as 
Primaries and those selected as Alternates. Figure 10 shows the selection outcomes for 
each board. Table 11 describes these results of the analysis. This table does not look at 
command type; it only considers whether or not someone was selected, selected as a 
Primary, or selected as an Alternate. As a reminder, these values are in relation to the base 
category as described in the table notes.  
Figure 11. Board Selection Outcomes (FY15–FY19) 
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Table 11. Odds of Being Selected (FY15–FY19) 
 
 
On average and holding everything else constant, Table 11 results show that board 
members are much more conclusive when it comes to selecting Primaries than Alternates. 
This is evident in the number of statistically significant variables in Primary selections and 
lack of statistically significant variables with respect to Alternates. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that variables have different impacts on selection to Primary than on selection to 
Alternate. 




















Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.250*** 1.236*** 1.305*** 1.286*** 1.012 1.010
[0.022] [0.023] [0.026] [0.028] [0.022] [0.023]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.334*** 1.321*** 1.362*** 1.342*** 1.076*** 1.081***
[0.024] [0.026] [0.028] [0.030] [0.023] [0.025]
Rank O4 2.699*** 1.691*** 3.084*** 1.789*** 1.141 1.014
[0.238] [0.166] [0.305] [0.197] [0.140] [0.130]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.937 0.913 0.985 0.943 0.889 0.887
[0.109] [0.115] [0.130] [0.135] [0.143] [0.143]
Aviation PMOS 1.911*** 2.324*** 2.110*** 2.473*** 1.062 1.089
[0.245] [0.327] [0.300] [0.387] [0.185] [0.191]
Time In Service 0.980 1.002 0.972* 0.993 1.003 1.010
[0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018]
Female 0.825 0.889 1.192 1.375 0.464** 0.476**
[0.176] [0.207] [0.281] [0.358] [0.166] [0.170]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.774** 0.917 0.733** 0.842 0.962 1.003
[0.088] [0.115] [0.098] [0.125] [0.150] [0.157]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.724*** 0.726*** 0.718*** 0.731*** 0.908 0.914
[0.061] [0.067] [0.068] [0.076] [0.106] [0.107]
STEM Degrees 0.872 0.894 0.911 0.951 0.875 0.879
[0.097] [0.109] [0.115] [0.133] [0.136] [0.137]
Number of Deployments 1.058*** 1.091*** 1.082*** 1.118*** 0.979 0.984
[0.018] [0.021] [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.659*** 0.711** 0.532*** 0.543*** 1.020 1.055
[0.100] [0.118] [0.102] [0.114] [0.202] [0.210]
High PFT (>=285) 1.443*** 1.345** 1.415*** 1.324** 1.120 1.091
[0.154] [0.156] [0.162] [0.166] [0.163] [0.160]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.616*** 0.662** 0.602*** 0.646** 0.807 0.832
[0.096] [0.112] [0.110] [0.129] [0.176] [0.182]
High CFT (>=285) 1.224* 1.333** 1.246* 1.339** 1.079 1.088
[0.132] [0.155] [0.154] [0.180] [0.161] [0.163]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 1.065 1.137 0.857 0.892 1.369** 1.376**
[0.109] [0.128] [0.101] [0.115] [0.183] [0.185]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.941 0.973 0.838* 0.845 1.129 1.148
[0.086] [0.096] [0.087] [0.096] [0.139] [0.142]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.692*** 1.477*** 2.070*** 1.802*** 0.882 0.836
[0.180] [0.171] [0.248] [0.235] [0.123] [0.117]
Bronze Star 1.580*** 1.488*** 1.797*** 1.679*** 0.946 0.915
[0.179] [0.185] [0.226] [0.232] [0.150] [0.145]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.520*** 1.466** 1.776*** 1.770*** 0.822 0.813
[0.237] [0.248] [0.295] [0.321] [0.191] [0.190]
Constant 0*** 0.273*** 0*** 0*** 0.118*** 0*** 5.73e-05*** 0.154*** 4.11e-05***
[0.000] [0.094] [0.000] [0.000] [0.047] [0.000] [0.000] [0.073] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected During Observation Period (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: 
LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, 
and Pistol Expert. 
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Variables that matter to the board include FitRep performance, deployments, 
physical fitness, and awards. However, these variables are only statistically significant for 
Primary selection but are not statistically significant for selection as an Alternate. Both 
non-white officers and officers assigned to Supporting Establishment units at the time of 
the board are less likely to be selected as Primaries than white officers, even after 
accounting for performance. Moreover, being female does not matter when it comes to 
Primary selection, but it does with respect to Alternate selection rates, with females less 
likely to be selected as Alternates. One interpretation is that if a female is not selected as 
Primary, she has very little chance of being selected as an Alternate by the board. Further, 
majors are much more likely to be selected as Primaries than lieutenant colonels. Using the 
survey responses for context, majors might be selected over lieutenant colonels because 
board members cannot see whether or not an eligible officer has been screened for 
command on a previous board. As such, board members might assume that lieutenant 
colonels have been passed over for command before and conclude that the majors are more 
competitive. 
With respect to awards, Meritorious Service Medals, Bronze Stars, and Recruiting 
Service Ribbons are statistically significant in increasing an eligible officer’s odds of being 
selected as a Primary but have no statistically significant effect on selection as an Alternate. 
For example, the precept explicitly states that those officers who have been Recruiting 
Stations Commanding Officers should be considered exceptionally qualified for lieutenant 
colonel command. The findings show just that, but only as a Primary. Those who have 
successfully held these billets (as indicated by the Recruiting Service Ribbon) are much 
more likely to be selected as a Primary than those who have not. However, this billet does 
not matter when being selected as an Alternate. Again, this finding is in alignment with the 
Commandant’s Precepts that these officers should be considered eminently qualified for 
command. It also demonstrates that the board follows the precepts. 
Next, I perform the same analysis but use command type as the outcome instead of 
using only selection outcome. The Marine Corps does not explicitly state that one type of 
command is more important than another. However, the board votes on Primary MOS  
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commands before Strung commands and slates officers to Operational Force commands 
before Supporting Establishment commands. Figure 12 shows the number of validated 
command types for each board.  
 
Figure 12. Command Type Distribution (FY15–FY19) 
Table 12 shows the results of the analysis when I interact Primary MOS (PMOS) 
and Strung commands with Operational Forces (OPFOR) and Supporting Establishment 
(SPTEST) commands and use them as the outcome variables. These results look at those 
officers who were selected as Primaries and slated to one of these four command types. 
Furthermore, Column (5) indicates whether or not the respective variable’s impact on the 
outcome statistically differs across command types.  
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Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.259*** 1.048 1.161*** 1.143*** 0.006*** 
[0.032] [0.056] [0.045] [0.049]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.255*** 1.194*** 1.252*** 1.224*** 0.797 
[0.032] [0.064] [0.053] [0.055]
Rank O4 2.349*** 1.088 0.995 0.694 0.000*** 
[0.307] [0.321] [0.225] [0.169]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.365*** 1.610 2.820*** 4.203*** 0.000*** 
[0.063] [0.601] [0.794] [1.769]
Aviation PMOS 2.093*** 2.162* 0.396** 5.635*** 0.001*** 
[0.352] [0.893] [0.169] [2.495]
Time In Service 1.016 1.061 0.958 0.906** 0.016**
[0.020] [0.040] [0.031] [0.035]
Female 0.654 2.374* 0.977 2.261** 0.091* 
[0.265] [1.215] [0.430] [0.855]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.743 1.128 0.631 1.450 0.163 
[0.138] [0.388] [0.193] [0.403]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.992 0.597* 0.654** 0.569*** 0.083* 
[0.120] [0.160] [0.136] [0.124]
STEM Degrees 1.161 0.646 0.448** 0.882 0.146 
[0.180] [0.268] [0.182] [0.260]
Number of Deployments 1.078*** 1.111*** 1.115*** 0.999 0.206 
[0.025] [0.043] [0.036] [0.043]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.550** 0.572 0.348** 1.243 0.225 
[0.144] [0.311] [0.170] [0.481]
High PFT (>=285) 1.148 0.957 1.177 1.646** 0.568 
[0.164] [0.326] [0.283] [0.409]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.616** 1.057 1.186 0.405* 0.324 
[0.149] [0.473] [0.448] [0.222]
High CFT (>=285) 1.333* 0.963 1.235 1.084 0.813 
[0.214] [0.316] [0.338] [0.310]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.951 0.342** 1.026 1.005 0.180 
[0.144] [0.154] [0.264] [0.259]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.760** 1.043 1.136 1.049 0.434 
[0.102] [0.307] [0.254] [0.249]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.453*** 2.887** 1.197 1.692* 0.369 
[0.207] [1.236] [0.366] [0.493]
Bronze Star 1.905*** 1.342 0.705 1.104 0.042** 
[0.293] [0.463] [0.200] [0.365]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.929*** 0.934 1.377 1.000 0.403 
[0.393] [0.455] [0.447] [0.450]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to Command Type (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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The results of this table indicate that on average, the board consistently prioritizes 
certain command types over others and stratifies the characteristics that are best and most 
fully qualified for each command type. These results are expected because the mission of 
the Marine Corps is centered on the operational forces. However, what is more interesting 
is that there are statistically significant differences in variables that matter across command 
types. These variables include performance as a captain, rank of major, CSS PMOS, 
aviation PMOS, time in service, female, being assigned to a SPTEST, and having a Bronze 
Star. Ideally, none of these variables would statistically differ across command types. 
As stated previously, there is no official precedence set when it comes to 
determining whether or not one command type is valued more highly than another. 
However, the results of this table indicate that the definition of “best and most fully 
qualified” varies depending on the type of command to which an officer is slated. 
(2) Is the Board Consistent over Time?  
In this next section, I examine the consistency of the board over time using Primary 
and Alternate selection as the two outcomes. Each board is comprised of randomly 
assigned board members who differ each year; however, there are some board members 
who appear twice in this dataset. The purpose of this section is to assess if each board 
values the same variables differently with respect to selection outcomes. I present two 
tables in this section; more tables are provided in Appendix E, which depict the by-year 
variations for command types. The results for Primary selection are shown in Table 13. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.286*** 1.367*** 1.330*** 1.365*** 1.265*** 1.263*** 0.623 
[0.028] [0.068] [0.065] [0.077] [0.066] [0.065]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.342*** 1.309*** 1.330*** 1.426*** 1.478*** 1.352*** 0.691 
[0.030] [0.066] [0.069] [0.080] [0.082] [0.070]
Rank O4 1.789*** 2.092*** 1.640** 1.895** 1.899** 1.716** 0.471 
[0.197] [0.521] [0.411] [0.530] [0.496] [0.454]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.943 0.822 1.022 0.827 0.785 1.338 0.964 
[0.135] [0.284] [0.322] [0.287] [0.256] [0.473]
Aviation PMOS 2.473*** 2.443** 4.509*** 2.231** 1.865* 3.197*** 0.783 
[0.387] [0.879] [1.659] [0.834] [0.667] [1.239]
Time In Service 0.993 0.973 0.949 1.021 0.951 1.029 0.473 
[0.016] [0.039] [0.036] [0.044] [0.036] [0.036]
Female 1.375 2.722* 1.494 1.140 1.991 1.194 0.365 
[0.358] [1.601] [1.149] [0.852] [1.108] [0.639]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.842 1.710 1.858* 0.387** 0.629 0.587 0.776 
[0.125] [0.571] [0.662] [0.166] [0.209] [0.194]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.731*** 0.952 0.491*** 0.595** 0.673 0.881 0.007*** 
[0.076] [0.234] [0.116] [0.150] [0.163] [0.221]
STEM Degrees 0.951 1.145 0.585 1.317 1.459 0.721 0.264 
[0.133] [0.336] [0.192] [0.460] [0.491] [0.232]
Number of Deployments 1.118*** 1.142*** 1.071 1.023 1.264*** 1.178*** 0.168 
[0.024] [0.058] [0.048] [0.053] [0.068] [0.063]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.543*** 0.933 1.006 0.414 0.452* 0.364* 0.031** 
[0.114] [0.397] [0.569] [0.234] [0.195] [0.191]
High PFT (>=285) 1.324** 1.514 2.162*** 1.197 1.635* 0.889 0.475 
[0.166] [0.460] [0.634] [0.368] [0.457] [0.263]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.646** 0.840 0.360* 0.548 1.242 0.379** 0.221 
[0.129] [0.355] [0.193] [0.354] [0.555] [0.174]
High CFT (>=285) 1.339** 1.814 2.201** 1.188 0.672 1.187 0.306 
[0.180] [0.667] [0.873] [0.506] [0.243] [0.302]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.892 0.834 1.228 1.316 0.692 0.568* 0.249 
[0.115] [0.236] [0.349] [0.428] [0.216] [0.183]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.845 0.967 0.977 0.729 0.670 0.700 0.272 
[0.096] [0.244] [0.245] [0.202] [0.183] [0.192]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.802*** 1.251 4.485*** 1.221 2.732*** 1.445 0.765 
[0.235] [0.348] [1.547] [0.360] [0.891] [0.439]
Bronze Star 1.679*** 1.071 1.354 2.163** 2.552*** 1.588 0.012** 
[0.232] [0.342] [0.415] [0.713] [0.796] [0.589]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.770*** 0.810 1.320 2.995** 2.216* 2.412** 0.251 
[0.321] [0.388] [0.551] [1.355] [0.913] [0.997]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.212 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 561 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected as a Primary (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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Column (7) indicates whether or not each board statistically differs from the others 
across all five years of the sample, as depicted in Columns (2) through (6). As shown in 
the Column (7), on average and holding all else constant, the boards are consistent with 
what they value when selecting an officer as a Primary. The three variables that statistically 
differ between the boards include if the officer was assigned to a supporting establishment 
unit, if the officer did not have a first class PFT, and if the officer had a bronze star at the 
time of the board. Additionally, the boards are consistent regarding the impact of each 
statistically significant variable, though both the magnitude of the coefficients and the level 
of significance might change. Race is the only variable where this statement does not  
hold true.  
I run the same analysis using Alternate as the selection outcome. Table 14 displays 
the results of this analysis. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.010 1.017 0.931 0.954 1.048 1.125** 0.099* 
[0.023] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] [0.056] [0.065]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.081*** 1.140*** 1.052 1.117** 0.980 1.135** 0.175 
[0.025] [0.056] [0.055] [0.060] [0.051] [0.064]
Rank O4 1.014 0.978 2.134** 0.810 1.113 0.403*** 0.004*** 
[0.130] [0.272] [0.628] [0.249] [0.327] [0.132]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.887 0.859 1.070 1.063 0.667 0.866 0.889 
[0.143] [0.327] [0.389] [0.400] [0.230] [0.349]
Aviation PMOS 1.089 1.456 0.992 1.300 0.677 0.979 0.679 
[0.191] [0.585] [0.406] [0.527] [0.254] [0.430]
Time In Service 1.010 1.065 1.132*** 0.927 0.959 0.969 0.006*** 
[0.018] [0.044] [0.047] [0.044] [0.041] [0.042]
Female 0.476** 0.653 0.515 0.577 0.436 0.348 0.982 
[0.170] [0.513] [0.552] [0.458] [0.336] [0.268]
Race Other (Non-White) 1.003 0.755 0.852 2.042** 0.621 1.086 0.120 
[0.157] [0.290] [0.331] [0.666] [0.233] [0.398]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.914 1.222 0.910 0.874 1.134 0.610* 0.465 
[0.107] [0.333] [0.248] [0.233] [0.294] [0.176]
STEM Degrees 0.879 0.919 1.208 1.029 0.525 0.834 0.615 
[0.137] [0.299] [0.414] [0.366] [0.228] [0.311]
Number of Deployments 0.984 0.891* 0.963 1.050 0.982 0.978 0.263 
[0.024] [0.057] [0.053] [0.054] [0.054] [0.062]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 1.055 1.764 0.505 1.335 0.875 0.945 0.491 
[0.210] [0.708] [0.326] [0.616] [0.396] [0.428]
High PFT (>=285) 1.091 1.323 1.096 0.853 1.127 1.234 0.938 
[0.160] [0.471] [0.393] [0.317] [0.329] [0.437]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.832 0.966 0.561 0.701 0.908 1.232 0.827 
[0.182] [0.447] [0.315] [0.456] [0.539] [0.530]
High CFT (>=285) 1.088 1.395 0.541 1.120 3.218** 0.791 0.089* 
[0.163] [0.534] [0.206] [0.505] [1.828] [0.248]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 1.376** 1.785** 1.080 0.961 1.317 2.080** 0.393 
[0.185] [0.517] [0.369] [0.318] [0.385] [0.656]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 1.148 0.947 0.949 1.494 1.392 1.072 0.673 
[0.142] [0.260] [0.280] [0.419] [0.373] [0.324]
Meritorious Service Medal 0.836 1.525 0.603 0.678 0.739 0.665 0.220 
[0.117] [0.493] [0.204] [0.208] [0.235] [0.231]
Bronze Star 0.915 0.754 0.952 1.160 0.843 1.088 0.935 
[0.145] [0.283] [0.344] [0.413] [0.289] [0.451]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 0.813 0.940 1.143 0.557 0.704 0.707 0.893 
[0.190] [0.484] [0.562] [0.356] [0.360] [0.405]
Constant 4.11e-05*** 2.86e-08*** 0.160 0.00143 0.0187 9.96e-11***
[0.000] [0.000] [1.022] [0.009] [0.119] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 561 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected as an Alternate (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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These results indicate that the board broadly defines “best and most fully qualified” 
with respect to Alternate selections. As shown in the Column (7), on average and holding 
all else constant, the boards are consistent in how they select Alternates. However, this 
consistency must be qualified by the fact that very few variables predict this selection. A 
majority of the variables are not statistically significant, and those that are, appear as such 
on only one board.  
According to these results, boards appear to be much less definitive about what 
matters when selecting Alternates as they are when selecting Primaries. For example, 
variables such as performance as a Captain, rank, and deployments, physical fitness, and 
awards do not affect the selection to Alternate; but these variables are important for 
selection to Primary. Furthermore, most of the variables that do seem to matter for 
Alternates are different than those that matter for Primaries. For example, variables such 
as being female, time in service, and rifle scores have a statistically significant impact on 
Alternate selection; these variables were not statistically significant for selection to 
Primary.  
(3) Does the board select officers who are similar to them?  
The purpose of this section is to examine whether or not the board members select 
officers who resemble the board members. This analysis originates from the literature that 
suggests that civilian hiring committees hire applicants who are similar to them. However, 
the literature suggests that besides physical features, these similarities are also apparent in 
hobbies, family details, and educational background. I do not have access to hobby 
information, family details, and educational background of both the board members and 
eligible officers; instead, I conduct this analysis using gender, race, PFT scores, 
deployment history, STEM degrees, and Bronze Star awards. 
I use two different interactions in these models. The first interaction is between the 
eligible officer and the board member who briefed them. The second interaction is between 
the eligible officer and the percentage of the board. The purpose is to show any effect of  
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the individual board member/briefer on selection outcomes, as well as the effect of the 
percent of the board on selection outcomes. 
Gender. The first model I run in this section examines gender similarities between 
the board and the eligible officers. Table 15 shows the results of the gender interactions.  
Table 15. Selection Rates Based on Gender Composition of Board 
 
 
As shown in Table 15, the only statistically significant interaction variable is that 
between female eligible offices and female briefers for selection to Primary. Figure 13 
provides a graphical interpretation of the results.  


















Female Screened Officer 0.844 1.224 1.233 2.306 0.525* 0.353 0.082* 0.186 
[0.204] [0.883] [0.335] [1.896] [0.189] [0.373]
Female Briefer 0.971 0.773 1.253 0.187 
[0.185] [0.172] [0.276]
Female Screened Officer and Female Briefer 2.045 4.385* -- 0.018** 
[1.711] [3.896]
Percent of Board Female 0.210 0.0794 1.123 0.510 
[0.446] [0.192] [2.960]
Female Screened Officer and Percent of Board Female 0.00487 0.000172 124.4 0.533 
[0.056] [0.002] [1,973.817]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 4.44e-05*** 4.04e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,826 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on Female Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, 




Figure 13. Interaction Plots of Gender Similarities (FY15–FY19) 
As shown in the top row, female eligible officers benefit much more than male 
eligible officers from having a female briefer, and more than female eligible officers with 
male briefers. However, this is only relevant with respect to Primary selection. Male 
eligible officers with male briefers are more likely to be selected than females with male 
briefers; and female eligible officers do not get selected as Alternates if they have a female 
briefer, whereas males received a marginal benefit.  
The bottom row indicates that both male and female eligible officers have the same 
probability of selection if the board members are all male. However, as the percent of the 
board that is female increases, the probability of a female eligible officer being selected at 
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all decreases more rapidly than for male eligible officers. Moreover, though female eligible 
officers have a higher probability of Primary selection than male eligible officers when the 
board members are all male, an increase in female board members yields an observable 
negative effect on Primary selection.  
Race. The next model examines race similarities between the board members and 
the eligible officers. Table 16 shows the results of these interactions. 
Table 16. Selection Based on Race Composition of Board 
 
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between non-white eligible officers 
and the percent of the board that is not white. As shown in Columns (2) and (6), non-white 
eligible officers are much less likely to be selected at all or as Alternates, respectively, as 
the number of non-white board members increases. Figure 14 shows the graphical 
depiction of this outcome. 
The results in the top row indicate that non-white eligible officers benefit more 
from having a non-white briefer than white eligible officers. If the briefer is white, non-
white eligible officers have a lower probability of being selected as a Primary than white 
eligible officers. However, if the briefer is not white, non-white eligible officers have a 
higher probability of Primary selection than white eligible officers. There is no observable 
effect with Alternate selection. 


















Non-White Screened Officer 0.880 2.094* 0.779 0.832 1.004 3.507** 0.344 0.107 
[0.122] [0.940] [0.129] [0.457] [0.173] [1.901]
Non-White Briefer 0.964 0.956 1.029 0.772 
[0.130] [0.144] [0.175]
Non-White Screened Officer and Non-White Briefer 1.255 1.507 0.991 0.486 
[0.394] [0.554] [0.394]
Percent of Board Non-White 0.741 0.193 4.834 0.130 
[0.820] [0.239] [6.805]
Non-White Screened Officer and Percent of Board Non-White 0.00525* 1.151 0.000284** 0.134 
[0.015] [3.861] [0.001]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 4.16e-05*** 2.89e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on Race Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: 




Figure 14. Interaction Plots of Race Similarities (FY15–FY19) 
The bottom row indicates that with every additional non-white board member, non-
white eligible officers are much less likely to be selected at all, even though they initially 
have a higher probability of selection than white eligible officers when the board members 
are all white. Moreover, effect of additional non-white board members has the same effect 
on white and non-white eligible officers for Primary selection but has an opposite effect 
for selection as an Alternate. 
MOS. Table 17 shows the results of the MOS interactions. Of note, I use the AMOS 
of the Colonels in this analysis because they are aligned with the PMOS of the eligible 
officer (the Marine Corps categorizes Colonel MOSs differently than at the ranks of second 
lieutenant through lieutenant colonel). 
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Table 17. Selection Based on MOS Composition of Board 
 
 














CSS PMOS Screened Officer 1.460 0 1.122 48,053 1.623 5,935
[0.874] [0.000] [0.762] [5154413.495] [1.151] [689,140.490]
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer 1.558 0 0.859 0* 2.461 4.637e+12
[0.987] [0.000] [0.630] [0.000] [1.940] [5.562e+14]
CSS Colonel Briefer 1.058 2.044 0.389
[0.653] [1.454] [0.304]
Aviation Colonel Briefer 1.421 2.291 0.551
[0.899] [1.677] [0.432]
General Officer Briefer 0.667 0.916 0.513
[0.400] [0.624] [0.373]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and CSS Colonel Briefer 0.979 0.498 2.584
[0.640] [0.374] [2.138]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Aviation Colonel Briefer 0.531 0.351 1.481
[0.357] [0.272] [1.244]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and General Officer Briefer 1.254 0.783 2.237
[0.847] [0.605] [1.841]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Ground Combat Colonel Briefer 0.557 0.789 0.487
[0.329] [0.530] [0.341]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and CSS Colonel Briefer 0.604 0.434 1.383
[0.514] [0.422] [1.447]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Aviation Colonel Briefer 0.359 0.264 1.039
[0.312] [0.264] [1.094]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and General Officer Briefer - - -
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Ground Combat Colonel Briefer 1.674 3.380* 0.426
[1.054] [2.461] [0.333]
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and CSS Colonel Briefer - - -
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Aviation Colonel Briefer - - -
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and General Officer Briefer 2.543 4.598 0.501
[2.200] [4.518] [0.555]
Percent of Board CSS Colonel 0 0* 4.006e+08
[0.000] [0.000] [2.573e+10]
Percent of Board Aviation Colonel 1.843e+69 1.534e+118 0
[2.851e+71] [2.598e+120] [0.000]
Percent of Board General Officer 1.549e+72 0 0
[7.283e+74] [0.000] [0.000]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board CSS Colonel 1.197e+29 1.344e+47* 3.57e-07
[6.590e+30] [8.095e+48] [0.000]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Aviation Colonel 0 0* 3.225e+19
[0.000] [0.000] [6.011e+21]
Ground Combat PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board General Officer 0 1.870e+07 9.858e+09
[0.000] [1.045e+10] [5.985e+12]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Ground Combat Colonel 7,353 2.01e-06 0.000555
[333,818.075] [0.000] [0.032]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board CSS Colonel 5.956e+15 3.018e+43 2.58e-08
[4.275e+17] [2.449e+45] [0.000]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Aviation Colonel 0 0 3.941e+14
[0.000] [0.000] [1.009e+17]
CSS PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board General Officer - - -
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Ground Combat Colonel 4.486e+21 2.178e+36 3.15e-07
[2.228e+23] [1.186e+38] [0.000]
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board CSS Colonel - - -
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board Aviation Colonel - - -
Aviation PMOS Screened Officer and Percent of Board General Officer 1.147e+169 0
[7.994e+171] [.] [0.000]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 3.34e-05*** 0.00120
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on MOS Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 
2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were 
screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, 
Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, 
and Pistol Expert. 
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The results of Table 17 indicate that neither the MOS composition of the board nor 
the MOS similarity between the eligible officer and the briefer has an effect on the selection 
outcomes. These results indicate that there is no evidence against the notion that the board 
is fair and equitable when it comes to command selection. However, one explanation for 
this result is that the MOS categories are too broad and do not allow for enough variation 
in the analysis. I do not provide plots of these results due to the density of this particular 
model and lack of statistical significance between the interactions.  
High PFT. The next two models examines physical fitness similarities between the 
board members and the eligible officers. Table 18 shows the results of the interactions 
based on eligible officers and board members having High PFT scores. 
Table 18. Selection Based on High PFT Composition of Board 
 
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between eligible officers with High 
PFTs and briefers with High PFT scores. As shown in Column (5), eligible officers with 
High PFTs are much more likely to be selected as Alternates if their briefer also has a High 
PFT. Figure 15 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome. 
 


















High PFT Screened Officer 1.200 1.370* 1.322** 1.463** 0.919 1.000 0.142 0.230 
[0.155] [0.228] [0.185] [0.263] [0.155] [0.214]
High PFT Briefer 0.843 0.984 0.762 0.343 
[0.116] [0.151] [0.141]
High PFT Screened Officer and High PFT Briefer 1.797** 1.011 2.218** 0.131 
[0.514] [0.311] [0.751]
Percent of Board High PFT 1.246 1.166 1.286 0.864 
[0.372] [0.395] [0.483]
High PFT Screened Officer and Percent of Board High PFT 0.875 0.578 1.487 0.441 
[0.572] [0.409] [1.190]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 3.90e-05*** 5.29e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on High PFT Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: 




Figure 15. Interaction Plots of High PFT Similarities (FY15–FY19) 
The top row indicates that with respect to Alternate selection, eligible officers with 
High PFTs benefit greatly from having a briefer with a High PFT but eligible officers who 
do not have High PFTs are negatively affected. Furthermore, eligible officers with High 
PFTs have a higher probability of being selected as a Primary than those eligible officers 
who do not, but there is no briefer effect on for either group.  
The bottom row indicates that an increase in board members with High PFTs 
actually has an opposite effect on eligible officers in both categories with respect to 
Primary selection, and a positive effect on eligible officers in both categories when it comes 
to Alternate selection.  
PFT Other. Table 19 shows the results of the interactions based on eligible officers 
and board members who do not have a 1stClass PFT. 
87 
Table 19. Selection Based on PFT Other Composition of Board 
 
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between selection outcomes and the 
percent of the board that does not have a 1stClass PFT. There are no statistically significant 
relationships with the interaction variables. Figure 16 shows the graphical depiction of this 
outcome. 
 
Figure 16. Interaction Plots of PFT Other Similarities (FY15–FY19) 


















PFT Other Screened Officer 0.719* 0.833 0.520*** 0.473** 1.102 1.528 0.025** 0.030** 
[0.124] [0.231] [0.116] [0.167] [0.226] [0.512]
PFT Other Briefer 1.286 1.189 1.240 0.889 
[0.203] [0.207] [0.240]
PFT Other Screened Officer and PFT Other Briefer 0.915 1.544 0.587 0.399 
[0.507] [0.981] [0.464]
Percent of Board PFT Other 7.994*** 11.73*** 1.680 0.094* 
[4.878] [7.982] [1.298]
PFT Other Screened Officer and Percent of Board PFT Other 0.223 6.561 0.0147 0.219 
[0.546] [19.654] [0.048]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 4.08e-05*** 3.79e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on PFT Other Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: 
LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and 
Pistol Expert. 
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Eligible officers with 1stClass PFTs have a higher selection probability than those 
eligible officers who do not have a 1stClass PFT. With respect to Primary selections, 
eligible officers without 1stClass PFTs benefit more from having a briefer who does not 
have a 1stClass PFT but are actually at a disadvantage for Alternate selection. However, 
these results are not statistically significant. 
The bottom row is also interesting considering the only statistically significant 
variable in this model is the percent of the board without 1stClass PFTs. Eligible officers 
who do not have a 1stClass PFT are impacted more by an increase in number of board 
members who also do not have a 1stClass PFT than those eligible officers with 1stClass 
PFTs, though this impact is positive for Primary selection and negative for Alternate 
selection. 
Deployments. The next model looks at the deployment similarities between eligible 
officers and board members. Table 20 shows the results of the deployment interactions. 
Table 20. Selection Based on Deployment Composition of Board 
 
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of times an 
eligible officer has deployed and a briefer’s number of deployments with respect to 
selection as an Alternate. Additionally, there is a positive relationship between an increase 


















Deployments of Screened Officer 1.073** 0.805 1.153*** 0.819 0.925* 0.961 0.000*** 0.485 
[0.036] [0.109] [0.043] [0.120] [0.040] [0.156]
Deployments of Briefer 1.009 1.051 0.960 0.085* 
[0.028] [0.033] [0.032]
Deployments of Screened Officer and Deployments of Briefer 1.004 0.994 1.012* 0.104 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
Number of Deployments of Board 0.853 0.828 1.057 0.271 
[0.111] [0.120] [0.165]
Deployments Screened Officer and Number of Deployments of Board 1.061** 1.063** 1.004 0.201 
[0.028] [0.030] [0.031]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 4.80e-05*** 3.77e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on Deployments Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: 
LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and 
Pistol Expert. 
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in both the number of eligible officer deployments and number of deployments of the board 
members. Figure 17 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome. 
 
Figure 17. Interaction Plots of Deployment Similarities (FY15–FY19) 
The top row indicates that for Primary selection, eligible officers with more 
deployments have a higher probability of being selected, though those with 4–5 
deployments benefit marginally from having a briefer with more deployments. However, 
eligible officers with less deployments initially have a higher probability of being selected 
as an Alternate than those eligible officers with more deployments; but as the briefer’s 
number of deployments increase, those eligible officers with less deployments experience 
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a decrease in probability of selection to Alternate, whereas those eligible officers with more 
deployments experience an increase in selection probability.  
The bottom row results indicate that officers with more deployments benefit from 
an increase in percentage of the board with more deployments. However, those eligible 
officers with 0–3 deployments are more likely to be selected as Primaries than any other 
group, and equally likely to be selected as Alternates as those with 4–5 deployments.  
STEM Degree. The next model looks at the education similarities between eligible 
officers and board members. I include this analysis to address the increased attention the 
Marine Corps has placed on attracting and retaining Marines with STEM Degrees. Table 
21 shows the results of the STEM Degree interactions. 
Table 21. Selection Based on STEM Degree Composition of Board 
 
 
There are no statistically significant relationships with the interaction variables. 
Figure 18 shows the graphical depiction of this outcome. 
 


















STEM Degree Screened Officer 0.935 0.410* 1.006 0.628 0.874 0.437 0.583 0.716 
[0.123] [0.217] [0.152] [0.375] [0.147] [0.299]
STEM Degree Briefer 1.170 1.263 0.926 0.252 
[0.161] [0.190] [0.164]
STEM Degree Screened Officer and STEM Degree Briefer 0.739 0.696 1.040 0.514 
[0.252] [0.267] [0.463]
Percent of Board STEM Degree 0.265 1.039 0.0884 0.406 
[0.411] [1.810] [0.173]
STEM Degree Screened Officer and Percent of Board STEM Degree 222.9 17.61 128.1 0.765 
[791.198] [70.747] [581.208]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 4.10e-05*** 8.49e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on STEM Degree Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: 




Figure 18. Interaction Plots of STEM Degree Similarities 
The top row indicates that eligible officers with STEM Degrees have a lower 
selection probability than eligible officers without STEM Degrees. Furthermore, eligible 
officers without STEM Degrees benefit more from having a briefer with a STEM Degree 
than eligible officers with STEM Degrees with respect to Primary selection.  
However, the bottom row indicates that eligible officers with STEM Degrees 
benefit much more than eligible officers without STEM Degrees as the number of board 
members with STEM Degrees increases. 
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There are a few possible reasons for this outcome. First, there may not be that many 
officers or board members with STEM degrees, so the sample size needs to be expanded. 
Second, STEM degrees may not be good indicators for “quality officers” as currently 
defined by the Marine Corps, so those with STEM degrees are not performing well in other 
areas. Lastly, the manpower databases do not accurately reflect an officer’s degree, and 
therefore the analysis does not accurately capture the effect of STEM degrees on the 
selection outcome. The important takeaway from this model is that these results seem to 
indicate that STEM degrees are either irrelevant or have the opposite effect that the Marine 
Corps states it wants, unless it also increases the number of board members with STEM 
Degrees. 
Bronze Star Award. The next model looks at the similarities between eligible 
officers and board members with Bronze Stars. Table 22 shows the results of the STEM 
Degree interactions. 
Table 22. Selection Based on Bronze Star Composition of Board 
 
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between selection outcomes and the 
percent of the board that has a Bronze Star. There are no statistically significant 
relationships with the interaction variables. Figure 19 shows the graphical depiction of this 
outcome. 


















Screened Officer with Bronze Star 1.729*** 3.959 1.557** 2.523 1.214 1.781 0.480 0.834 
[0.335] [3.398] [0.336] [2.365] [0.285] [1.944]
Briefer with Bronze Star 1.103 1.086 1.041 0.833 
[0.116] [0.130] [0.137]
Screened Officer with Bronze Star and Briefer with Bronze Star 0.792 1.115 0.636 0.194 
[0.181] [0.282] [0.183]
Percent of Board with Bronze Star 8.112*** 11.12*** 1.386 0.081* 
[5.036] [7.844] [1.084]
Screened Officer with Bronze Star and Percent of Board with Bronze Sta 0.205 0.504 0.346 0.886 
[0.275] [0.738] [0.595]
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 4.10e-05*** 8.49e-05***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Selected Based on Bronze Star Composition of the Board (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were 
removed from the observations. Base category for Eligible Officers is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective board having the following 
characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle 
Expert, and Pistol Expert.
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Figure 19. Interaction Plots of Bronze Star Similarities  
The top row indicates that eligible officers with Bronze Stars have a much higher 
selection probability than eligible officers without Bronze Stars, and benefit equally from 
a having a briefer with a Bronze Star for selection as a Primary. However, if the briefer has 
a Bronze Star, eligible officers with Bronze Stars are less likely to be selected as Alternates 
than eligible officers without Bronze Stars. This makes sense considering eligible officers 
with Bronze Stars are much more likely to be selected as Primaries. 
The bottom row indicates a similar effect. However, even eligible officers who do 
not have Bronze Stars benefit from having more board members with the award.  
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(4) Survey Respondents on Board Composition 
I include a section in the survey that asks the participants to answer questions 
regarding the relevance of board composition on selection outcomes. Table 23 lists these 
questions and respective response rates. 
Table 23. Survey Responses on Board Composition 
 
 
Board members report valuing diversity of thought, experience, and perspective 
when it comes to reducing biases and ensuring the best and most fully qualified are selected 
for command. The respondents further believe that a diverse MOS cross-section within the 
board is essential in ensuring all MOSs are given a fair and equitable opportunity to 
command. With respect to slating, the board members believe composition is still relevant, 
but identify that MOS and experience is more important than gender and race. However, 
MMOA-3 currently has a greater role in slating commanders, so this question may be less 
relevant altogether. Also, all respondents believe there was adequate distribution of board 
member experience. As stated throughout this thesis, board members are selected for their 
vast experience and proven performance. 
Many of the respondents believe that their boards had adequate minority and gender 
representation, considering that on average boards have only 1–3 board members who 
represent each of these categories. These responses might be associated with the fact that 
these categories are adequately represented on the board given the demographic makeup 
of the Marine Corps officer ranks and/or the population of the eligible officers screened by 
their respective boards. However, what I find most intriguing about this section of 
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questions is the responses surrounding briefing experience, board member experience, and 
voting. The respondents were able to provide open-text responses throughout this survey; 
the following provides discussion of those specific responses. 
As shown in Table 23, the respondents do not agree about board member 
experience and briefer experience. Many of the survey respondents express that briefing 
experience matters initially, but once the board settles in after a couple of days, briefing 
experience and board member experience even out and no longer matter. Some respondents 
also state that the board members hold each other accountable to ensure every eligible 
officer receives a fair screening. Additionally, one respondent states that a briefer’s 
influence does not matter because all board members have access to the eligible officer’s 
record and can decide on their own how to vote.  
In contrast, a few respondents state that MOS experience and knowledge influenced 
their voting at times, but board member and/or briefer experience did not. Another 
respondent stated that briefer quality is important in the later stages of the board when 
board members might be fatigued. There were also a few other recurrent themes in the 
comments worth discussing separately.  
The first theme centers on board members advocating for their packages. 
 
“This said, it is not a competition to see who can get the most packages selected. Board 
[members] need to call it as objectively as possible.” 
 
“It’s easy to think that ‘personality’ in the board room can help with advocating … it is 
not necessarily true … at least not for me … we keep each other honest in the board 
room.” 
 
“Clearly…some board members viewed their role to “advocate” for their guy they were 
briefing… (NOT necessarily) calling ‘balls & strikes.’ I disagreed with this approach … 






The second theme highlights the impact of senior ranking board members on board 
room discussions and voting outcomes. 
 
“I also found that most of the Marines in the room were comfortable in making 
statements with the exception of GO involvement. When the GOs spoke, debate was 
quelled. My impression is that this did not change the voting, it only stopped the debate.” 
 
“Although I do not believe I was influenced in my decisions, board presidents and senior 
members absolutely must be cognizant of the timing of their opinion comments, because 
unintentionally they could influence decisions.” 
 
“The board president’s comments changed the outcome of the many votes with a simple 
sentence whether accurate or inaccurate. Powerful. The endurance of the board 
[members] especially at the end waned and thus the longer the board the more powerful 
the impact.” 
 
There is little way of knowing how much advocacy and rank seniority actually 
influence the voting process and selection outcomes. The point of this discussion is to 
provide information regarding what board members think about board room dynamics and 
factors that might influence selection decisions. This feedback could potentially benefit 
future board rooms by understanding what past board members experienced and observed 
and any impact those experiences may have had on the selection outcomes. 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #2 
Is there a correlation between the number of voting iterations required by the 
board to select an officer and that officer’s performance in command? The purpose of 
this question is to assess whether or not there is a difference in officer quality of those who 
get selected as Primaries and slated to command, as determined by how many voting 
iterations the board used to select an officer and how that officer performed while in 
command. 
The number of voting iterations varies by board. Not only does the board president 




sub-boards used in each board (the voting process is explained in detail in Chapter II). As 
such, these sub-boards are inconsistent across all of the boards in this sample. Instead of 
analyzing the voting iterations within each sub-board, I aggregate the total number of times 
an eligible officer appears in a voting iteration per fiscal year board. The logic behind this 
course of action is that the board selects the highest quality officers in the first voting 
iteration, but it takes more iterations to decide on those officers who might be less 
obviously qualified. 
There are two models that I use to answer this question. First, I look at the total 
number of voting iterations it takes for the board to select an officer as a Primary. The 
second model compares performance of those selected in the first voting iteration against 
those selected in all other voting iterations. Furthermore, I run these models using both the 
Reporting Senior and Reviewing Officer cumulative values to determine if one is a better 
predictor than the other. As a reminder, I use an Ordinary Least Squares regression model 
in this analysis, so the coefficients are interpreted differently than those in the previously 
used Logistic, Odds Ratio models.  
Table 24 provides the descriptive statistics for all Fitness Reports during lieutenant 
colonel command. Additionally, Figure 20 shows the distribution of FitRep performance 
while in command. Most of the observations are from those officers selected on the 
FY2015–FY2017 boards. This is due to the difference in timing between when each board 
convenes and when officers typically assume command the following year.  
Table 24. Descriptive Statistics of LtCol Command Fitness Reports  
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LtCol RS Cumulative 523 93.820 4.635 80 100
LtCol RO Cumulative 521 0.360 0.683 -3.989 2.099
Command Performance Summary Statistics (FY15-FY19)
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Figure 20. Distribution of Performance during LtCol Command 
Table 24 and Figure 20 show that, on average, officers receive above-average 
Fitness Reports as lieutenant colonel commanders. 
Next, I examine when the board selects eligible officers as Primaries. Figure 21 
shows the distribution of Primary Selection by voting iterations for each fiscal year board 


























Figure 21. Primary Selection Distribution by Voting Iteration 
As shown, on average the board makes about 55 percent of Primary selections in 
the first voting iteration, though the distribution varies with each board. For example, the 
FY2017 board made over 70 percent of its Primary selections in the first voting iteration; 
in contrast, the FY2015 board made its Primary selections throughout many more voting 
iterations.  
To begin the statistical analysis, I examine the correlation between how an officer 
performs in command (as measured by FitReps) and how many voting iterations the board 
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Table 25. Relationship between LtCol Command Performance and 
Number of Voting Iterations (FY15–FY19) 
 
 
The results of Table 25 indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the voting iteration in which an officer was selected as a Primary and how that 
officer performed while in command.  
The second model examines the relationship between those eligible officers 
selected as Primaries in the first voting iteration and how they performed in command as 
compared to the performance of those who were selected as Primaries in any other voting 
iteration. Table 26 displays these results. 




















Number of Voting Iterations to be Selected as Primary -0.082 -0.040 0.038 0.012 0.019 0.026
[0.129] [0.126] [0.140] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023]
Captain (RS Cumulative) 0.121 0.093 0.013 0.013
[0.090] [0.093] [0.015] [0.015]
Major (RS Cumulative) 0.398*** 0.340*** 0.071*** 0.064***
[0.093] [0.100] [0.015] [0.016]
Control Variables N N Y N N Y
Constant 94.01*** 45.31*** 51.62*** 0.273*** -7.590*** -6.837***
[0.349] [10.460] [11.433] [0.058] [1.726] [1.878]
N 409 409 409 410 410 410
R-Squared 0.001 0.059 0.099 0.001 0.060 0.104
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Relationship Between LtCol Command Performance and Number of Voting Iterations (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 
1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at 
the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, 
Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol 
Expert. 
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Table 26. Relationship between LtCol Command Performance and 
Officers Selected in the First Voting Iteration (FY15–FY19) 
 
 
The results of Table 26 indicate that there is no statistically significant difference 
in command performance between those eligible officers selected as Primaries in the first 
voting iteration and those who were not. Column (1) shows that when looking only at those 
selected in the first voting iteration, those selected in the first voting iteration have a 0.766–
point higher RS cumulative value while in command than those who are not selected in the 
first voting iteration. However, any statistical significance disappears once other variables 
are included in the model, as shown in Columns (2) and (3). RO cumulative values are 
never statistically significant.  
These models may not be that strong over half of the eligible officers are selected 
as Primaries in the first voting iteration. Furthermore, there is only a small number (1–3) 
of command Fitness Reports on each commander. Moreover, of those in my sample, most 
of the command Fitness Reports are from those officers selected as Primaries in FY2015–
FY2017 command selection boards. There are only a few selected on the FY2018 board 
with command Fitness Reports, and none from FY2019 because they have not yet taken 
command at the time this thesis was written. Additionally, not all of those officers with 




















Selected as Primary in Voting Iteration #1 0.766* 0.341 0.148 0.052 -0.013 -0.044
[0.404] [0.404] [0.452] [0.066] [0.066] [0.074]
Captain (RS CV Point Increase) 0.096 0.079 0.010 0.008
[0.082] [0.084] [0.013] [0.014]
Major (RS CV Point Increase) 0.405*** 0.352*** 0.066*** 0.058***
[0.086] [0.092] [0.014] [0.015]
Control Variables N N Y N N Y
Constant 93.30*** 46.60*** 52.01*** 0.260*** -6.879*** -5.845***
[0.263] [9.770] [10.579] [0.043] [1.596] [1.730]
N 519 519 519 521 521 521
R-Squared 0.007 0.057 0.099 0.001 0.049 0.088
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Relationship Between LtCol Command Performance and Officers Selected in the First Voting Iteration
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 
1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at 
the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, 
Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol 
Expert. 
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command Fitness Reports had RS and/or RO cumulative values so I remove them from my 
analysis. 
These models show that on average, all commanders receive above-average Fitness 
Reports, regardless of when the board selects them. As shown in the descriptive statistics, 
there are those who receive RS cumulative values of 80 and those who receive 100s, but 
on average, there is no distinction between officer quality and the voting iteration in which 
someone is selected to command. As such, Fitness Reports—or how a commander 
performs while in command—are not an adequate measure of how well the command 
screening program is working. 
The importance of Table 25 and Table 26 cannot be overstated. Voting iterations 
are not an indication of officer quality and how an officer performs while in command. 
Furthermore, Fitness Reports as a major are still highly statistically significant after 
controlling for all other observable factors. Combining these results with the fact briefer 
does not matter either, this means we are taking 19 board members away from their primary 
billets and responsibilities to make decisions that could essentially be done by a computer.  
D. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION #3 
 How should the Marine Corps measure CSP effectiveness? According to JP 3-0, 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) reveal whether or not desired conditions or effects are 
being created within an operating environment (Department of Defense, 2018). When it 
comes to the CSP, the desired effect is “that Marines receive the best possible leadership 
and to provide all eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command” 
(USMC, 2017, p. 1). Using board observations and survey results, I believe the CSP 
generally meets the desired condition of providing a fair and equitable opportunity for 
officers to command. As such, the MOEs discussed in this section focus on the other 
desired effect: ensuring Marines receive the best possible leadership. 
One hundred percent of the survey respondents believe that the CSP is effective, 
but there is a clear divide between the respondents when asked how to measure the CSP’s 
effectiveness. According to survey results, 45 percent of the respondents agree the Marine 
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Corps has well-established measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the CSP, whereas the 
other 55 percent disagree. 
From those who agree, the responses include statements such as: 
“Slating high quality officers.” 
“Performance of commanders and their units.” 
“How many commanders get fired.” 
“Successful MCCRE, MCCAT, CGI, and FSMAO.” 
“Selection to TLS and O6 promotion.” 
In contrast, those who disagree provide the following responses: 
“I’m not sure we have an objective measure.” 
“I don’t know.” 
“Do we measure effectiveness?” 
“If we have MOEs, I don’t know about them.” 
“It doesn’t.” 
Furthermore, though there is debate on whether or not the Marine Corps has CSP 
MOEs, only eight percent of the respondents believe the Marine Corps should create better 
CSP MOEs. Many of the respondents convey the difficulty—and danger—in trying to tie 
statistics and metrics to subjective and intangible qualities associated with leadership; 
others state that it would not be worth the time and effort to create MOEs. Moreover, a few 
of the respondents state that the Marine Corps should use existing MOEs such as an 
officer’s record and command climate surveys rather than create new MOEs. Of those who 
believe better MOEs are necessary, they recommend including peer reviews, adding 
sections into Fitness Reports, and analyzing trends and causal factors of reliefs. To further 
highlight the difficulty of this question, a few respondents believe better MOEs are 
necessary but plainly state that they do not know what those MOEs would be. 
Implementing MOEs might imply that the CSP needs to be changed in some manner, or 
that it is not currently effective. Although that is possible, the more significant value of 
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MOEs is that they provide the Marine Corps a means to seek self-improvement and 
determine whether or not the desired conditions of the CSP are being met.  
As part of this analysis, I ask the survey respondents to answer two questions about 
the information provided to them on the board. Table 27 displays the questions and 
respective responses. 
Table 27. Survey Responses Regarding CSP Inputs 
 
 
The responses are as expected. A few of the respondents mention that a 360-degree 
review or interview should be added to the process to enable the board members to evaluate 
an eligible officer’s character. One respondent states further that “often the true personality 
of an individual does not come thru in [an] OMPF or board room.” Even so, nearly every 
respondent states that they had sufficient quantitative and qualitative information during 
the screening process. Many of the respondents believe the CSP is as objective as it can be, 
and Fitness Reports provide the best quantitative and qualitative assessment of an officer. 
As discussed throughout this thesis—and repetitively expressed by survey 
respondents—commander reliefs are not a holistic means of capturing the CSP’s 
effectiveness. Likewise, a low relief rate can also be a great indicator that the CSP is 
functioning well. With that stated, commander reliefs are still worth examination, 
especially in the context of understanding the information used by the board to select them. 
Board members make selection decisions based on the information given to them 
(Chapter II presents a discussion of the CSP inputs and voting process in detail). As 
previously mentioned, whereas board members have sufficient information to measure the 
quality and performance of an eligible officer, they cannot always ascertain the character 
of that officer. As such, I explore the voting results of the 11 officers selected on the 
Survey Questions: Perspective Agree (%) Disagree (%)
As a board member, I had sufficient quantitative information to screen the officers 28 96.55% 1 3.45%
As a board member, I had sufficient qualitative information to screen the officers 28 96.55% 1 3.45%
Survey Responses Regarding CSP Inputs
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FY2015–FY2019 boards and subsequently relieved. Table 28 is a summary of those voting 
results. 
Table 28. Voting Results of Commanders Selected on FY15–FY19 
LtCol CSBs and Subsequently Relieved 
 
 
Of the 11 officers relieved, eight were selected as Primaries in the first voting 
iteration with a significant number of “Yes” votes; the other three were nearly unanimous 
selections in their respective voting iterations. All 11 were selected on their Primary MOS 
sub-boards, nine were slated to PMOS-OPFOR commands, and the other two were slated 
to Strung-OPFOR commands. Of further interest, the commander’s rank at the time of the 
board (e.g., O4 or O5) seems to not matter. 
These commanders were not selected as Alternates and then “fleeted-up.” They 
were not selected in the fifth voting iteration, and the board members were not hesitant in 
their selection decisions. This sample size is too small to accurately analyze any 
relationships between command reliefs and contributing factors, but the message is clear: 
FY Board PayGrade Select Status Yes No Status Yes No Status Yes No Status
2015 O5 PRIMARY 19 2 S
2015 O5 PRIMARY 20 1 S
2015 O5 PRIMARY 21 0 S
2015 O4 PRIMARY 18 3 S
2016 O4 PRIMARY 20 0 S
2016 O5 PRIMARY 14 6 18 2 19 1 S
2016 O5 PRIMARY 16 4 18 2 S
2016 O4 PRIMARY 19 1 S
2016 O4 PRIMARY 17 3 19 1 S
2017 O4 PRIMARY 15 4 S
2017 O5 PRIMARY 15 4 S
Voting Results for Relieved Commanders (FY15-FY19)
VI #1 VI #2 VI #3
Note: Each commander's PMOS, slated command, and respective briefer are deliberately removed from this table. This table only 
includes commanders selected on the FY15-FY19 LtCol CSB. It  does not include Colonel commanders, or those LtCol commanders 
relieved during FY15-FY19 but were selected on previous boards.
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these relieved commanders were considered to be the “best of the best” by the board given 
the information provided.  
As shown, there is enough debate surrounding this question to again acknowledge 
there are no simple—or comprehensively correct—answers. With that understanding in 
mind, I provide the following considerations regarding how the Marine Corps can and 
should measure the effectiveness of the CSP, if only as a means to know our processes 
better and seek self-improvement. 
1. Change the Paradigm: Sustainment versus Improvement 
The Marine Corps needs to re-examine its paradigm surrounding what it means to 
be a successful commander. Just because a commander is a high-quality officer and his or 
her respective unit accomplishes its mission, should not mean that commander is 
successful. Commanders at any level can receive great Fitness Reports regardless of how 
well or poorly we lead our Marines, and Marines will always find a way to accomplish the 
mission regardless of how well or poorly we are led. The Marine Corps should focus less 
on the fact the mission was accomplished and focus more on the manner in which it was 
accomplished and the effects of accomplishing the mission on the unit. In short, the Marine 
Corps should be asking whether or not the commander has improved the operational, 
training, and administrative readiness levels of their unit and their Marines, not simply 
sustained these levels. 
This principle of “seeking self-improvement” extends beyond the Marine Corps. 
Take Amazon and the Seattle Seahawks for example. These two organizations hire their 
people using two similar principles: 1) will this person make our organization better; and 
2) does this person want to be better? Amazon’s 14 Leadership Principles and the 
Seahawks’ commitment to character, passion, and excellence make it very clear: there is 
no room for complacency and resting on past successes, only a commitment to improve 
and be better in everything. As such, these two organizations hire individuals who not only 
meet the current standards and fit within the established organizational culture, but also 
have a vision to take themselves and the organization to the next level. 
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Amazon wants people who have vision and take bold risks. In fact, two of 
Amazon’s guiding leadership principles include “Learn and Be Curious” and “Hire and 
Develop the Best.” This means there is an organizational expectation that leaders are 
constantly seeking ways to improve themselves and the organization while raising their 
own level of performance and the performance of those around them. Amazon expects 
boldness, creativity, and relentless improvement from its people; sustainment is neither 
accepted nor allowed. The Seattle Seahawks are guided by the same mindset. 
Seahawks General Manager John Schneider defines the Seahawks as a 
“developmental organization” (J. Schneider, 2018). His vision is to attract people who fit 
within the organization culture, understand their role, buy into the vision, and will help the 
organization consistently perform at a high level. This vision applies to players, coaches, 
trainers, and staff alike. For example, the Seahawks hire assistant coaches who have visions 
to be head coaches, players who want to be starters and all-pros, and trainers who want to 
be head trainers. Seahawks Head Coach, Pete Carroll, echoes this vision in his coaching 
philosophy. To “Win Forever,” every member of the organization must always compete 
and be committed to “doing things better than they have ever been done before” (Carroll, 
Roth, & Garin, 2011, p. 80). As with Amazon, the Seattle Seahawks expect every member 
of their organization to be committed to the constant pursuit of excellence in every area of 
life. In this same way, the Marine Corps must redefine its standard of success when it 
comes to commanders. 
Successful commanders not only accomplish the mission and take care of their 
Marines, but they do so in a manner that is better than what has ever been done before. 
Successful commanders develop their Marines and provide opportunities for them to 
succeed. Successful commanders demand the best from themselves and inspire their 
Marines to do the same. Successful commanders create positive change, they are not 
complacent with simply sustaining or checking a proverbial career progression box. If the 
Marine Corps embraces this paradigm, then it becomes simple to implement Measures of 
Effectiveness, especially since many of these MOEs already exist. 
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2. Use Existing Metrics 
As stated previously, MOEs answer whether or not the CSP is creating the desired 
environment. The CSP is fair and equitable when compared to prior methods or other 
services; however, we also need to understand if Marines are receiving the best possible 
leadership. Leaders accomplish the mission and take care of their Marines; both of these 
actions are measurable and are able to be tied to the CSP. As such, I recommend 
establishing CSP MOEs to assess three areas: the Command Screening Board, unit 
performance, and performance of the commander. 
Command Screening Board. Board members should receive briefs detailing the 
outcomes of past boards and any trends in commander and unit performance. For example, 
board members do not receive any information about how or why commanders are 
relieved. As previously stated, command reliefs are not a direct reflection of the CSP’s 
effectiveness, but the board should be made aware of any trending factors that might be 
something to consider during the selection process. Additionally, the board should be made 
aware of the types of officers selected by past boards to reinforce good practices and reduce 
any negative practices or biases. 
Board members need this feedback; we are doing them a disservice if we are not 
learning from our organizational successes and failures. Feedback is an essential aspect of 
organizational strength and development. The data and analytical tools already exist, we 
only need to implement them into the CSP. The Marine Corps should want its board 
members to be able to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the board and be 
empowered to improve it. In fact, some board members expressed this sentiment to me 
directly while I was observing the board, and others mention the need for feedback in the 
survey responses as well. 
Contrast the CSP review to organizations like the Seattle Seahawks. The Seahawks 
are constantly re-evaluating their draft and hiring processes and re-assessing how and why 
they made certain decisions in order to better refine the process and achieve the desired 
outcome. This is how the Seahawks compete in selecting “the best athletes” or the best 
coaches; they consistently strive to understand their processes and make them more 
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effective and efficient. In the same way, CSP board members should receive feedback on 
past board dynamics and selection trends to ensure they are achieving the Marine Corps’ 
desired endstate. 
Unit Performance. Currently, there is no known correlation between how a unit 
performs and the officer selected by the board to command it. A few of the survey 
respondents state that the Marine Corps uses existing evaluation tools to measure the 
effectiveness of the CSP. These tools include, but are not limited to: MCCREs, MCCATs, 
CGRIs, DRRS, WTIs, ITX, and FSMAOs. Whereas I agree these tools are good metrics 
for unit performance and readiness, I disagree that they are directly tied to the CSP. Board 
members do not currently receive briefs on how well units are performing as a result of the 
commanders. Again, this could go back to the fact that very few commanders are relieved 
and very few units fail their various evaluations and readiness exercises; using these 
successes (or failures) as metrics may not reveal much. Instead, the Marine Corps should 
look at whether or not the unit did better at these exercises and evaluations under the 
respective commanders. To implement this properly, “better” must be defined as well to 
ensure the baseline is set appropriately. However, not only should the Marine Corps assess 
unit performance as measured by the evaluations and readiness exercises, we should also 
be examining how the commander performs.  
Commander Performance. Many of the themes presented in the survey results—
and past research regarding “officer quality”—center around the individual officer. 
However, quality officer is not necessarily synonymous with quality leader. But leadership 
is not about the leader, it is about the led. Warfighting states “Commanders should see the 
development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves” (HQMC, 1997, 
p. 63). So, if we really want to know how effective the CSP is at providing Marines with 
the best leadership, we should also be looking at the development of a commander’s 
Marines.  
Fitness Reports provide an opportunity for evaluation in this area, but I question its 
accuracy as a holistic measure. The truth is much better seen in other existing metrics 
within a unit. I recommend that we look at the following as measures to determine how 
well a commander performs: officer and enlisted retention rates (and associated reasons for 
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separation), meritorious promotions, Marines/NCOs of the Quarter at the Regiment or 
Group levels, SDA packages and school house instructor packages submitted, and Marines 
sent to PME and career-enhancing schools. These measures are a better depiction of how 
well Marines are developing and the emphasis a commander puts on ensuring Marines are 
taken care of. Furthermore, there are more common methods to assess how well a 
commander is developing and taking care of his or her Marines, these include: timeliness 
of Fitness Reports and Pros & Cons, awards approved for Marines in the unit, and 
Command Climate Surveys. These are existing metrics that communicate how well a 
commander takes care of his or her Marines, develops them, and rewards them for their 
performance. 
A commander’s performance is much more than a Fitness Report and whether or 
not the unit passed an evaluation. If the CSP is truly designed to ensure Marines have the 
best leadership, it is time we considered a more comprehensive means for evaluating its 
effectiveness at doing just that. In Chapter V, I discuss the factors that define a successful 
command tour. To many survey respondents, success is defined as a commander’s ability 
to consistently accomplish the unit’s mission, improve readiness, establish a healthy 
command climate, and take care of the Marines and gear under his or her charge. If there 
is still any question about what or how to measure the effectiveness of the CSP, I 
recommend the Marine Corps start right here. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the CSP and factors 
that influence selection outcomes. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, my intent is 
to challenge the reader to think about and better understand the situational dynamics 
influencing the CSP outcomes.  
I find that I cannot currently conclude whether or not the CSP is meeting its intent 
and selecting the best and most fully qualified eligible officers for command. I do find that 
board members generally agree on how to define “best and most fully qualified” and what 
characterizes a successful command tour. Furthermore, I find that the board is much more 
conclusive when selecting Primaries than Alternates, and what matters for selection varies 
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by Command Type and even across time in some cases. The findings also show that on 
average commanders perform well in their billet regardless of when they were selected by 
the board. I also find that similarities between the board and the eligible officer sometimes 
do matter; further supporting the board members’ beliefs that board composition has the 
ability to impact the selection outcomes. 
I further find that the CSP is analogous to the resume portion of most civilian firms’ 
initial hiring processes. Whereas civilian organizations place significant emphasis on being 
able to assess a person’s qualitative attributes through interviews and other means, board 
members are required to make command selection decisions directly from a resume. Lastly, 
I find that the Marine Corps should implement measure the effectiveness into the CSP to 
better understand the process and continually discover ways to improve it. 
The next chapter offers a few recommendations on how to improve the CSP while 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CSP 
Seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide 
behind their grade insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personal 
advancement—the behavior of ‘“yes-men”—will not be tolerated. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
As stated in Chapter II, the Command Screening Program is non-statutory though 
it is structured to mirror the statutory boards. Therefore, the Marine Corps has a significant 
amount of flexibility both in actions leading up to the board and those occurring while the 
board is convened. However, there is debate whether or not the CSP requires any revisions. 
Slightly less than half of the survey respondents believe that the CSP should not be 
changed, while the others responded that they would modify the CSP in some way.  
Those who believe the CSP is good as-is provide the following statements: 
“I think the board process is as fair as it could be.” 
“No program with a human element to it is perfect[,] but the Marine Corps 
command screening program is very good. I believe the other services 
would concur.” 
“The system works.” 
“I felt the process was efficient and very fair.” 
“Absolutely convinced that we do this about as well as it can be done.” 
“Pretty darn effective as it stands. You have to have credibility to be on 
this board.” 
“Messing with it scientifically would probably lead to it going sideways.” 
“It is impossible to design a ‘perfect’ program. The Marine Corps’ current 
program is under constant review and refinement for process 
improvement… That said, I believe we have the process as close to “right” 
as we can. 
Respondents that think changes should be made provide the following statements: 
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“The program seems fine, it’s the information that they have that needs 
work.” 
“…simply make the electronic system more efficient so board members 
can spend more time getting into the weeds and discerning the proverbial 
wheat from the chaff.” 
“Require GO-level interviews and letters from those GOs.” 
“I think the precept is [too] narrowing and does more damage than good.” 
“…I would have all Marines pre-screened and pull anyone without a 
picture or PME.” 
“I would allow the board to know if someone had never been screened for 
command…” 
“Tell the Board why you believe your career experience and performance 
has demonstrated that you are ‘best and most fully qualified’ for 
command.” 
“Add a 360 degree survey, to be completed within 12 months of a board 
convening.” 
In Chapter V, I provide a detailed analysis and discussion of the process. I am of 
the opinion that the CSP needs revision to more effectively and efficiently achieve its 
desired endstate. The purpose of this chapter is to provide pragmatic recommendations that 
will only serve to make the CSP that much stronger. My recommendations focus on 
improving the CSP in four specific areas: 1) augmenting the information available to the 
board, 2) randomizing the board briefing order, 3) making the CSP an application process, 
and 4) adding Cornerstone as the final phase of the CSP. 
A. AUGMENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE BOARD 
The CSP needs two significant changes to the information available to the board. 
First, board members should be provided with an analytical summary of each eligible 
officer that compares them to the other eligible officers on the board, both within their 
MOS and with the entire population. Second, the CSP should leverage all applicable 
HQMC elements for qualitative information on the eligible officer.  
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Analytical Summary. One of the most recurrent comments by the board 
members—both in the survey and during my board observation period—is that the board 
members want the ability to spend more time going into the details of an officer’s record 
rather than figuring out the electronic system (DBR). In effect, the board members spend 
most of their time compiling and making sense of data that could be aggregated and 
analyzed by a machine. A majority of this information is quantifiable and comes from the 
eligible officer’s OMPF and MBS. Additionally, board members spend time recreating and 
copying information that already exists into the briefing template rather than spending 
more time assessing the eligible officer’s competitiveness. An analytical summary would 
enable board members to reallocate their time to the actual screening and assessment of the 
eligible officers. In addition to affecting how the board members prepare their briefing 
packages, an analytical summary would also improve the accuracy of the briefing and 
voting process.  
Board members and board rooms have learning curves. During my one-week 
observations of the board, it was clear that briefing and voting improved as the board 
members began to better understand the systems and the other board members. Some board 
members even state—both in the survey and in the board room—that eligible officers 
briefed at the beginning of the board are at a disadvantage than those briefed in the middle 
or at the end. One of the most significant board room dynamics is watching how the 
briefing and rankings change within a sub-board as more board members brief their 
packages. A reason this happens is because as more packages are briefed, the other board 
members gain context of how eligible officers compare to the rest of the sub-board. This 
is no fault of the board members; anyone in their positions would be affected in the same 
manner. However, the Marine Corps could better inform the board members to minimize 
the effect of this phenomenon. The board members would be more confident in their briefs 
and rankings at the start if they had a document that gave them the within-MOS comparison 
and comparison to the rest of the eligible officer population. An analytical summary like 
this benefits both the eligible officers and the board members. 
M&RA has manpower analysts that could provide MMOA-3 with a statistical 
analysis of every eligible officer being screened by the board. In doing so, board members 
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would be able to focus on qualitative information in the Fitness Reports and other 
qualitative information provided to the board. By implementing this analytical summary, 
the Marine Corps can better inform and equip the board members by providing them a 
baseline comparison of each eligible officer and then allow the board members to use their 
experience and judgment to make the final selection decisions. 
Leverage HQMC Resources. The CSP exists and operates in isolation from the rest 
of HQMC. M&RA provides and controls the data used to inform the board, and M&RA 
releases the results of the board. Whereas M&RA should maintain control of the CSP, it 
should also leverage the information controlled by other HQMC elements to provide a 
more holistic and qualitative picture of an officer. For example, Training and Education 
Command (TECOM) maintains data on the training and education of all Marines. TECOM 
can provide M&RA with summary of each officer’s PME documents, including command 
philosophy, papers written during PME, transcripts, and any published articles. TECOM 
has the resources to provide the board members with a broader perspective of who an 
officer is, M&RA just needs to leverage those existing resources.  
Additionally, every MOS should have an advocate represent them during the board. 
Chapter II briefly describes the use of MOS advocates prior to the board members 
preparing packages for each MOS. This practice is an effective means of informing board 
members about the attributes and career paths important to each MOS community. 
However, not all MOSs are briefed by an officer within that MOS (I observed this during 
the board). Many MOS advocates reside within the National Capital Region. If there is not 
a sitting board member with a particular MOS who can advocate for his or her community, 
M&RA should require the other elements of HQMC to provide them with an advocate of 
that MOS. Furthermore, all advocates should be required to provide the board members 
with a reference document that outlines the characteristics that are valued and essential to 
their respective MOS community with respect to command. In the survey, some 
respondents expressed that they relied heavily upon the views of board members with 
MOSs that they were unfamiliar with when it came to voting. A reference document 
provided by an MOS advocate would only continue to better inform board members about 
the eligible officers upon which they are selecting for command. 
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The board members make the best selection decisions they can with the information 
presented to them. The CSP simply needs to provide more comprehensive information 
about the eligible officers to the board members. 
B. RANDOMIZE THE BOARD BRIEFING ORDER 
The mechanics of the process and board room are sound. Commands are validated, 
board members are vetted, packages are randomly assignment to board members, voting is 
anonymous and methodical, and the board members are allowed to openly deliberate about 
each eligible officer as necessary. However, there is one aspect of the board that can be 
revised to ensure selection outcomes remain fair and equitable: the briefing order of sub-
boards and packages within those sub-boards. 
The FY2015–FY2019 boards briefed MOS categories in the same order, ground 
MOSs followed by aviation MOSs (MMOA personnel, personal communication, July 
2018). MMOA provides a recommended briefing order to the Board President; however, 
the Board President makes the final decision. As such, each board varies with respect to 
when specific MOSs and sub-boards are briefed within those categories (e.g., 1302 PMOS 
sub-board prepared and briefed on Days 1 and 2 on one board and on Days 8 and 9 on 
another). Furthermore, the Board President decides the order in which eligible officer 
packages are briefed, and this order is often alphabetical (see Chapter II). I do not have the 
data to assess any correlations between briefing order and selection outcomes, but there is 
a profuse amount of existing research surrounding the relationships between those who 
make repetitive decisions and factors that influence those decisions (Danziger, Levav, & 
Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). This research directly applies to the board members who make 
repetitive decisions on which eligible officers are selected for command. 
Briefing order matters. In 2011, a seminal study found that “judicial rulings can be 
swayed by extraneous variables that should have no bearing on legal decisions” (Danziger 
et al., 2011, p. 6889). For example, the study shows that lunch-breaks may lead to different 
judicial rulings even when the cases are similar (Danziger et al., 2011). They further present 
evidence that suggests “when judges make repeated rulings, they show an increased 
tendency to rule in favor of the status quo” (Danziger et al., 2011, p. 6892).  
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As stated previously (and supported by survey respondents), the board has a 
learning curve and is susceptible to both mental and physical fatigue. Warfighting refers to 
this in part as the impact of friction and the human dimension, and further states that “the 
greater requirement is to fight effectively despite the existence of friction” (HQMC, 1997, 
p. 6). These factors—friction and the human dimension—have the propensity to influence 
CSP selection outcomes. However, they can be effectively mitigated through 
randomization of the board briefing order, to include removing the standard “alphabetical” 
briefing order of the sub-boards. And by making the MOS and sub-board briefing order 
random, the CSP can better meet its intent of a fair and equitable opportunity for all eligible 
officers to command.  
C. MAKE THE CSP AN APPLICATION PROCESS 
As discussed in length in the previous chapter, the CSP is analogous to a civilian 
firm screening resumes and lacks the means to provide qualitative information to the board 
members. To make the CSP similar to civilian hiring processes, the Marine Corps should 
require all eligible officers who desire to be screened for lieutenant colonel command to 
submit an application. Furthermore, the Marine Corps demands a lot from its board 
members in a condensed amount of time. Not only do board members commit three weeks 
to the board, they are also expected to simultaneously fulfill the daily requirements of their 
assigned billets. Fatigue undoubtedly plays a factor as the board continues throughout the 
weeks. Currently, the board screens the package of every eligible officer who has not 
elected to RBR (those numbers are discussed in Chapter II). This includes eligible officers 
with incomplete packages and/or non-competitive packages (e.g., packages without 
updated pictures, without completed questionnaires, PME incomplete, and low physical 
fitness scores). To address these issues and streamline the process, I recommend the CSP 
require every eligible officer to submit an application if they desire to be screened for 
command by the board.  
Board members enthusiastically profess that one of the hardest requirements of 
their job as board members is choosing commanders from among so many high-quality 
eligible officers. As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter V, personnel economic theory 
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would suggest implementing a screening mechanism to narrow the screening pool and 
signal to the board which eligible officers desire to command (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). The 
application would be designed to encourage the best and most fully qualified officers to 
apply for command screening while discouraging unqualified and/or uninterested eligible 
officers from applying (Lazear & Gibbs, 2014). In requiring an application, there is the 
possibility the board would screen fewer packages altogether, but the screened packages 
would be of higher quality. However, most board members do not like the idea of the 
turning the CSP into an application process.  
When surveyed, over 72 percent of the respondents disagreed with the idea of an 
application requirement. Furthermore, over 86 percent disagreed that eligible officers 
should be required to go through an interview process before being screened by the board. 
Though in stark contrast, over 86 percent of the board agreed that eligible officers should 
be required to submit the command questionnaires before being screened by the board. My 
interpretation of this contrast in responses is that board members value the qualitative 
information provided by the command questionnaire but do not think additional screening 
requirements are necessary. With that stated, the command questionnaire does not currently 
provide a qualitative perspective on an officer (see Appendix C). To do so, it would require 
revision. As such, this contrast could also be caused by the fact that board members do not 
want to leverage additional requirements on eligible officers. If that is the case, I 
respectfully disagree. The Marine Corps needs to demand more from its best and most fully 
qualified, not simply allow them to be considered by default. 
This application should include the following documents: command philosophy, 
command questionnaire, 360-degree feedback, and interview results. The command 
philosophy and command questionnaire would be submitted directly to MMOA-3 by the 
eligible officer; the 360-degree feedback and interview results would be submitted 
electronically to MMOA-3 by the interviewing panel. MMOA-3 would then compile each 
submission and include as part of the eligible officer’s package to the board. 
Every officer is required to write a command philosophy as part of Marine Corps 
PME, so this should not require any additional work on the eligible officer’s part. 
Furthermore, MMOA-3 already requires that each eligible officer submit a command 
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questionnaire prior to the board. However, the command questionnaire should be revised 
to include a place for eligible officers to tell the board why they believe they should 
command Marines. New requirements levied on the eligible officers include an interview 
and the 360-degree feedback. Prior to the board convening, a panel comprised of superiors, 
peers, and subordinates (both officer and enlisted) would interview eligible officers and 
ask them a series of questions from an established list of questions. The interview panel, 
led by the first general officer in that eligible officer’s chain of command, would aggregate 
the interview notes and responses and submit them to MMOA-3. Moreover, the eligible 
officer would be required to complete a 360-degree evaluation prior to the board. The 
participants of this evaluation would be selected either by the eligible officer’s Reporting 
Senior or superior officer in his or her chain of command. Together, these four documents 
would provide the board members with a comprehensive and qualitative perspective 
of an officer. 
An application process could also address the issue of submission timelines. Once 
the board convenes, eligible officers should not be allowed to submit and/or update any 
further information to the board. Timelines are in place for a reason; failing to meet them 
is failing to respect the process and the people involved. Eligible officers who submit late 
information to the board place unnecessary burden on the board and the support personnel 
and should not be tolerated. Moreover, nonstatutory boards that allow late submissions are 
effectually lowering standards from those of statutory boards, as statutory boards do not 
allow updates to the board once convened. Command board should only be raising the 
standards when selecting the best and most qualified eligible officers for one of the most 
important billets in the Marine Corps. 
D. ADD CORNERSTONE AS THE FINAL CSP PHASE 
I offer this final recommendation as a course of action if the first and third 
recommendations are deemed unfeasible and/or undesirable. 
In FY2015, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) established Cornerstone: 
The Commandant’s Combined Commandership Course “to prepare board selected 
commanders, sergeants major, and their respective spouses for the challenges of command” 
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(HQMC, 2018, para. 2). The President of Marine Corps University, acting as executive 
agent for the CMC and Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, annually conducts two 
Cornerstone Courses. The purpose of Cornerstone is to “educate commanders, sergeants 
major, and their spouses on the fundamental authorities, responsibilities, programs, and 
practices that contribute to a successful command tour” (HQMC, 2018, para. 3.A.1). 
Through the use of advocacy briefs, guided discussions, and mentorship opportunities, the 
end state of Cornerstone is to produce “successful command teams fully prepared to meet 
the challenges and demands of command” (HQMC, 2018, para. 3.A.3). For Cornerstone to 
become part of the CSP, it must fall under the command and control of M&RA. This is a 
logical transition for two reasons. 
First, the mission of Cornerstone is inherent to the CSP mission. Cornerstone is 
meant to prepare commanders for the challenges and demands of command, whereas the 
CSP intends to provide Marines with “the best and most fully qualified commanders” 
(HQMC, 2017, p. 1). The CSP mission cannot be accomplished without also accomplishing 
Cornerstone’s mission; the two are fundamentally connected. Second, Cornerstone can be 
a means to provide a qualitative assessment of each board-selected commander. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, the CSP uses Fitness Reports as its predominant decision 
tool and does not currently have an established qualitative means to assess prospective 
commanders. Though Cornerstone occurs after the CSP, Cornerstone can be the mode by 
which those board-selected commanders are subjected to interview panels and assessed 
qualitatively. Furthermore, if any assessed are deemed unsuitable, the CSP can procure 
replacements from the board-selected alternate lists. 
As it stands, Cornerstone requires very little of its participants. Commanders 
register for the course, receive informational briefs, participate in a few discussions, and 
then assume command of their respective units. Furthermore, Cornerstone funds all travel 
costs, per diem, and course materials at no expense to the participants. There is no 
obligation or incentive for a commander to do anything but “show up.” Similar to the CSP, 
Cornerstone assumes these commanders are “the best and most fully qualified” without 
question and without requiring any additional work from these board-selected 
commanders. Command is undoubtedly a reward for sustained performance, but it is also 
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a challenge worth competing for. If we want our commanders to be fully prepared for that 
challenge, we must assess their individual desire to be the best and push them beyond their 
comfort zones by doing rather than simply acquiring knowledge (Ericsson & Pool, 2017). 
The Marine Corps should require more from its best and most fully qualified, especially 
considering the organizational importance of their positions. As such, Cornerstone should 
be used as a qualitative assessment of each commander, to include a thorough review of 
each commander’s command philosophy and mandated panel interviews for each 
commander. This is where Cornerstone can fill the gap in the Marine Corps’ “hiring 
process” for commanders. There are challenges to this recommendation though. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I provide a few recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of 
the CSP by providing more comprehensive information to the board, randomizing the 
briefing order, requiring eligible officers to apply for command, and/or adding Cornerstone 
as the final phase of the CSP. The next chapter discusses the limitations of this thesis and 
provides recommendations for further research.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
We must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit 
opportunities as they arise, rather than adhering insistently to predetermined 
plans that outlived their usefulness. 
—MCDP 1 Warfighting 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Marine Corps can—and should—improve the CSP to achieve the desired 
outcome of providing Marines with the “best and most fully qualified” leadership. My 
findings illuminate aspects of the CSP where the Marine Corps can improve its 
understanding of existing biases and outcomes. These aspects include understanding what 
the board values with respect to selection outcomes and command types, and identifying 
other factors that influence selection outcomes such as board composition and similarities 
between the board and the eligible officers. 
Likewise, the Marine Corps must give the board members a more comprehensive 
means to assess an officer’s character and intangible qualities. The board members know 
the importance of their decisions and make every effort to select the right officers for 
command. Every board member puts in the time and effort required to ensure the mission 
is accomplished and the institution is taken care of. It is time the Marine Corps stopped 
placing the responsibility solely on the shoulders of the individual Marine, looked for ways 
to improve its processes, and started taking better care of its board members and its 
Marines. Furthermore, resumes and statistics are necessary but not sufficient in selecting 
commanders. The Marine Corps must incorporate analytics and applications into the CSP 
and give the board members the sufficient tools to determine the best and most fully 
qualified officers for lieutenant colonel command. 
B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The Sample. My thesis only covers a five-year period and as such, the sample size 
is relatively small and similar when compared to the total number of board members and 
officers selected for lieutenant colonel command by the CSP since 1992. The same analysis 
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might produce different outcomes if the sample size spanned more years and/or covered 
periods involving significant events (e.g., 9/11 or a force drawdown). Furthermore, my 
data includes only those who were selected on the board, not those who were fleeted up or 
placed in command after the board results were published.  
The Data. The data is only as good as the source. TFDW reflects an individual’s 
record; if the officer’s record is inaccurate or incomplete, so is the TFDW data. 
Additionally, I received the data from MMOA-3 in various formats and versions. The 
analysis could be wrong if I entered in the data incorrectly or made wrong assumptions 
about categorical variables. 
The data used in my thesis is sourced using a combination of electronic systems 
and human input. As such, some of the quantitative data used in my analysis might be 
inaccurate as a result of my inputting errors, which would subsequently affect the analysis 
outcomes. If there were errors, the variables associated with the board voting results would 
be most significantly affected. A majority of the voting source documents were scanned 
files, and I had to enter the data manually. Additionally, I had to standardize the voting 
processes and sub-board categories in order to run the analysis. Because each board votes 
differently and records the results differently, it is possible I made incorrect assumptions 
when attempting to standardize the voting results.  
Furthermore, my survey response size is small and only covers board members 
between FY2006–FY2019 lieutenant colonel command selection boards. I wrote the Likert 
questions to only allow binary answers (e.g., “Agree” or “Disagree”). A few respondents 
thought this was restricting, not allowing for situationally dependent responses. As such, I 
use the open text responses to add context to the binary answers. Additionally, I do not 
analyze the differences between those who responded and those who did not. There is 
always the inherent possibility of self-selection bias associated with surveys. In using these 
responses, I am cautious to claim their responses as representations of the entire board 
member population since the CSP’s implementation in 1992. With that stated, these 
respondents provide an exclusive perspective on the process, and I use their responses to 
strengthen the validity of my thesis. 
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Lastly, I was only present for the first week of the board; therefore, I cannot speak 
definitively about anything that happened during the subsequent weeks. Furthermore, the 
board is different every year. Each board is comprised of new board members, new officer 
pools being screened, and new precepts. As such, I do not claim my observations as reality 
for every command board. The non-statutory nature of the board allows for flexibility and 
variation in the process that I cannot account for in my analysis. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board is one of the most important 
boards in the Marine Corps. Therefore, the Marine Corps must continue to understand its 
processes and seek institutional improvement. My thesis contributes to the institutional 
knowledge, but the opportunities for continued research in this area are vast and immediate 
and must be pursued further. As such, I provide the following recommendations for 
consideration. 
Incorporate Command Climate Surveys. I recommend comparing the results of 
Command Climate Surveys to board voting results. This would provide a bottom-up, 
retroactive perspective on a commander (e.g., what the Marines think) compared to what 
the top-down sees during the command selection process (e.g., what the board thinks). The 
findings could provide interesting insight into the similarities and differences between 
hierarchical perspectives on what defines a quality commander. The findings might also 
have policy implications affecting how Command Climate Surveys are used and valued in 
the Marine Corps. 
Analyze RBRs. During my time observing the command selection board, it was 
apparent that there is significant senior-level interest in determining the reasons why 
officers are choosing to remove themselves from command consideration. Officers already 
give reasons for removal, but the response categories are vague and provide very little 
actionable intelligence from which to derive cultural and procedural change. I recommend 
further research be conducted to assess the relationships between those officers who are 
screened for command and those who self-select out of consideration. It would be 
interesting to see if there are officer quality differences between those who RBR and those 
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who are screened by the command board. Similarly, further research could assess the 
comprehensive quality of the “remaining” officers screened for command against those 
officers who have left the Marine Corps (e.g., “Are the best and most fully qualified officers 
still in the Marine Corps?”).  
Analyze Specific Commands. Do some commands need different types of leaders? 
Is “best and most fully qualified” the same for all commands? Does the CSP effectively 
match commanders to their respective commands? There is an ample amount of academic 
research pertaining to the importance of person-organizational fit in the hiring process. I 
recommend further research be done to examine the relationships between a commander’s 
unit experiences and interests and the commands for which they are selected. 
Incorporate a National Lens. National security threats change, economic stability 
fluctuates, and technological changes influence social and cultural norms. I recommend 
conducting research through the national lenses and analyzing whether or not the 
characteristics that define officer quality change through each lens. For example, does the 
Marine Corps select the same type of officer for command during times of peace as it does 
during times of war? Do command selection standards vary with the strength of the national 
economy? Is the Marine Corps purposely consistent or adaptable in its selection criteria, 
and does it matter? Through this analysis, the Marine Corps could better understand 
systemic trends and biases in the selection process to ensure the right officers are in 
command at the right time. 
Colonel Command Selection. There are undoubtedly systemic similarities between 
how officers are chosen for both Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel Command (e.g., 
performance based on Fitness Reports). However, like lieutenant colonel command 
selection, not much research exists about the dynamics influencing selection to colonel 
command. I recommend a similar qualitative and quantitative analysis as this thesis to 
provide insight into that portion of the Command Screening Program. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Everything is a manpower problem in a profession where people are the 
institution’s greatest assets. The solution to our holistic service problem starts with 
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leadership and understanding how and why we select our commanders. The Marine Corps 
has an incredible opportunity to seek self-improvement when it comes to this area. As 
evidenced by my thesis, there is still much to be learned. We only need the humility and 
willingness to learn it. 
The Marine Corps owes every Marine its institutional best. Yes, the CSP might be 
working and be comparatively better than other processes, but we have an institutional 
imperative to understand the process and continuously seek out ways to improve it. The 
Marine Corps holds Marines at every rank accountable for knowing themselves and 
seeking self-improvement. It is time the Marine Corps held itself accountable for doing the 
same. Our institutional survival depends on it. 
I conclude with an excerpt that captures the essence of my thesis in its entirety:  
The Marine Corps’ vision of leading is less concerned with rank, self-
identity, recognition, or privilege than the essence of our Corps: the 
individual Marine and the unyielding determination to persevere because 
Marines and the Corps do not fail. Our vision of leading is linked directly 
to our common vision of warfighting, which needs leaders devoted to 
leading, capable of independent and bold action, who are willing and eager 
to assume new and sometimes daunting responsibilities, willing to take 
risks—not because they may succeed, but because the Corps must succeed. 
—FMFM 1-0 Leading Marines 
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APPENDIX A.  COMMAND VALIDATION EXAMPLE 
 
Figure 22. Command Validation Example. Source: HQMC (2018). 
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APPENDIX C.  COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRE TEMPLATE 
 
Figure 24. Command Questionnaire Template. Adapted from the 
actual FY19 Command Questionnaire 





If so, return date?
Deployment/family issues that
would prevent you from taking
command before May 2019?
If so, explain.
Medically qualified for DIFOP
 status?
Completed six month squadron 
CVN Deployment (7523 only)?
MEU Deployment (7532 only)?




















Intensity for Geographical Locations:
Overseas East Coast:






Operating Forces: Supporting Establishment:
Geographic Location: None:
Additional Comments:
Specific Expertise/Areas to highlight:
LtCol Command Questionnaire Template
AVIATION ONLY
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APPENDIX D.  LIST OF LTCOL CSB STRUNG COMMANDS 
 
Figure 25. List of LtCol CSB Strung Commands (FY15–FY19) 
 
8006 (ANY MOS) 8007 (ANY GND COMBAT MOS) 0404/1302/3002 AVIATION
1ST RT BN, MCRD SD 1ST ANGLICO CLB-1 H-HS, MCAS BEAUFORT
2D RT BN, MCRD SD 2D ANGLICO CLB-11 H-HS, MCAS CAMPEN
3D RT BN, MCRD SD 5TH ANGLICO CLB-13 H-HS, MCAS CHERRY PT
SPT BN RTR, MCRD SD I-I 3D ANGLICO CLB-15 H-HS, MCAS FUTENMA
1ST RT BN, MCRD PI I-I 4TH ANGLICO CLB-2 H-HS, MCAS IWAKUNI
2D RT BN, MCRD PI I-I 6TH ANGLICO CLB-22 H-HS, MCAS MIRAMAR
3D RT BN, MCRD PI 1ST MRSB CLB-24 H-HS, MCAS NEW RIVER
4TH RT BN, MCRD PI 2D MRSB CLB-26 H-HS, MCAS YUMA
SPT BN RTR, MCRD PI 3D MRSB CLB-3 HT-18
8TH BN, USMEPCOM 1ST RECON BN CLB-31 HT-28
HQBN, SOI, MCB CAMP PEN 2D RECON BN CLB-4 NAMTRA MARUNIT, NEW RIVER
HQBN,  SOI, MCB CAMP LEJ 3D RECON BN CLB-5 MWHS-1
HQBN, MCB HAWAII I-I 4TH RECON BN CLB-6 MWHS-2
REGION 1 FRANKFURT HQ BN, MAGTF TRAINING CMD CLB-7 MWHS-3
REGION 2 ABU DAHBI, UAE MCSF KINGS BAY, GA CLB-8 MCAF QUANTICO
REGION 3 BANGKOK MCSF BANGOR, WA I-I, CLB-23 MCAS KANEOHE BAY
REGION 4 FT LAUDERDALE WTBN, MCB CAMPLEJ I-I, CLB-25 VMFT-401, MAG-41
REGION 5 FRANKFURT I-I, CLB-451 VMR-1
REGION 6 JOHANNESBURG I-I, CLB-453 VMU-2
REGION 7 FRANKFURT MWSS-171, MAG-12 VT-6
REGION 8 FRANKFURT MWSS-172, MAG-36 VT-22








LtCol CSB Strung Commands
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APPENDIX E.  SELECTION OUTCOMES BY FISCAL YEAR 
Table 29. Slating to Command Types (FY15–FY19) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OPFOR SPTEST PMOS STRUNG P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.271*** 1.109*** 1.243*** 1.167*** 0.010*** 
[0.029] [0.038] [0.029] [0.035]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.287*** 1.226*** 1.267*** 1.256*** 0.318 
[0.030] [0.043] [0.030] [0.040]
Rank O4 2.049*** 0.827 2.214*** 0.825 0.000*** 
[0.242] [0.158] [0.273] [0.141]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.659*** 2.687*** 0.454*** 3.453*** 0.000*** 
[0.100] [0.747] [0.073] [0.828]
Aviation PMOS 1.734*** 3.671*** 2.261*** 1.701* 0.043** 
[0.278] [1.100] [0.367] [0.473]
Time In Service 1.001 0.975 1.028 0.932*** 0.019** 
[0.018] [0.026] [0.019] [0.024]
Female 0.778 2.431*** 0.952 1.604 0.012** 
[0.248] [0.764] [0.318] [0.484]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.680** 1.338 0.803 0.954 0.121 
[0.113] [0.295] [0.136] [0.203]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.884 0.566*** 0.911 0.589*** 0.094* 
[0.098] [0.097] [0.104] [0.092]
STEM Degrees 1.012 0.801 1.086 0.683 0.465 
[0.149] [0.195] [0.162] [0.165]
Number of Deployments 1.106*** 1.053* 1.096*** 1.072*** 0.599 
[0.024] [0.032] [0.024] [0.029]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.474*** 0.910 0.535*** 0.668 0.257 
[0.113] [0.290] [0.130] [0.208]
High PFT (>=285) 1.178 1.377 1.132 1.411* 0.772 
[0.155] [0.280] [0.155] [0.253]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.704 0.675 0.668* 0.764 0.977 
[0.152] [0.235] [0.148] [0.242]
High CFT (>=285) 1.370** 1.046 1.279 1.185 0.404 
[0.200] [0.231] [0.192] [0.242]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.985 0.719 0.834 1.018 0.377 
[0.136] [0.160] [0.122] [0.191]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.818* 1.037 0.778** 1.092 0.490 
[0.099] [0.195] [0.098] [0.183]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.457*** 2.084*** 1.619*** 1.472* 0.400 
[0.197] [0.506] [0.224] [0.320]
Bronze Star 1.620*** 1.220 1.911*** 0.857 0.071* 
[0.232] [0.297] [0.281] [0.191]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.914*** 0.950 1.814*** 1.225 0.227 
[0.359] [0.320] [0.354] [0.333]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838 2,838
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to Command Type During Observation Period (FY15-FY19)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 
2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were 
screened at the time of their respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms 
PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, 
Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.271*** 1.410*** 1.243*** 1.402*** 1.231*** 1.260*** 0.238 
[0.029] [0.077] [0.062] [0.086] [0.066] [0.071]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.287*** 1.196*** 1.310*** 1.452*** 1.367*** 1.272*** 0.161 
[0.030] [0.061] [0.072] [0.091] [0.076] [0.070]
Rank O4 2.049*** 2.315*** 2.005*** 1.734* 2.221*** 2.338*** 0.946 
[0.242] [0.617] [0.530] [0.533] [0.614] [0.680]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.659*** 0.492* 0.812 0.512* 0.665 0.730 0.830 
[0.100] [0.179] [0.273] [0.192] [0.224] [0.269]
Aviation PMOS 1.734*** 1.496 3.874*** 1.409 1.436 1.643 0.313 
[0.278] [0.545] [1.485] [0.541] [0.519] [0.652]
Time In Service 1.001 0.969 0.979 0.995 0.993 1.034 0.799 
[0.018] [0.041] [0.039] [0.047] [0.039] [0.039]
Female 0.778 1.728 1.625 0.233 0.817 0.625 0.334 
[0.248] [1.152] [1.282] [0.272] [0.576] [0.434]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.680** 1.382 1.078 0.477 0.398** 0.556 0.109 
[0.113] [0.498] [0.432] [0.225] [0.150] [0.212]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.884 0.943 0.879 0.813 0.682 0.951 0.888 
[0.098] [0.242] [0.222] [0.221] [0.173] [0.257]
STEM Degrees 1.012 1.091 0.456** 1.737 1.597 0.932 0.050** 
[0.149] [0.334] [0.170] [0.643] [0.559] [0.318]
Number of Deployments 1.106*** 1.107** 1.080 1.051 1.194*** 1.139** 0.484 
[0.024] [0.053] [0.051] [0.057] [0.063] [0.064]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.474*** 0.860 0.754 0.674 0.314** 0.152** 0.223 
[0.113] [0.392] [0.510] [0.389] [0.153] [0.120]
High PFT (>=285) 1.178 1.306 1.654* 1.016 1.379 0.913 0.651 
[0.155] [0.415] [0.503] [0.336] [0.396] [0.285]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.704 0.692 0.585 0.190* 1.284 0.527 0.499 
[0.152] [0.316] [0.342] [0.175] [0.580] [0.268]
High CFT (>=285) 1.370** 1.360 4.068*** 1.143 0.528* 1.216 0.071* 
[0.200] [0.526] [2.033] [0.532] [0.201] [0.333]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.985 0.749 1.700* 1.365 0.808 0.733 0.184 
[0.136] [0.233] [0.513] [0.484] [0.262] [0.255]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.818* 0.726 0.819 0.754 0.680 1.013 0.893 
[0.099] [0.198] [0.220] [0.228] [0.194] [0.296]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.457*** 0.999 4.150*** 0.868 1.997** 1.080 0.006*** 
[0.197] [0.289] [1.526] [0.272] [0.656] [0.345]
Bronze Star 1.620*** 1.008 1.593 1.875* 2.683*** 1.256 0.203 
[0.232] [0.339] [0.517] [0.649] [0.835] [0.482]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.914*** 0.909 1.693 2.864** 2.330** 2.340** 0.557 
[0.359] [0.466] [0.722] [1.377] [0.972] [1.014]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 561 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to OPFOR Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.109*** 1.046 1.253*** 1.005 1.092 1.109 0.336 
[0.038] [0.086] [0.098] [0.085] [0.091] [0.084]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.226*** 1.415*** 1.137 1.138 1.311*** 1.283*** 0.106 
[0.043] [0.127] [0.089] [0.097] [0.108] [0.104]
Rank O4 0.827 1.036 0.686 1.572 0.866 0.591 0.621 
[0.158] [0.484] [0.297] [0.791] [0.377] [0.256]
Combat Service Support PMOS 2.687*** 4.879* 1.874 3.517* 1.498 7.021** 0.449 
[0.747] [4.131] [1.023] [2.390] [0.864] [5.350]
Aviation PMOS 3.671*** 9.836** 2.169 4.833** 1.923 12.04*** 0.277 
[1.100] [8.861] [1.345] [3.497] [1.224] [9.541]
Time In Service 0.975 0.996 0.933 1.048 0.889* 1.010 0.365 
[0.026] [0.072] [0.058] [0.069] [0.059] [0.057]
Female 2.431*** 3.406 0.756 3.744* 3.693** 2.816 0.840 
[0.764] [2.604] [0.907] [2.944] [2.416] [1.827]
Race Other (Non-White) 1.338 2.072 2.427* 0.350 1.814 0.898 0.185 
[0.295] [1.190] [1.217] [0.273] [0.819] [0.433]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.566*** 1.312 0.212*** 0.372** 0.830 0.743 0.013** 
[0.097] [0.616] [0.089] [0.156] [0.329] [0.297]
STEM Degrees 0.801 1.168 1.194 0.394 0.860 0.441 0.590 
[0.195] [0.621] [0.602] [0.308] [0.516] [0.262]
Number of Deployments 1.053* 1.070 1.017 0.956 1.119* 1.147* 0.470 
[0.032] [0.066] [0.073] [0.095] [0.070] [0.089]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.910 1.043 1.281 1.351 1.580 0.947 
[0.290] [0.771] [1.068] [0.847] [1.025]
High PFT (>=285) 1.377 1.829 2.176 1.448 1.426 0.920 0.752 
[0.280] [0.936] [1.033] [0.683] [0.634] [0.467]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.675 2.405 0.194 3.038 0.585 0.252 0.049** 
[0.235] [1.899] [0.219] [2.745] [0.516] [0.218]
High CFT (>=285) 1.046 2.764 0.554 1.370 1.477 1.174 0.534 
[0.231] [2.131] [0.304] [1.071] [0.999] [0.492]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.719 1.174 0.547 0.913 0.596 0.395 0.575 
[0.160] [0.563] [0.284] [0.497] [0.304] [0.236]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 1.037 1.999 1.374 0.900 0.890 0.361* 0.152 
[0.195] [0.923] [0.571] [0.416] [0.395] [0.192]
Meritorious Service Medal 2.084*** 2.262 1.635 2.365 2.627 2.353 0.969 
[0.506] [1.284] [0.883] [1.390] [1.618] [1.251]
Bronze Star 1.220 1.287 0.843 1.884 0.969 1.751 0.756 
[0.297] [0.789] [0.452] [1.022] [0.516] [1.110]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 0.950 0.702 0.526 1.418 0.920 1.872 0.795 
[0.320] [0.761] [0.415] [1.013] [0.729] [1.292]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 1.57e-08* 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 513 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to SPTEST Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.243*** 1.356*** 1.216*** 1.399*** 1.147** 1.281*** 0.095* 
[0.029] [0.076] [0.064] [0.090] [0.064] [0.075]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.267*** 1.207*** 1.255*** 1.434*** 1.329*** 1.251*** 0.267 
[0.030] [0.065] [0.071] [0.092] [0.076] [0.070]
Rank O4 2.214*** 2.404*** 1.887** 2.191** 2.931*** 2.408*** 0.865 
[0.273] [0.671] [0.526] [0.699] [0.857] [0.725]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.454*** 0.462** 0.427** 0.363** 0.383*** 0.560 0.943 
[0.073] [0.179] [0.152] [0.146] [0.138] [0.218]
Aviation PMOS 2.261*** 2.372** 4.220*** 1.689 2.006* 2.846** 0.494 
[0.367] [0.896] [1.624] [0.671] [0.738] [1.163]
Time In Service 1.028 1.009 0.996 1.009 1.024 1.057 0.845 
[0.019] [0.044] [0.041] [0.050] [0.041] [0.041]
Female 0.952 1.631 0.290 0.973 2.227 0.710 0.435 
[0.318] [1.329] [0.345] [0.900] [1.415] [0.499]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.803 1.287 1.687 0.255** 0.793 0.534 0.049** 
[0.136] [0.490] [0.666] [0.141] [0.287] [0.210]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.911 0.987 0.745 0.838 0.702 1.083 0.753 
[0.104] [0.265] [0.195] [0.236] [0.185] [0.301]
STEM Degrees 1.086 1.291 0.499* 1.747 1.244 1.027 0.165 
[0.162] [0.400] [0.188] [0.672] [0.450] [0.351]
Number of Deployments 1.096*** 1.189*** 1.008 0.994 1.207*** 1.104* 0.011** 
[0.024] [0.062] [0.056] [0.060] [0.063] [0.065]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.535*** 0.552 0.503 0.535 0.602 0.446 0.997 
[0.130] [0.281] [0.397] [0.331] [0.284] [0.279]
High PFT (>=285) 1.132 1.004 1.396 0.881 1.811* 1.044 0.446 
[0.155] [0.335] [0.445] [0.300] [0.549] [0.340]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.668* 1.405 0.561 0.847 1.010 0.121*** 0.104 
[0.148] [0.624] [0.337] [0.634] [0.453] [0.094]
High CFT (>=285) 1.279 2.806** 2.899** 1.694 0.477* 0.897 0.013** 
[0.192] [1.266] [1.447] [0.867] [0.186] [0.252]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.834 0.628 1.696* 1.125 0.502* 0.566 0.043** 
[0.122] [0.209] [0.536] [0.422] [0.177] [0.212]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.778** 0.512** 0.895 0.648 0.901 0.874 0.610 
[0.098] [0.152] [0.249] [0.207] [0.265] [0.266]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.619*** 1.078 6.011*** 0.667 1.979** 1.750* 0.000*** 
[0.224] [0.318] [2.416] [0.214] [0.664] [0.585]
Bronze Star 1.911*** 1.679 1.571 2.378** 3.128*** 1.611 0.494 
[0.281] [0.574] [0.531] [0.862] [1.002] [0.645]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.814*** 0.763 2.109* 2.123 2.531** 1.838 0.599 
[0.354] [0.421] [0.911] [1.088] [1.070] [0.859]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 561 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to PMOS Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, LtCol, 
and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their respective 
board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no STEM 
Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.167*** 1.287*** 1.258*** 1.092 1.254*** 1.104 0.306 
[0.035] [0.105] [0.084] [0.082] [0.090] [0.078]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.256*** 1.363*** 1.207*** 1.184** 1.365*** 1.327*** 0.418 
[0.040] [0.113] [0.086] [0.092] [0.102] [0.105]
Rank O4 0.825 1.040 1.004 0.926 0.599 0.709 0.833 
[0.141] [0.458] [0.368] [0.431] [0.231] [0.287]
Combat Service Support PMOS 3.453*** 1.868 4.301*** 3.547** 2.809** 5.690*** 0.794 
[0.828] [1.356] [2.215] [2.060] [1.403] [3.393]
Aviation PMOS 1.701* 1.567 1.761 2.242 0.962 2.859 0.832 
[0.473] [1.233] [1.079] [1.493] [0.555] [1.897]
Time In Service 0.932*** 0.916 0.918 1.004 0.857** 0.980 0.339 
[0.024] [0.067] [0.051] [0.062] [0.054] [0.055]
Female 1.604 2.514 2.355 1.291 1.208 1.696 0.935 
[0.484] [1.753] [1.857] [1.141] [0.873] [1.104]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.954 2.465* 1.202 0.896 0.544 0.909 0.311 
[0.203] [1.336] [0.594] [0.488] [0.271] [0.421]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.589*** 1.119 0.371*** 0.397** 0.791 0.633 0.221 
[0.092] [0.485] [0.129] [0.152] [0.277] [0.238]
STEM Degrees 0.683 0.675 1.004 0.485 1.347 0.280* 0.418 
[0.165] [0.388] [0.484] [0.325] [0.690] [0.211]
Number of Deployments 1.072*** 0.988 1.100* 1.089 1.090 1.190** 0.233 
[0.029] [0.065] [0.061] [0.081] [0.062] [0.086]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.668 1.812 1.813 0.393 0.369 0.346 0.217 
[0.208] [1.209] [1.265] [0.415] [0.256] [0.288]
High PFT (>=285) 1.411* 2.969** 2.824** 1.924 0.999 0.702 0.091* 
[0.253] [1.444] [1.140] [0.862] [0.398] [0.315]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.764 0.130* 0.275 0.326 1.125 1.582 0.170 
[0.242] [0.151] [0.247] [0.379] [0.753] [0.881]
High CFT (>=285) 1.185 0.462 0.929 0.570 1.358 1.949* 0.263 
[0.242] [0.263] [0.505] [0.336] [0.755] [0.778]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 1.018 1.292 0.776 1.211 1.277 0.858 0.892 
[0.191] [0.584] [0.333] [0.586] [0.513] [0.411]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 1.092 3.276*** 1.135 1.166 0.606 0.611 0.049** 
[0.183] [1.444] [0.415] [0.481] [0.246] [0.264]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.472* 1.664 0.923 5.477** 2.217 0.934 0.250 
[0.320] [0.888] [0.427] [4.217] [1.208] [0.430]
Bronze Star 0.857 0.198** 0.905 1.193 0.797 1.044 0.391 
[0.191] [0.158] [0.441] [0.609] [0.366] [0.581]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.225 0.809 0.529 2.044 0.799 2.758* 0.251 
[0.333] [0.693] [0.360] [1.207] [0.552] [1.517]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 561 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to Strung Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.259*** 1.397*** 1.224*** 1.470*** 1.148** 1.346*** 0.025** 
[0.032] [0.085] [0.067] [0.102] [0.066] [0.089]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.255*** 1.160*** 1.281*** 1.421*** 1.340*** 1.215*** 0.165 
[0.032] [0.065] [0.077] [0.097] [0.079] [0.073]
Rank O4 2.349*** 3.021*** 1.982** 2.092** 2.716*** 2.982*** 0.770 
[0.307] [0.897] [0.583] [0.717] [0.819] [1.008]
Combat Service Support PMOS 0.365*** 0.281*** 0.429** 0.224*** 0.367*** 0.362** 0.860 
[0.063] [0.120] [0.163] [0.100] [0.137] [0.157]
Aviation PMOS 2.093*** 1.932* 5.447*** 1.271 1.871* 2.345** 0.114 
[0.352] [0.749] [2.224] [0.520] [0.696] [1.015]
Time In Service 1.016 0.992 0.988 1.003 1.018 1.030 0.955 
[0.020] [0.046] [0.043] [0.054] [0.043] [0.045]
Female 0.654 1.368 0.451 0.508 0.954 0.610 0.903 
[0.265] [1.233] [0.536] [0.625] [0.778] [0.515]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.743 1.670 1.677 0.245** 0.516* 0.459* 0.017** 
[0.138] [0.652] [0.708] [0.152] [0.207] [0.214]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.992 0.877 1.024 0.972 0.781 1.182 0.872 
[0.120] [0.246] [0.285] [0.292] [0.212] [0.358]
STEM Degrees 1.161 1.226 0.501* 1.980* 1.565 1.233 0.128 
[0.180] [0.397] [0.199] [0.797] [0.575] [0.450]
Number of Deployments 1.078*** 1.161*** 0.997 0.994 1.159*** 1.096 0.062* 
[0.025] [0.061] [0.060] [0.064] [0.060] [0.071]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.550** 0.817 0.659 0.759 0.452 0.219* 0.539 
[0.144] [0.417] [0.522] [0.482] [0.232] [0.183]
High PFT (>=285) 1.148 1.026 1.454 1.010 1.639 1.087 0.741 
[0.164] [0.359] [0.484] [0.359] [0.505] [0.381]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.616** 0.857 0.496 0.320 1.053 0.166** 0.320 
[0.149] [0.416] [0.328] [0.310] [0.489] [0.132]
High CFT (>=285) 1.333* 2.070 3.887** 1.645 0.440** 0.927 0.022** 
[0.214] [0.962] [2.218] [0.903] [0.179] [0.283]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.951 0.736 1.855* 1.328 0.644 0.589 0.069* 
[0.144] [0.255] [0.616] [0.520] [0.228] [0.241]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 0.760** 0.485** 0.797 0.779 0.797 0.944 0.683 
[0.102] [0.153] [0.235] [0.262] [0.244] [0.314]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.453*** 0.998 5.441*** 0.595 1.797* 1.382 0.000*** 
[0.207] [0.306] [2.247] [0.203] [0.609] [0.484]
Bronze Star 1.905*** 1.471 2.191** 2.113** 2.757*** 1.508 0.656 
[0.293] [0.534] [0.775] [0.805] [0.895] [0.645]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.929*** 0.672 2.373* 1.575 2.565** 2.546* 0.481 
[0.393] [0.406] [1.054] [0.884] [1.099] [1.257]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 561 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to PMOS-OPFOR Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.048 1.113 1.103 0.921 1.016 1.010 0.861 
[0.056] [0.158] [0.146] [0.114] [0.169] [0.115]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.194*** 1.437** 1.041 1.277* 1.076 1.238* 0.201 
[0.064] [0.210] [0.142] [0.169] [0.180] [0.141]
Rank O4 1.088 0.349 1.160 2.152 3.462 0.818 0.317 
[0.321] [0.274] [0.846] [1.676] [3.095] [0.513]
Combat Service Support PMOS 1.610 3.902 0.552 4.267 0.424 3.061 0.178 
[0.601] [3.857] [0.425] [4.071] [0.492] [2.780]
Aviation PMOS 2.162* 5.517 0.544 5.065 0.872 5.667* 0.205 
[0.893] [6.133] [0.514] [5.148] [1.113] [5.378]
Time In Service 1.061 1.115 1.036 1.010 1.018 1.115 0.885 
[0.040] [0.118] [0.099] [0.105] [0.096] [0.077]
Female 2.374* 3.168 3.817 27.14*** 1.263 0.024** 
[1.215] [4.696] [5.006] [32.439] [1.432]
Race Other (Non-White) 1.128 1.459 0.383 9.185** 0.828 0.114 
[0.388] [1.312] [0.426] [8.220] [0.542]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.597* 4.767 0.123*** 0.405 0.296 0.760 0.012** 
[0.160] [4.587] [0.100] [0.253] [0.253] [0.438]
STEM Degrees 0.646 1.698 0.460 0.413 0.431 0.597 
[0.268] [1.336] [0.515] [0.451] [0.357]
Number of Deployments 1.111*** 1.179* 1.127 1.031 1.310*** 1.125 0.244 
[0.043] [0.113] [0.148] [0.118] [0.135] [0.118]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.572 2.743 1.831 0.597 
[0.311] [2.882] [1.582]
High PFT (>=285) 0.957 1.012 0.830 0.548 1.891 0.901 0.897 
[0.326] [0.910] [0.723] [0.455] [1.663] [0.654]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 1.057 16.64*** 1.168 6.543* 0.466 0.001*** 
[0.473] [17.484] [1.454] [7.201] [0.690]
High CFT (>=285) 0.963 17.04* 0.781 1.491 0.572 0.914 0.194 
[0.316] [25.296] [0.726] [1.597] [0.741] [0.535]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 0.342** 0.220 0.553 0.295 0.366 0.031** 
[0.154] [0.278] [0.513] [0.332] [0.313]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 1.043 0.632 1.668 0.422 3.136 0.898 0.476 
[0.307] [0.469] [1.177] [0.348] [2.465] [0.579]
Meritorious Service Medal 2.887** 1.733 1.101 2.273 7.328* 0.365 
[1.236] [1.639] [0.804] [2.773] [8.145]
Bronze Star 1.342 2.489 0.160 2.563 2.473 1.238 0.054* 
[0.463] [2.046] [0.185] [1.923] [2.437] [1.091]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 0.934 1.123 0.675 2.700 1.681 0.832 
[0.455] [1.379] [0.762] [2.484] [2.121]
Constant 0*** 0*** 1.35e-07 9.01e-10 1.55e-07 0**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 472 385 513 362 419
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to PMOS-SPTEST Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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Table 36. Slating to Strung-OPFOR Command (by FY) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RS Cumulative) 1.161*** 1.396*** 1.131 1.085 1.323*** 1.033 0.171 
[0.045] [0.141] [0.097] [0.106] [0.132] [0.102]
Major (RS Cumulative) 1.252*** 1.292** 1.252** 1.306** 1.263** 1.332*** 0.993 
[0.053] [0.134] [0.131] [0.142] [0.125] [0.145]
Rank O4 0.995 0.642 1.976 0.790 0.891 1.005 0.603 
[0.225] [0.372] [0.996] [0.504] [0.452] [0.574]
Combat Service Support PMOS 2.820*** 1.718 3.514* 4.270** 2.995* 3.104* 0.947 
[0.794] [1.351] [2.273] [3.150] [1.831] [2.049]
Aviation PMOS 0.396** 0.313 0.360 0.840 0.230 0.340 0.943 
[0.169] [0.332] [0.362] [0.856] [0.216] [0.341]
Time In Service 0.958 0.922 1.000 0.917 0.913 1.056 0.530 
[0.031] [0.085] [0.077] [0.081] [0.071] [0.072]
Female 0.977 1.756 2.726 0.667 0.555 0.628 
[0.430] [1.558] [2.443] [0.760] [0.642]
Race Other (Non-White) 0.631 0.599 0.153 1.468 0.292 1.119 0.181 
[0.193] [0.511] [0.176] [0.954] [0.229] [0.684]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.654** 1.147 0.624 0.453 0.551 0.664 0.806 
[0.136] [0.634] [0.292] [0.236] [0.265] [0.346]
STEM Degrees 0.448** 0.614 0.271 0.563 1.085 0.631 
[0.182] [0.497] [0.295] [0.477] [0.870]
Number of Deployments 1.115*** 0.988 1.205*** 1.202** 1.125 1.225** 0.045** 
[0.036] [0.080] [0.079] [0.099] [0.083] [0.114]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.348** 0.579 0.897 0.821 0.155* 0.495 
[0.170] [0.527] [1.006] [0.905] [0.172]
High PFT (>=285) 1.177 2.872 1.817 1.028 0.791 0.632 0.458 
[0.283] [1.846] [0.961] [0.688] [0.449] [0.357]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 1.186 0.177 1.111 1.505 3.173* 0.235 
[0.448] [0.219] [1.083] [1.141] [2.160]
High CFT (>=285) 1.235 0.297* 3.205 0.396 0.979 2.725* 0.075* 
[0.338] [0.208] [2.928] [0.286] [0.689] [1.514]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 1.026 0.647 1.256 0.926 1.270 1.513 0.929 
[0.264] [0.413] [0.743] [0.681] [0.683] [0.934]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 1.136 2.955* 0.780 0.860 0.734 1.602 0.435 
[0.254] [1.669] [0.402] [0.504] [0.407] [0.849]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.197 0.969 0.819 5.345 1.980 0.623 0.609 
[0.366] [0.706] [0.560] [6.117] [1.598] [0.416]
Bronze Star 0.705 0.205* 0.470 0.988 1.186 0.569 0.566 
[0.200] [0.184] [0.355] [0.666] [0.664] [0.404]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.377 2.004 0.516 4.126* 0.693 1.841 0.418 
[0.447] [1.766] [0.462] [3.000] [0.598] [1.385]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 646 546 500 560 379
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to Strung-OPFOR Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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Table 37. Slating to Strung-SPTEST Command (by FY) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTAL FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 P-VALUE
Captain (RV Point Increase) 1.143*** 1.094 1.311*** 1.076 1.141 1.163 0.476 
[0.049] [0.140] [0.126] [0.123] [0.112] [0.118]
Major (RV Point Increase) 1.224*** 1.512*** 1.171* 1.026 1.430*** 1.299** 0.045** 
[0.055] [0.204] [0.112] [0.113] [0.149] [0.147]
Rank O4 0.694 2.193 0.513 1.262 0.457 0.420 0.555 
[0.169] [1.543] [0.277] [0.865] [0.244] [0.252]
Combat Service Support PMOS 4.203*** 4.147e+06 4.024* 2.324 2.880 25.75** 0.456 
[1.769] [8.997e+09] [3.095] [2.209] [2.432] [34.629]
Aviation PMOS 5.635*** 1.900e+07 4.972* 4.033 3.167 36.57*** 0.485 
[2.495] [4.122e+10] [4.272] [3.982] [2.819] [50.170]
Time In Service 0.906** 0.907 0.879 1.079 0.806** 0.860 0.018** 
[0.035] [0.106] [0.072] [0.092] [0.082] [0.096]
Female 2.261** 3.938 1.837 3.573 1.798 4.260* 0.843 
[0.855] [4.066] [2.301] [3.500] [1.572] [3.498]
Race Other (Non-White) 1.450 13.71*** 2.784* 0.350 0.967 0.809 0.271 
[0.403] [11.238] [1.694] [0.387] [0.605] [0.574]
Assigned to Supporting Establishment Unit 0.569*** 1.459 0.246*** 0.319** 1.123 0.733 0.127 
[0.124] [1.046] [0.126] [0.182] [0.546] [0.394]
STEM Degrees 0.882 1.014 1.612 0.450 1.419 0.449 0.562 
[0.260] [0.785] [0.938] [0.487] [0.919] [0.371]
Number of Deployments 0.999 0.996 0.970 0.890 1.056 1.136 0.478 
[0.043] [0.107] [0.091] [0.134] [0.088] [0.125]
PFT Other (Not 1st Class) 1.243 4.738 2.747 0.853 1.555 0.738 
[0.481] [4.696] [2.449] [0.719] [1.478]
High PFT (>=285) 1.646** 3.025 3.702** 3.051* 1.176 0.845 0.235 
[0.409] [2.179] [2.167] [1.840] [0.625] [0.605]
CFT Other (Not 1st Class) 0.405* 1.112 0.534 0.395 0.528 
[0.222] [1.610] [0.651] [0.403]
High CFT (>=285) 1.084 1.423 0.408 1.033 1.449 1.547 0.484 
[0.310] [1.222] [0.270] [1.086] [1.177] [0.918]
Rifle Other (Not Expert) 1.005 3.528* 0.475 1.610 1.138 0.464 0.478 
[0.259] [2.381] [0.303] [1.073] [0.632] [0.392]
Pistol Other (Not Expert) 1.049 3.981* 1.193 1.590 0.610 0.0908** 0.136 
[0.249] [2.838] [0.615] [0.933] [0.342] [0.100]
Meritorious Service Medal 1.692* 3.065 0.999 6.918* 2.153 1.072 0.345 
[0.493] [2.439] [0.605] [7.602] [1.529] [0.668]
Bronze Star 1.104 0.173 1.498 1.307 0.433 3.100 0.300 
[0.365] [0.298] [0.944] [1.015] [0.348] [2.680]
Recruiting Service Ribbon 1.000 0.567 0.706 0.832 5.275** 0.308 
[0.450] [0.622] [0.810] [0.932] [4.181]
Constant 0*** 0*** 0*** 8.27e-08 0*** 0***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 2,838 599 490 513 560 525
Standard errors Eform in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Odds of Being Slated to Strung-SPTEST Command (by FY)
Using RS Cumulative averages of all FitReps at the rank of Captain and the rank of Major.  All enlisted, WO, CWO, 2ndLt, 1stLt, 
LtCol, and Col FitReps were removed from the observations. Base category is those officers who were screened at the time of their 
respective board having the following characteristics: LtCol, Ground Combat Arms PMOS, Male, White, Assigned to OPFOR unit, no 
STEM Degree, no deployments, 1st Class PFT, 1st Class CFT, Rifle Expert, and Pistol Expert. 
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